Event Notification Report for September 04, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/03/2015 - 09/04/2015
EVENT NUMBERS
51373513715137851369
Agreement State
Event Number: 51373
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PREMIER NDT
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: CO 1162-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: PREMIER NDT
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: CO 1162-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 22:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
GREG WARNICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN DRIVE CABLE ON RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was provided by the State of Colorado via email:
"A radiography source stuck outside the shielded position on Friday, September 4, 2015 [at a temporary job site near Rangely, CO]. The source did not return to the shielded position after an exposure and was quickly discovered by the radiographer. Neither the radiographer nor assistant approached the source. [Both individuals] set up a 2 mR/hr boundary and ensured no person entered the area; then called the RSO for support at approximately 1400 MDT. The RSO arrived on scene and notified the State around 1700 MDT. The licensee is authorized for retrieval and verbally verified all necessary emergency equipment was available and there were no elevated exposures suspected at the time. The licensee began retrieval and contacted the State at 2000 MDT to verify the source was successfully returned to the shielded position. A full report on the cause and recovery efforts to follow.
"Cause and corrective action: broken drive cable, corrected by replacing drive cable and returning [source] to the shielded position.
"Camera/device information: QSA Global Delta 880; SN D8543
Source information: QSA Global A424-9; SN 20273G; current activity 97.7 Ci
assayed 8/26/2015 - 106.3 Ci - leak tested by manufacturer at that time
"Doses from pocket dosimeters: RSO - 110 mRem; Radiographer - 21 mRem; assistant - 4 mRem (this was the total from previous exposures during the day, he did not assist with retrieval but was tasked with maintaining surveillance of the boundaries)"
Incident identification: CO15-I15-24
The following information was provided by the State of Colorado via email:
"A radiography source stuck outside the shielded position on Friday, September 4, 2015 [at a temporary job site near Rangely, CO]. The source did not return to the shielded position after an exposure and was quickly discovered by the radiographer. Neither the radiographer nor assistant approached the source. [Both individuals] set up a 2 mR/hr boundary and ensured no person entered the area; then called the RSO for support at approximately 1400 MDT. The RSO arrived on scene and notified the State around 1700 MDT. The licensee is authorized for retrieval and verbally verified all necessary emergency equipment was available and there were no elevated exposures suspected at the time. The licensee began retrieval and contacted the State at 2000 MDT to verify the source was successfully returned to the shielded position. A full report on the cause and recovery efforts to follow.
"Cause and corrective action: broken drive cable, corrected by replacing drive cable and returning [source] to the shielded position.
"Camera/device information: QSA Global Delta 880; SN D8543
Source information: QSA Global A424-9; SN 20273G; current activity 97.7 Ci
assayed 8/26/2015 - 106.3 Ci - leak tested by manufacturer at that time
"Doses from pocket dosimeters: RSO - 110 mRem; Radiographer - 21 mRem; assistant - 4 mRem (this was the total from previous exposures during the day, he did not assist with retrieval but was tasked with maintaining surveillance of the boundaries)"
Incident identification: CO15-I15-24
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51371
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LAUREN SYKORA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LAUREN SYKORA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 08:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO BOTH AIRLOCK DOORS BEING OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
"At 0810 [CDT] on September 4, 2015, two Secondary Containment doors in one access opening, were opened simultaneously. The interlock mechanism preventing both doors from operating simultaneously at the Unit 2 570 foot elevation Turbine to Reactor Building interlock did not operate as expected.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained within specification. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0810 [CDT] on September 4, 2015, two Secondary Containment doors in one access opening, were opened simultaneously. The interlock mechanism preventing both doors from operating simultaneously at the Unit 2 570 foot elevation Turbine to Reactor Building interlock did not operate as expected.
"This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2. As a result, entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 condition A was made due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained within specification. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 51378
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/08/2015
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 14:45 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2015
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 14:45 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE DENSITY GUAGE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"The RSO of the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), called [the State of Utah, Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] to report an incident involving one of their thin lift, Troxler 4640 gauges containing a 9 mCi Cs-137 source. The incident occurred at about 1400 MDT on Friday, September 4, 2015, at a construction site on eastbound I-215 at Redwood Road. A survey vehicle entered the construction zone at freeway speeds and ran over the gauge while the operator was making a measurement. The gauge was 'destroyed,' but the sealed source remained intact. However, the gauge's shielding for the source was demolished.
"The licensee performed surveys of the accident site and of the vehicle involved. No contamination was found. The licensee transported the damaged gauge and source back to the licensee's gauge storage room. The licensee has ordered a replacement base for the gauge to provide shielding for the source so that the source can be safely shipped back to the gauge manufacturer.
"The licensee has a report from the gauge operator, reports from eyewitnesses to the incident, and a report from the Highway Patrol. It will take the licensee about a week to compile all of the information into a written report to send to the Division [of Waste Management and Radiation Control]."
Utah Event Report ID No.: UT150004
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PHILIP GRIFFIN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1347 EDT ON 09/14/2015 * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Utah via email:
The event took place at 1445 MDT on September 4, 2015 versus 1400 initially reported. The gauge contains 8 mCi Cs-137 versus the 9 mCi that was originally reported and the gauge serial number is 65867. A black 4 door car entered the construction zone and ran over the gauge followed by two other vehicles. The manufactured is sending an appropriate shipping container for the licensee to use when returning the source to the manufacturer.
"The licensee is authorized to remove portable gauge source rods from their gauges to perform non-routine maintenance on their gauges. Because of this, the licensee has a source rod shield that will be used (per the manufacturer's instructions) to shield the source rod taken from the damaged gauge during transport to the manufacturer."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
The following information was received via facsimile:
"The RSO of the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), called [the State of Utah, Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] to report an incident involving one of their thin lift, Troxler 4640 gauges containing a 9 mCi Cs-137 source. The incident occurred at about 1400 MDT on Friday, September 4, 2015, at a construction site on eastbound I-215 at Redwood Road. A survey vehicle entered the construction zone at freeway speeds and ran over the gauge while the operator was making a measurement. The gauge was 'destroyed,' but the sealed source remained intact. However, the gauge's shielding for the source was demolished.
"The licensee performed surveys of the accident site and of the vehicle involved. No contamination was found. The licensee transported the damaged gauge and source back to the licensee's gauge storage room. The licensee has ordered a replacement base for the gauge to provide shielding for the source so that the source can be safely shipped back to the gauge manufacturer.
"The licensee has a report from the gauge operator, reports from eyewitnesses to the incident, and a report from the Highway Patrol. It will take the licensee about a week to compile all of the information into a written report to send to the Division [of Waste Management and Radiation Control]."
Utah Event Report ID No.: UT150004
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PHILIP GRIFFIN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1347 EDT ON 09/14/2015 * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Utah via email:
The event took place at 1445 MDT on September 4, 2015 versus 1400 initially reported. The gauge contains 8 mCi Cs-137 versus the 9 mCi that was originally reported and the gauge serial number is 65867. A black 4 door car entered the construction zone and ran over the gauge followed by two other vehicles. The manufactured is sending an appropriate shipping container for the licensee to use when returning the source to the manufacturer.
"The licensee is authorized to remove portable gauge source rods from their gauges to perform non-routine maintenance on their gauges. Because of this, the licensee has a source rod shield that will be used (per the manufacturer's instructions) to shield the source rod taken from the damaged gauge during transport to the manufacturer."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51369
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 09:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 09:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS DUE TO MSIV CLOSURE
"On September 4, 2015, at 0916 [EDT], Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve [MSIV] closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."
"The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System.
"2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033.
"3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit.
"4. Containment Isolation actuation.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect."
The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.
"On September 4, 2015, at 0916 [EDT], Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve [MSIV] closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."
"The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System.
"2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033.
"3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit.
"4. Containment Isolation actuation.
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect."
The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.