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Event Notification Report for July 21, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/20/2015 - 07/21/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51220 51226 51227 51241 51242 51243

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51220
Rep Org: OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Licensee: OAKWOOD HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: DEARBORN State: MI
County:
License #: 21-04515-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TALJIT SANDHU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/10/2015
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

SEALED I-125 SOURCE DAMAGED DURING PATHOLOGY EXAMINATION

A breast implant of an I-125 seed had been performed followed by a lumpectomy. The lump with the implanted seed was sent to the pathology lab for analysis. During the analysis, the Pathology assistant cut through the I-125 seed. No contamination was noted on the counter top and a thyroid scan of the Pathology assistant was negative.

"1) The source was placed in the leaded container which would not allow any I-125 to escape and release any radioactivity any longer.

"2) There was no radioactive material left on the countertop which was further verified by a wipe test.

"3) A thyroid bioassay was performed on the Pathology assistant working on the specimen and the results were negative.

"4) On 7/9/15 a wipe test of the source revealed that the source integrity was compromised indicated by elevated counts on the wipe compared to the background (4900 dpm vs 120, indicating an activity of approximately 1.5 micro Curie). This indicates that surface of the solid source is contaminated.

"5) [The licensee] will also contact the vendor to find out if the source can be returned to them (since the source is in a sealed shielded container)."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51226
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ERWIN RESIN SOLUTIONS
Region: 1
City: ERWIN State: TN
County:
License #: TRML R-86011-
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SINGLETON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 07/13/2015
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2015
Event Time: 21:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
PATRICIAL MILLIGAN (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- POTENTIAL RAD WORKER OVEREXPOSURE

The following report was provided by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"At approximately 2105 [EDT] on the night of July 12th, using our local access control program (i.e., Canberra HIS20) and a DMC 3000 series electronic dosimeter, an Erwin Resin Solutions employee was exiting the Radiological Controlled Area when he received a message stating that he had exceeded his TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent] limit. According to the access control program, a dose of 10002.2 mrem was received. The employee was immediately removed from the area and follow up surveys were conducted. Surveys indicated that general area dose rates were 2-15 mr/hr and that the highest individual package dose rate was 45 mr/hr. The individual had been in the area for approximately 0.47 hours and he recalls at one point looking down at his dosimeter to see a display of 2.4 mrem. The employee's TLD has been pulled and sent off to Mirion for an emergency read, results are expected within 24-48 hrs. The individual will remain out of the RCA until the investigation has concluded.

"Access records have been pulled from the HIS20 program and the doses given were not reflective of a normal entry. A START READ of 0 mrem was given and an END READ of 0 mrem was also given. A GAMMA COMPONENT READ of 10002.2 mrem was given but should have been the same as the END READ which was 0 mrem. All indicators lead to a faulty electronic dosimeter, the dosimeter in question is being sent to our instrument department for further evaluation.

"Tennessee Event Report ID No.: TN-15-101"

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Agreement State Event Number: 51227
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MC SQUARED, INC.
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3424-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CLARK CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 07/13/2015
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ROBERT BUNCH (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE

At approximately 1745 EDT the State of Florida was contacted by the Radiation Safety Officer for MC Squared, Inc. The RSO reported a probable stolen Troxler gauge. Model number 3411B Serial Number: 13563. The company vehicle was parked at a contractor's site at the intersection of Anderson and West Waters Avenue in Tampa, FL. The gauge and packaging were chained and locked to the bed of the truck and was also strapped down. When the technician came out around 1600 EDT he noticed it was missing. They were only parked in that area between 30 minutes to an hour and the lock is also missing. The Hillsboro County Sherriff's office was notified. A report was filed by the Hillsboro County Deputy, Report Number: 15-441038. When the report is completed it will be available to the State of Florida.

The Troxler gauge sources are 40 mCi of Am/Be, and 8 mCi of Cs-137.

State of Florida Incident Number: FL15-068.

The State of Florida is continuing to investigate this event.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51241
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/20/2015
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2015
Event Time: 08:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY SIREN

"On 7/20/2015 at approximately 0931 CDT, the Monticello nuclear generating plant was notified by Wright County Sheriffs Office of a spurious actuation of one emergency response siren in the city of Monticello that occurred at approximately 0855 CDT (lasted for approximately three minutes). This actuation was confirmed by vendor system monitoring. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Wright County Sheriffs Office. The source of the activation signal has not been determined. The vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a single siren failure. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The State of Minnesota will be notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51242
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 07/20/2015
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2015
Event Time: 07:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IN SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"On the morning of July 20, 2015 at 0740 EDT, with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, the Secondary Containment differential pressure decreased below the JAF Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR-3.6.4.1.1) value of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. Both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System were placed in service and the Reactor Building was isolated. The decrease in Secondary Containment differential pressure was caused by Reactor Building roof maintenance creating multiple openings. Maintenance workers were immediately ordered to stop work and address the condition. Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored to within the TS SR value at 0915 EDT, and remains greater than 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge.

"The secondary containment is a structure that surrounds the primary containment and is designed to provide secondary containment for postulated loss-of-coolant accidents inside the primary containment. To prevent exfiltration the secondary containment requires the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. The differential pressure requirement of TS SR-3.6.4.1.1 ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration. During this period there were no unmonitored radioactive releases; however, this event could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material and it is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

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Part 21 Event Number: 51243
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: NORCROSS State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MALLIA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 07/20/2015
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

POTENTIAL PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY FAILURE TO DOCUMENT DESIGN CHANGE

The following information is excerpted from an email received from United Controls International:

"[In] August 2014, United Controls supplied four (4) time delay relays to Omaha Public Power-Fort Calhoun Station. The subject relay was qualified in accordance with IEEE 323-74/83, IEEE 344-1975/1987 and IEEE C37.98-1987, for use in mild environment safety related applications.

"Per NRC Part 21 notifications, UCI was informed that the Allen Bradley relays base model 700RTC contain a Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) which was unpublished. This design change could not be noticed since the external appearance of the relay and the relay part number remained the same. Hence, UCI has qualified the subject relay as solid state relay whereas the presence of the CPLD device elects the item as a digital device which can be affected by EMI/RFI noises.

"At this time, UCI has no sufficient information to determine whether this design change would create a Substantial Safety Hazard as it relates to the plant applications for the subject relay.

"Per the Nutherm Part 21 ML 1516IA230, Allen Bradley has indicated that a rolling change occurred from mid-2009 with no specific manufacturing date to distinguish between the old and the new configuration. Hence, all units manufactured during 2009 and later are suspect.

"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

"Jim Garrison
"Engineering Manager
"jgarrison@unitedcontrols.com
"770-496-1406 x 103"

Affected facility: Omaha Public Power-Fort Calhoun Station
Part Number: 700-RTC-11200U1
Quantity: 4

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Tuesday, July 21, 2015