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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/10/2015 - 08/11/2015
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Part 21 |
Event Number: 51206 |
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON KLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION |
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI) |
Event Text
PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - NOTIFICATION OF PRESSURE SEAL VALVE YOKE MATERIAL COMPLIANCE
The following information was received via fax:
"This letter provides interim notification of Crane Nuclear's investigation into ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel [B&PV] Section Ill Code design Pressure Seal Valve orders for yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings. The information required for this notification is provided below:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Jason Klein
Sustaining Engineering Manager
Rosalie Nava
Director Safety and Quality
Crane Nuclear
860 Remington Blvd
Bolingbrook, IL 60440
"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect
This is an interim report. Crane Nuclear is currently investigating Pressure Seal Valve orders potentially having misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for Yokes with integral hub retaining ring designs. The material requirements are specified per Crane Procedure 03-107 which utilizes ASME B&PV Code Case N-62-7 as guidance for material classification.
"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Crane Nuclear
860 Remington Blvd
Bolingbrook, IL 60440
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, is guidance for appropriate material and NDE requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62-7. A yoke incorporating a threaded hub should be treated in the same manner as a threaded retaining ring requiring the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62-7). Yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings may have been processed to material requirements without required CNI Classification per Procedure 03-107.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
Crane Nuclear Engineering initiated investigation correspondence to Crane Nuclear Director of Safety and Quality via email correspondence dated Feb 20th, 2015.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
Crane has yet to determine the extent of Pressure Seal Valve designs sales order numbers (SO#) affected prior to 2001; the following Utility and Sites were supplied non-compliant CNI Procedure 03-107 Classification yokes for the following valve assemblies:
1. CNI SO# 24237-01, TVA, Browns Ferry, P.O. 00031943 - Quantity shipped = 1, Chapman, 8 [inch], Figure L953, Class 900, ASME Class 2, 95 Ed., 96 Add., no N stamp
2. CNI SO# 39501-01, Georgia Power, Hatch, P.O. SNG10016537 - Quantity shipped = 3, Crane, 3 [inch], Figure 776U, Class 600, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., W71 Add.
3. CNI SO# 39745-01, Southern California Edison, San Onofre, P .0. 4500456451 - Quantity Shipped = 1, Aloyco, 4 [inch], Figure N5247PSB, Class 900, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., S73 Add.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
Crane Nuclear has completed sales orders search of Pressure Seal Valve designs with integral retaining ring hubs from 2001 to present identifying a total of 25 orders where three orders are impacted, as identified in part iv of this report (see above). Crane Nuclear is currently investigating sales orders previous to 2001, which will require an additional 30 days to complete (estimated completion date, August 6th, 2015).
Corrective action by Crane Nuclear is to review documentation of supplied material to determine if yokes can be recertified as currently supplied. A revision to Crane Nuclear Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations, and clarify classifications with applicable training, is in-process.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
Crane Nuclear is notifying sites affected and are developing a plan to address the valve items.
"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
Not applicable.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940."
* * * UPDATE FROM JASON KLEIN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1802 EDT ON 8/10/15 * * *
The following excerpted information was received via fax:
"Crane Nuclear has completed the sales orders search of the ASME Section Ill Code Pressure Seal Valve designs with retaining rings from 1992 to present. Crane Nuclear identified a total of 112 orders that required review. Of these orders, two orders were supplied with non-compliant retaining ring material for the valve assemblies. The orders are as follows:
1. Walworth's Supplied Order #PP37653, Dominion, Millstone.
2. CNI SO# 32634-01, Dominion, Millstone.
"Corrective action being taken by Crane Nuclear is training held for engineers involved in classification of components, completed 8/10/15. Revise Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations and clarify classifications 8/24/15. Revise assembly drawings to correct item identification as pressure retaining material, recertify ASTM material as ASME, and provide corrected documentation 8/28/15.
"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940."
Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Masters), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Hagar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51281 |
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTIONS SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 4
City: BENTON State: AR
County:
License #: PA-1467
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID J. ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 07/31/2015
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INABILITY TO RETRACT A RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
"On July 31, 2015, the licensee reported a disconnected radiography source at a work site in New Milford Township, Pennsylvania. A secure and restricted area around the source has been established, limiting potential public radiation exposure to below the 2 millirem in any one hour 'unrestricted area' limit.
"Source: lridium-192 (lr-192)
"Activity: 68 curies
"The license has informed the Department [PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection] they will keep the source secure and shielded until the radiography device manufacturer arrives. They are expected be onsite at approximately 0300 [EDT] on August 1st. A full report is expected within 15 days. A Southeast Regional Office Radiation Protection staff radiological health physicist has already been onsite to perform a reactive inspection and validate the licensee's actions. More information will be provided as received.
"Event Report ID No.: PA150021" |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51284 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: RABA-KISTNER CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 01571
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 08/03/2015
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED HUMBOLDT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On August 3, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its technicians had run over and damaged a Humboldt 5001 EZ moisture/density gauge at a temporary job site in Belton, Texas. The gauge contained a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The technician had started the test and the cesium source was extended four inches into the ground. The technician decided to move his pickup and while doing so he backed over the gauge and then pulled forward over it again. The source rod handle broke completely off of the gauge. A boundary around the gauge was marked and the licensee's radiation safety officer called a licensed service company. The service company responded and reported that the source was inside the gauge and not down in the hole, that it had apparently been pulled back into the gauge when it was run over. The service technician performed surveys and found no contamination. No member of the public received any exposure as a result of this event. No elevated exposures are anticipated for the technicians. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtain in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9329 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51302 |
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/10/2015
Notification Time: 00:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2015
Event Time: 22:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING TESTING
"On August 9, 2015, during the performance of Reactor Protection System Logic Matrix Testing, a reactor trip occurred. All CEA's [control rods] fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat removal is from Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. All equipment operated as expected. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia, temperature maintaining at 532 degrees F.
"Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation."
The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safety or relief valves lifted during this event. The cause of the trip is under investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 |
Event Number: 51303 |
Rep Org: ATC-NUCLEAR
Licensee: MOORE INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 08/10/2015
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION |
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI) |
Event Text
PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT ON P/N 535-601 MOORE INDUSTRIES MILLIAMP MODULES
The following information is a summary that was excerpted from a facsimile received from ATC-Nuclear:
"The basic component which is the subject of this notification is identified as Moore Industries Milliamp Module with part number (P/N) 535-601 (alternate P/N: 535-601-SSTRV) which has been provided individually and/or contained within a STS 535 Single Loop Process Controller.
"On December 22, 2014, ATC Nuclear received a 535 controller from Detroit Edison (DTE) with a failed Milliamp Module (P/N 535-601). The customer requested ATC Nuclear to perform a failure analysis to determine the cause of no output (0 Ma) on output 2 of the 535 controller. ATC Nuclear initiated a failure analysis in January 2015 that was broken down into several stages to determine the cause of the Milliamp Module failure. ATC Nuclear is continuing to evaluate the cause of the Milliamp Module failure and has preliminarily identified workmanship issues with a surface-mount fuse that is installed in the Milliamp Modules. ATC Nuclear has provided the results of the analysis to Moore Industries and Littelfuse to support or refute the workmanship concerns.
"Preliminary information provided by Littelfuse on June 11, 2015, was sufficient evidence to identify the existence of a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard (i.e., discovery as defined in 10 CFR Part 21). This information was documented as part of CAR 15T-24. Evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 was not able to be completed within the 60 day evaluation period.
"The discovery date of the deviation requiring evaluation under 10 CFR Part 21 is June 11, 2015.
"ATC Nuclear has preliminarily identified a total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 that have been supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 2010. However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses (P/N 0448.100MR) installed. ATC Nuclear will continue to work with Moore Industries and Littlefuse to define the population of Milliamp
Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. This information will become available once our 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation is completed.
"ATC Nuclear is reviewing customer purchase orders for Milliamp Modules to identify the population of Milliamp Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. Additionally, ATC Nuclear is working with Moore Industries to purge its stock of potentially defective fuses. Additional time is needed to evaluate the condition of new surface-mount fuses and it is expected that this evaluation will be completed no later than October 9, 2015.
"Littlefuse identified a very low failure rate (< 0.001 %) in a preliminary report issued June 2015 spanning approximately an eighteen month period commencing January 2014. There were 356,250 fuses manufactured during this period. Littelfuse is conducting a more thorough review of this failure mechanism. There is no additional advice at this time."
For additional information, contact the following;
Ray Chalifoux
Vice President QA, ATC-Nuclear
777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830
(865) 384-0124 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51306 |
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: COREY HEDGERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 08/10/2015
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2015
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF A SINGLE EMERGENCY SIREN
"On August 10, 2015, at approximately 1555 CDT, the licensee was notified that emergency siren S-07 in Sherburne County, MN had inadvertently activated from approximately 1525-1538 CDT. The cause of the activation is under investigation. The siren vendor (NELCOM) was also contacted and made the notification to the licensee. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Sherburne County Sherriff's Office. The source of the activation signal has not been determined. The vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a failure of only 1 out of 106 total sirens. The site is operating normally with no emergency present.
"[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will notify the State. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51307 |
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SLABY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS |
Notification Date: 08/11/2015
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2015
Event Time: 23:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION
"At approximately 2332 EDT on August 10, 2015, the Ginna Control Room was notified of an inadvertent siren activation by the Monroe County Emergency Center. It is unclear at this time why the siren inadvertently activated. Company personnel are addressing the issue with the siren.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The siren activated for approximately 1 minute. The licensee will remove the siren from service until the cause of the inadvertent actuation can be corrected. The licensee has a sufficient number of sirens to allow this siren to be removed from service. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51308 |
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK COVEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/11/2015
Notification Time: 05:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2015
Event Time: 01:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AFTER AN OFFSITE ELECTRICAL FAULT
"Reactor trip caused by turbine trip. Turbine tripped immediately following the trip of one of four 345KV offsite lines. The reason for protective relaying not preventing the grid disturbance from tripping the turbine generator is not known at this time. All normal offsite and onsite power sources are available.
"Auxiliary Feedwater actuated as expected on low steam generator level following the trip from 100% power. All systems functioned as expected in response to the trip.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
An electrical fault on a 345 kV line 2 miles from the site caused the bus to strip and reclose, which cleared the fault. All control rods fully inserted and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. |
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