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Event Notification Report for September 8, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/04/2015 - 09/08/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51120 51277 51352 51354 51356 51357 51358 51359 51369 51371 51374 51375

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51120
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.

"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.

"2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (HAAG).


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10088142"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).


* * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved.

"CR 10108999."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Nease).


* * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10113740, CR 10113745"

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).


* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104.

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.

"3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Rose).

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GUY GRIFFIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1815 EDT ON 09/04/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building and Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in Fire Area's where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Torus Suction Valve, 1E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 1 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable required for Torus Suction Valve, 2E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024.

"3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. The fire impacts a cable required for MCC 1C, 1R23-S003 to remain energized. This MCC supports the operation of Air Handling Unit B, 1Z41-B003B which is required in support of Main Control Room HVAC. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0031 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. These AHUs are required in support of MCR HVAC. MCR HVAC was not required in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, and thus these failures were not evaluated in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0031.

"5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for Station Battery Chargers 2A (2R42-S026) 2B (2R42-S027) and 2C (2R42-S028) to remain energized. These chargers support 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016), which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014.

"6) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016) to remain energized. This is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014.

"7) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact cables required for Station Battery Chargers 1D (1R42-S029), 1E (1R42-S030), and 1F (1R42-S031) to remain energized. These chargers support 125VDC Switchgear 1B (1R22-S017) which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 2 Safe Shutdown. Path 1 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10118312, CR 10118328, CR10118333, CR10118338, CR10118345"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Seymour)

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Agreement State Event Number: 51277
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NEA BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: JONESBORO State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0504-0212
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE E. MACK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/30/2015
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Category 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT DELIVERED TO WRONG ADDRESS

The following information was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"The Arkansas Radiation Control Program is making this immediate notification under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) and Arkansas Regulations RH-1501.c.1.A.

"On July 30, 2015, at 1349 [CDT], NEA Baptist Memorial Hospital, in Jonesboro, Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0504-02120, reported that an Iridium-192 sealed source, approximately 10 Curies had been delivered to the wrong address. The source was in an unsecured location for approximately 23.5 hours. The source had been delivered by [common carrier] at 0900 [CDT] on July 29, 2015, to a clinic of a similar name as the hospital but at the wrong address. The source was delivered to the therapy department through the Hospital's receiving department this morning at 0830 [CDT].

"This concludes the available information at this time. The Licensee is investigating this event. The Arkansas Radiation Control Program continues to investigate this event under Arkansas Event Number AR-2015-010."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STEVE MACK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1458 ON 09/04/2015 * * *

The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email:

"The Program [Arkansas Radiation Control Program] received a written report from the licensee on September 3, 2015, outlining actions taken to inform staff should a package containing radioactive material be delivered to the wrong area. These actions included: reviewing procedures, photos of packages containing radioactive material and retraining on the receipt procedures. The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event to be closed."

Notified R4DO (Warnick) and NMSS Events Notifications group via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51352
Rep Org: OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Licensee: OAKWOOD HOSIPITAL
Region: 3
City: DEARBORN State: MI
County:
License #: 21-04515-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TALJIT SANDHU
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/27/2015
Notification Time: 13:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2015
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST I-125 SEED

"Late on 8/25/15, the [Chief Physicist] was informed that the I-125 seed count in storage does not reconcile with the Written Directives and the pathology log. The storage vial is one seed short. Instead of 30 seeds, there are only 29 seeds. Also there is a non-radioactive marker/clip in the storage container along with 29 Iodine-125 seeds. All seeds are of nominal activity of 0.3 mCi. The lead container housing the sources was brought down to Radiation Oncology source storage room on 8/26/2015.

"So far our findings are as follows:
Radiation survey of the pathology lab was performed by the pathology lab supervisor. Survey revealed no presence of radioactivity. Radiation survey of the stored tissue specimens for these cases revealed no radioactivity. [Licensee staff] reviewed the radiographs of each tissue specimen and the count was 30 seeds. It would seem that the pathology assistant mistook the marker/clip to be an iodine seed and put it in storage container and the actual seed somehow got discarded as hazardous waste, in spite of the documented procedure to survey everything which comes in contact with specimen to be surveyed with Geiger counter. By reviewing the radiographs of each specimen we have ruled out the possibility that a source was left in the patient. On 8/26/2015, another independent radiation survey of the Pathology Lab was performed by Nuclear Medicine using a scintillation detector and once again no seed was found."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51354
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TEXAS A & M ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
Region: 4
City: COLLEGE STATION State: TX
County:
License #: L-00448
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/27/2015
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2015
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - COBALT-57 SOURCE LOST DURING SHIPMENT

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On August 27, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that a 100 milliCurie cobalt-57 source had been ordered by one of its investigators and shipped to the proper address for the licensee, but the source had not been received. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) reported that the investigator had checked around noon on the status of the order with the radiation safety office. The radiation safety staff learned that the investigator had ordered it without following procedure and going through their office, so they had not been aware that the source was supposed to be coming. The RSO reported that upon checking with the common carrier handling the package, the carrier showed the package had been delivered on August 21, 2015, 'in College Station' (no other information documented by the driver), and the carrier provided the name of the person who signed for receipt. The carrier opened an investigation. The RSO contacted the company from whom the source was purchased and verified the shipping address was correct. A search was conducted of the building it should have been delivered to, staff was questioned if they had seen/received it or knew the person who signed for it, and the RSO searched staff and student directories and checked through the university's police department for the signer's name with negative results. At approximately 1630 [CDT], the RSO made the determination the package was missing and reported to the Agency. The RSO stated that a team will begin canvasing other buildings in the morning and efforts will continue to locate the package and identify the signer. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9335

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51356
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: ESTEE LAUDER, INC.
Region: 1
City: MELVILLE State: NY
County:
License #: G01540
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SOUCIE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/28/2015
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GENERALLY LICENSED SOURCE MISSING, LATER RECOVERED

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On 12/12/14, the Department of Health (DOH) became aware of this incident. A liquid scintillation counter [LSC] (25 years old and containing 10 microCuries of Radium 226) had been stored for three years. It could not be located on 12/12/14. An attorney in Estee Lauder's legal department was asked to contact the DOH to report that the LSC could not be located.

"DOH received a phone call from Estee Lauder's legal department to say that they had found where the missing LSC was shipped. Keith Machinery Corporation had purchased the LSC and then sold it.

"On 6/15/15, a letter was sent to Estee Lauder [from DOH] requesting a copy of the Keith Machinery Corporation Equipment Trade-In Credit Memo.

"On 6/17/15, DOH received a letter from Estee Lauder's RSO which had an attachment from Keith Machinery Corporation stating that they had received the Perkin Elmer LSC, Model 1217 Rackbeta. Keith Machinery Corporation stated by phone, on 6/29/15, that the LSC was to be shipped to Romania and he will send DOH a confirmatory letter that it was received in Romania if he can. If not, he will send a letter that it was shipped to Romania.

"On 8/18/15, [DOH was notified that] Keith Machinery Corporation had located the Perkin Elmer LSC, Model 1217 Rackbeta, which was awaiting shipment to Romania. Items are not shipped immediately and individually to places like Romania, but are accumulated until a large shipment is acquired, which is more efficient and cost effective. Keith Machinery Corporation was able to locate the LSC and return it to Estee Lauder. Estee Lauder shipped it to Radiac Research Corporation for disposal on 7/28/15. DOH received a copy of Radiac Research Corporation receipt. The Estee Lauder General License Registration can now be terminated according to their request."

NY State Event Report ID No.: NY-15-07

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51357
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: ACADIAN MEDICAL CENTER, LLC
Region: 4
City: EUNICE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-0452-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/28/2015
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2015
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CS-137 CALIBRATOR CHECK SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the State of Louisiana via email:

"Event date and time: On August 27, 2015, [a licensee employee] reported a lost QC/QA check source utilized to perform the daily constancy on the dose calibrator. He did the daily test at approximately 6:00 a.m. [CDT] with the source. He noticed the source was missing at approximately 1130. His administrator and he used survey meters and searched every possible place where the source could be, but have not located the missing source. [He] reported the source missing to LADEQ Radiation Assessment at 1538 on August 27, 2015.

"The source is an Atomic Labs 102 microCurie Cs-137 check source. The model number given was #11010170 and the serial number was 356013-0001. The source was last leak tested on April 29, 2015, with no leakage detected.

"This site is a medical institution. The source was kept in a locked hot lab in the Nuclear Medicine Department. They surveyed the Nuclear Medicine Dept., the Radiology Department and the waste disposal location. KLS Physics Consultants was called in to help with the search and the reporting requirements.

"Event Location: Ville Platte Medical Center/dba Acadian Medical Center, 3501 Hwy 190, Eunice, LA 70535. The last known location within the facility was during the daily dose calibrator constancy check."

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-150014, T165187

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51358
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: JARDEN ZINC PRODUCTS
Region: 1
City: GREENVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-30012-L23
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CROSSLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2015
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK CLOSED

The following was received via e-mail:

"The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health was notified on August 19, 2015 of an inoperable fixed nuclear gauge at the Jarden Zinc facility in Greeneville, TN. The gauge shutter was stuck in the closed position due to a defective solenoid in the gauge. The gauge was a LFE Model SS3A containing a 1 curie Americium 241 source."

Tennessee Event: TN-15-126

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 51359
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES, INC.
Region: 4
City: BLANDING State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1900479
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RYAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/31/2015
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2015
Event Time: 15:50 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOW LEVEL ALPHA RADIATION ON A SHIPPING CONTAINER

The following information was received via e-mail:

"On 8/21/2015 at 1550 [MDT] an incident involving radioactive material was reported to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's 24 hr. hotline. The caller reported low level alpha radiation activity on an empty shipping container and roll-off box that exceeds DOT standards. The container arrived at their facility the morning of 8/21/2015 from a Utah (NRC Agreement State) regulated facility near Blanding. It was the belief of the caller that it is very unlikely there was any dosage to humans or the environment.

"The container was shipped from Blanding, Utah to Douglas, Wyoming through Grand Junction. The caller has notified the NRC [National Response Center], Incident #1126333. They have also contacted Colorado and Wyoming DOT."

Utah Event: UT15-0003

* * * UPDATE AT 1825 EDT ON 9/1/2015 FROM RYAN JOHNSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The source of the alpha radiation was natural uranium. The container was decontaminated.

A radiation survey of the container was conducted before decontamination with the following results:
Direct alpha readings of 2437, 7616, and 6092 dpm per 100 square cm
Removable alpha readings of 191, 200, and 786 dpm per 100 square cm. These results are below the DOT 49CFR173.443(a) reporting requirements

Notified the R4DO (Warnick) and NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail).

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY RYAN JOHNSON TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1514 EDT ON 09/03/2015 * * *

The following information was received from the State of Utah via email:

"After further investigation into this incident, the DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] has concluded that the reported incident was in error and that DOT standards were not exceeded. The DOT alpha contamination limits found in 49 CFR 173.443(a) are for removable (non-fixed) contamination. The incident was reported on an incoming survey results for direct alpha measurements and not on removable alpha measurements. The removable alpha measurements from the same incoming survey were below the DOT alpha contamination limits. Therefore, the State of Utah is requesting to retract this incident (EN#51359)."

Notified R4DO (Warnick) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "NOT RECORDED" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51369
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 09:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS DUE TO MSIV CLOSURE

"On September 4, 2015, at 0916 [EDT], Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve [MSIV] closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."

"The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System.

"2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033.

"3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit.

"4. Containment Isolation actuation.

"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect."

The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electrometric Relief Valve (ERV).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51371
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LAUREN SYKORA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO BOTH AIRLOCK DOORS BEING OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

"At 0810 [CDT] on September 4, 2015, two Secondary Containment doors in one access opening, were opened simultaneously. The interlock mechanism preventing both doors from operating simultaneously at the Unit 2 570 foot elevation Turbine to Reactor Building interlock did not operate as expected.

"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained within specification. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51374
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LAUREN SYKORA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/05/2015
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2015
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 80 Power Operation 80 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF VACUUM FROM OPEN INSPECTION HATCH

"At 1010 [CDT] on September 5, 2015, Reactor Building differential pressure did not meet the required 0.25 inches of vacuum due to an open inspection hatch. At 1018 [CDT], an inspection hatch was found to have fallen open and [was] subsequently closed [manually] on the Reactor Building exhaust fan damper access hatch. The damper is outside of the Reactor Building secondary containment isolation boundary. Following closure of the hatch, Reactor Building differential pressure returned to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge.

"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)c as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51375
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JASON WILLIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/07/2015
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2015
Event Time: 09:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

"This report is made due to notification from Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a bypass of the sewage treatment plant at the plant property. The notification was approved at 0925 [EDT] and completed at 0940 [EDT] hours on 09/07/15.

"The sewage treatment plant operator reported excessive influent which led to an unanticipated bypass of the sewage treatment plant. The influent was returned to normal values by isolating the domestic water filter backwash line. No bypass leakage is occurring at this time."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, September 08, 2015
Tuesday, September 08, 2015