Event Notification Report for June 01, 2015

COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM-226 DISCOVERED AT SCRAP YARD

The following information was obtained from the State of Colorado via email:

"The Colorado Radiation Program [CRP] is investigating an incident at 711 S. 6th Ave. in Grand Junction, CO. A number of weeks ago, we [CRP] were asked to investigate a crushed car that was rejected at a scrap yard because it set off the radiation detector. Yesterday, [CRP] found in the car, a metal plate approximately 1.5 ft. long, 5 inches wide and less than a half an inch thick that contains Radium-226. The readings on contact with this piece of metal are higher than what our instrument could read which means it's an unknown amount, over 200 mr/hr. Last night, the item was placed in a locked room in a warehouse on the property with no one around it and [CRP] instructed the property owner to not let anyone near it.

"Today, the Colorado Civil Support Team is responding to the site to verify the isotope and try to determine the dose rate and activity. Additionally, they will help secure the source on site."

LOSS OF UNIT 2 VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR OPERABILITY

"On June 2, 2015 at 2027 CDT, it was discovered that the unit vent radiation monitor was inoperable beginning on June 1, 2015 at 1026 CDT. Compensatory measures were not taken in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) during this time period and the radiation monitor was unable to be used to assess Emergency Action Levels in accordance with the Emergency Plan. On June 3, 2015 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the period of inoperability that the condition resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability which is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures were implemented per the ODCM upon discovery on June 2 at 2027, thus there is currently no major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"This event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barriers and it did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL

"At 2111 [CDT] River Bend Nuclear Station sustained an Automatic Reactor Scram due to low Reactor Water Level (Level 3). The plant is currently stable, with level being maintained in a normal band of 10 - 51 inches with Condensate and Feedwater. Reactor Pressure is in the prescribed band of 500-1090 psig. The plant is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, and will remain in Mode 3 until investigation of the scram is complete. The transient began with a trip of Reactor Feed Pump 'A', followed by a Reactor Scram and a trip of Reactor Feed Pump 'C'. Reactor water level was recovered with Reactor Feed Pump 'B' to a normal post scram level band. There was a problem noted with the Reactor Feedwater Master Level Controller; this was mitigated by the Operator placing the controller to manual. There was no subsequent Level transient. Reactor Pressure was stabilized in normal pressure band with Turbine bypass valves. During the transient, a Reactor Recirculating Flow Control Valve Runback was not received as expected. Reactor Recirculating Pump 'A' responded as expected to transient [switching to low pump speed], Reactor Recirculating Pump 'B' tripped during transient. A Level 3 isolation signal was received, all expected isolations occurred.

"The cause of the transient is currently under investigation."

The reactor is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via turbine bypass valves, and a normal electrical line up.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM JACK MCCOY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0712 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *

"At 2231 on 6/1/15, Reactor Water Cleanup System isolated on High Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger room temperature due to loss of Turbine Building chill water during the initial transient. All Reactor Water Cleanup System Valves isolated as expected. Reactor Water Cleanup was the only system affected by this isolation signal."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Whitten).

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Generating Station has removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately sixteen hours and will return to service at approximately 2200 [EDT] June 1, 2015.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOSHUA MCGUIRE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2324 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *

At 2240 EDT on 6/1/15, the TSC ventilation system was restored.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Powell).

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE CIRCUIT BREAKER SECONDARY CLOSE LATCH

The following is an excerpt of communication received via email:

"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with a secondary close latch, part number 716610K01, used in K-Line 225/800 and 1600/2000 amp electrically operated Model 7 circuit breakers.

"Nature of the deviation: During installation of a primary close latch and subsequent bench testing at a nuclear utility, mechanical binding was observed between the primary and secondary close latches. This binding prevented the breaker from operating. Inspection of both latches by ABB showed that the issue lies with the secondary close latch. It was determined that the secondary close latch dimension from the centerline of the hub that the latch rotates about, to the edge of the secondary latch surface with the half pin on the primary latch, was oversized. The failure to comply was identified when replacing latches and verified with a calculated dimension.

"The additional length from the center of the hub in the secondary close latch to the corner of the latch surface caused an interference between the pin cam interface and the half pin on the primary close latch, where it rolls off of the latch surface on the secondary close latch.

"It is recommended that affected licensees with this latch in inventory, ensure that bench testing is performed prior to installation to verify that the primary and secondary close latches work together without any evidence of binding.

"ABB currently cycles K-Line breakers that are refurbished approximately 55 close/open operations before they ship from the Florence facility. New breakers get at least the same number of close/open operations before shipment. This level of operational testing validates that there is no binding between the primary and secondary close latches.

"Questions concerning this notification should be directed to the Quality Manager at the Medium Voltage Service Center in Florence, SC at (843) 413-4727 or Fax (843) 413-4853."