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Event Notification Report for June 4, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/03/2015 - 06/04/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51090 51091 51104 51115 51116

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Agreement State Event Number: 51090
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: PIONEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, LLC
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02451-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DARREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/26/2015
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE

The following report was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via email:

"On the afternoon of May 21, the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] received a call from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) who explained that their portable moisture density gauge had been involved in an accident at a construction site in Barrington, IL. The gauge operator had been briefly called away from the device and during his absence, the device was struck by a piece of heavy machinery. The RSO indicated that the operator had gathered up the pieces and put them into the transportation case and was in the process of returning the broken device to the company's Chicago storage facility at the time of the RSO's notification. Pictures provided by the RSO showed that the rod which contained the Cs-137 was significantly bent some 4 inches from its end and was no longer in its shielded position. The operator secured the device in a remote location upon his return to the storage facility that night until Agency inspectors could be dispatched to the location.

"The next morning, inspectors arrived at the storage location and conducted surveys including field leak tests of the sources. Those tests showed no leakage of radioactive material but determined that elevated radiation levels of up to 60 [millirem/h] were present at the surface of the transportation case. After providing additional storage suggestions, the pieces of the gauge were reconfigured and secured at the site. Dose rates were lowered to 16 [millirem/h] near the surface of the case and less than 1 [millirem/h] at 1 foot by those efforts.

"The gauge manufacturer was contacted and asked to provide a shipping container and additional shielding for return of the damaged device. When those materials are received, Agency inspectors will return to the site and verify the gauge is properly packaged and documented for return. This item remains open at this time pending this additional action and receipt of the licensee's written report which is due in 30 days.

"Device manufacturer: Troxler
Model Number: 3430
Serial Number: 68332
Device activity content: 0.008 Ci - Cs-137, 0.040 Ci - Am/Be

"Illinois Event Number: IL15011"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51091
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BRITT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/26/2015
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351 AND EN #50998

* * * UPDATE ON 05/26/15 AT 1745 EDT FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147[foot] elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10074859"

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2017 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 [foot] were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL.

- An issue was identified with the wall separating the el. 112 [foot] Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Station Battery Room 1B, FA 1005.
- An issue was identified with the wall separating the Station Battery Room 2A, Fire Area (FA) 2004 from the Station Battery Room 2B, FA 2005, on el. 112 [foot].

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10077573 & 10077574."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO(O'Donohue).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 [foot] were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL:

- Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 [foot] Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, FA 1008.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078011."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1501 EDT ON 6/3/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 [foot] were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL:

- Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 [foot] Control Building U2 Water Analysis Room, Fire Area (FA) 2006 from the Control Building East Corridor, FA 0007

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078561."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51104
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/30/2015
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2015
Event Time: 04:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

RHR PUMP TRIP IN COLD SHUTDOWN MODE

"At 0458 CDT on 05/30/2015, with Cooper Nuclear Station Unit 1 in Mode 4 [cold shutdown], an inadvertent trip of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump B was experienced which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling. The cause of the trip is currently not known and is under investigation. Shutdown cooling was restored with B RHR Pump at 0520 on 05/30/2015, and there have been no other issues with the system. During the loss of shutdown cooling, forced circulation of the core was not lost due to the Reactor Recirculation System remaining in service. Based on indication from the in-service Reactor Recirculation System A loop, reactor coolant temperature experienced a 7 (seven) degree Fahrenheit increase during the event. Reactor coolant temperature did not exceed 212 degrees Fahrenheit during the event.

"This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) - any event or condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: B) remove residual heat.

"The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVID VANDERKAMP TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1646 EDT ON 06/03/2015 * * *

"After further evaluation of the reported transient, it was determined that the Reactor Recirculation System A Loop increased from 186 degrees F to 204 degrees F for a heatup of 18 degrees during the loss of Shutdown Cooling. The Vessel Drain temperature increased from 190 degrees F to 210 degrees F for a heatup of 20 degrees during the same time frame."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Whitten)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51115
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SILVESTRE ROMERO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/03/2015
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2015
Event Time: 10:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF UNIT 2 VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR OPERABILITY

"On June 2, 2015 at 2027 CDT, it was discovered that the unit vent radiation monitor was inoperable beginning on June 1, 2015 at 1026 CDT. Compensatory measures were not taken in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) during this time period and the radiation monitor was unable to be used to assess Emergency Action Levels in accordance with the Emergency Plan. On June 3, 2015 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the period of inoperability that the condition resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability which is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures were implemented per the ODCM upon discovery on June 2 at 2027, thus there is currently no major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"This event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barriers and it did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51116
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/03/2015
Notification Time: 21:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2015
Event Time: 17:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3.

"At 1705 [CDT] the reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of an automatic trip due to loss of main feedwater pump 'A'.

"The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with emergency feedwater feeding and maintaining both steam generators due to an automatic emergency feed actuation signal.

"During the trip, the 'B' electrical safety and non safety busses did not automatically transfer from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer causing a loss of off-site power to the 'B' electrical busses. This resulted in a loss of main feedwater pump 'B'.

"The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as designed and reenergized the 'B' safety related buses.

"The plant entered the emergency operating procedure for loss of main feedwater.

"Off-site power has been restored to the 'B' safety and non safety busses, and the emergency diesel generator 'B' is secured.

All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, June 04, 2015
Thursday, June 04, 2015