Event Notification Report for June 16, 2015

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FOUND INOPERABLE

"At 0452 EDT hours on June 16, 2015, during performance of a surveillance test for the Division 3 4160 Volt Bus Undervoltage/Degraded Voltage Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Test, the K36 degraded voltage time delay relay was found outside of the Technical Specification 3.3.8.1 allowable value, resulting in an inoperable condition of the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The Division 3 EDG had previously been declared inoperable for performance of the surveillance testing.

"The K36 degraded voltage time delay relay initiates load shedding, isolates the Division 3 bus, and starts the Division 3 EDG. The Technical Specification allowable value is 180 to 270 seconds. The as-found time was 272.66 seconds. The K36 relay was calibrated in accordance with plant procedures and returned to service at 0730 hours on June 16, 2015.

"The Division 3 EDG is the on-site power source for the High Pressure Core Spray system which is a single train system. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

SEALED SOURCE FOUND IN SHIPMENT OF SCRAP MATERIAL

The licensee (US FDA) sent a shipment of scrap material which had been generated onsite, to a scrap recycling facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The scrap facility detected a device containing radioactive material in the shipment. The device was returned to the licensee who identified the device as an Alnor Dewpointer. The source was removed from the device and the exposure rate was measured as 4.2 mR/hr on contact. The source is being stored pending disposal. The isotope is unknown, but is suspected to be either Radium 226 or Americium 241. The licensee has contacted the State of Arkansas.

SERVICE WATER EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE

The B train of the service water effluent radiation monitor failed at 2343 EDT and is being repaired.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.



* * * RETRACTION ON 07/01/2015 AT 1411 EDT FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

"The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on June 17, 2015, NRC Event Number 51161. Event Report number 51161 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) in which a service water radiation monitor failed, was taken out of service for repair and was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability.

"Upon further review, MPS3 has concluded that the subject radiation monitor is not utilized for emergency assessment capability. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 51161 is being retracted.

"The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

R1DO(Dimitriadis) have been notified.

MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE INVOLVED IN AUTOMOBILE FIRE

A licensee employee working at a job site in Claymont, Delaware went to leave the job site at 1500 EDT on June 16, 2015. The employee got in his vehicle and turned on the ignition. A fire started under and around the dashboard. The employee exited his vehicle and called 911 and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer. The local fire department responded. The front portion of the vehicle had been totally engulfed. The vehicle trunk, where the gauge was stored, received heat and smoke damage. The carrying case of the gauge was partially melted. No visible damage occurred to the gauge itself. The gauge was transported to a service vendor for inspection and repair if needed.

The gauge was a Troxler 3440 Moisture/Density gauge, serial number 20118, containing an 8 mCi Cesium-137 source and a 40 mCi Am-241source.

The licensee notified NRC R1(Ragland), Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, Division of Waste and Hazardous Substances, Emergency Prevention and Response Section, and Delaware Health and Social Services, Division of Public Health.


* * * UPDATE ON 07/01/15 AT 1827 EDT FROM IRVIN FISCHER TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

The licensee provided the following update via email:

"The gauge is back in service after being evaluated and recalibrated. "

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NMSS Events (via email).

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO OPEN HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOORS

"On June 16, 2015 at 1145 EDT while in Mode 1 at 100% power steady-state conditions, two fire doors between the Reactor Auxiliary building (RAB) and steam tunnel were opened under administrative controls to support maintenance. These doors are credited in high energy line break equipment qualification and internal flooding analyses and opening of the doors is not addressed in the analyses. A high energy line break in the steam tunnel with the doors open could result in equipment in the RAB experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable.

"The event was determined to be reportable on June 24, 2015 at approximately 1550 [EDT]. During that reportability evaluation, it was determined that the doors may have been in a similar condition multiple times in the May-June time frame.

"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

PART 21 REPORT - ABB 50H INSTANTANEOUS OVER CURRENT PROTECTION RELAY FAILURE

The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received from the Xcel Energy:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy, submits the attached initial notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect.

"If there is any question or if additional information is needed, please contact Dr. Glenn A. Carlson, P.E., at (651) 267-1755.

"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Scott M. Sharp, Site Operations Director, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Northern States Power Company - Minnesota, 1717 Wakonade Drive East, Welch, MN 55089

"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: ABB Power T&D Company Inc., Relay, Overload, Overcurrent, 58/125VDC, Type: 50H, Cat.: 468S0475, 1.B.: 7.2.1.7-3

"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: During bench testing to calibrate the relay, 125 VDC was applied to the relay with no noticeable effect. This was shop work on a spare relay and was not a plant installed piece of equipment. The relay protects against an instantaneous over current condition, which if undetected would cause substantial damage to the motor. This type of relay is installed in many locations; the failed relay was reserved to replace an existing relay protecting a Residual Heat Removal System pump motor. If the relay had been installed and required actuation during an accident, it would have resulted in major degradation in safety related equipment.

"The ABB 50H relays are installed in ten locations at PINGP. All of the 50H relays are installed on the Unit 2 safety-related buses. The equipment protected is 21 Aux Feedwater Pump, 21 Component Cooling Pump, 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump, 21 Safety Injection Pump, 21 Containment Spray Pump, 22 Safety Injection Pump, 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump, 22 Component Cooling Pump, 22 Containment Spray Pump, and 121 Cooling Water Pump. The failed relay was reserved to replace an existing relay protecting a Residual Heat Removal pump motor.

"PINGP Material Management has custody of the failed relay pending further investigation and notified the supplier of this notification by email on 8/6/2015.

"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: Continue bench testing relays prior to installation."