Event Notification Report for August 07, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/06/2015 - 08/07/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51300
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHURCHILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHURCHILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/07/2015
Notification Time: 19:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2015
Event Time: 13:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2015
Notification Time: 19:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2015
Event Time: 13:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE ON VENT LINE WELDED JOINT
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded Condition.
"At 1340 CDT on 8/7/15, on LaSalle Unit 2, a through-wall (welded joint) leak was identified on a 3/4 inch vent line off of the bonnet of the 2B33-F067B, 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve. This condition qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 0140 on 8/9/15. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gpm [leak rate is 0.2 gpm] and therefore, does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 3 - Hot Shutdown, heading into Cold Shutdown for a planned maintenance outage."
This event does not affect Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded Condition.
"At 1340 CDT on 8/7/15, on LaSalle Unit 2, a through-wall (welded joint) leak was identified on a 3/4 inch vent line off of the bonnet of the 2B33-F067B, 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve. This condition qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 0140 on 8/9/15. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gpm [leak rate is 0.2 gpm] and therefore, does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 3 - Hot Shutdown, heading into Cold Shutdown for a planned maintenance outage."
This event does not affect Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51451
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MICHAEL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MICHAEL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/05/2015
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2015
Event Time: 19:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2015
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2015
Event Time: 19:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTIVATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Unit 2, Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
"At 1919 EDT on August 7, 2015, during planned performance of a Unit 2 containment vent, the Train B CVI actuated due to an invalid Hi Rad signal from 2-RM-90-131, Containment Vent Radiation Monitor. In addition to the Train B CVI alarm, unexpected alarms were received for 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Radiation Monitor and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Radiation Monitor instrument malfunctions as they isolated for the CVI and 2-RM-90-131 Hi Rad alarm. Prior to the invalid Hi Rad alarm, all radiation monitors were stable at their normal values. All required automatic actuations occurred as designed. Upon investigation, the cause of the invalid Hi Rad alarm was due to an exposed shield wire at the 2-RM-90-131 detector. Preventative maintenance had been performed the week prior to the CVI and it is believed the damage occurred at that time.
"Control Room Operators performed Annunciator Response actions and verified by diverse indications that the subject condition was an invalid Hi Rad signal. There were no indications of degraded reactor coolant system parameters or fuel failure. Applicable Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) were entered and the radiation monitors declared inoperable. No Emergency Response criteria were applicable with the subject radiation monitors inoperable. Radiological surveys performed in the vicinity of 2-RM-90-131 verified no abnormal radiological conditions.
"Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-131 was removed from service, the shield wire was repaired and returned to service with no issues. Radiation Monitors 2-RM-90-106 and 2-RM-90-112 were tested and returned to service. The applicable TS LCOs were exited. At the time of the event, plant conditions for a Hi Rad alarm did not exist; therefore, the CVI was invalid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Unit 2, Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
"At 1919 EDT on August 7, 2015, during planned performance of a Unit 2 containment vent, the Train B CVI actuated due to an invalid Hi Rad signal from 2-RM-90-131, Containment Vent Radiation Monitor. In addition to the Train B CVI alarm, unexpected alarms were received for 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Radiation Monitor and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Radiation Monitor instrument malfunctions as they isolated for the CVI and 2-RM-90-131 Hi Rad alarm. Prior to the invalid Hi Rad alarm, all radiation monitors were stable at their normal values. All required automatic actuations occurred as designed. Upon investigation, the cause of the invalid Hi Rad alarm was due to an exposed shield wire at the 2-RM-90-131 detector. Preventative maintenance had been performed the week prior to the CVI and it is believed the damage occurred at that time.
"Control Room Operators performed Annunciator Response actions and verified by diverse indications that the subject condition was an invalid Hi Rad signal. There were no indications of degraded reactor coolant system parameters or fuel failure. Applicable Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) were entered and the radiation monitors declared inoperable. No Emergency Response criteria were applicable with the subject radiation monitors inoperable. Radiological surveys performed in the vicinity of 2-RM-90-131 verified no abnormal radiological conditions.
"Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-131 was removed from service, the shield wire was repaired and returned to service with no issues. Radiation Monitors 2-RM-90-106 and 2-RM-90-112 were tested and returned to service. The applicable TS LCOs were exited. At the time of the event, plant conditions for a Hi Rad alarm did not exist; therefore, the CVI was invalid.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."