| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/22/2015 - 05/26/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51076 | Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: STERICYCLE
Region: 1
City: CURTIS BAY State: MD
County:
License #: NONE
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/18/2015
Notification Time: 08:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2015
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DISPOSED IN MEDICAL WASTE
"On May 15, 2015, at about 2130 hours [EDT], Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) received an emergency notification from Stericycle located at 5800 Chemical Road, Curtis Bay [Baltimore], Maryland 21226. Apparently the biohazardous waste service received I-131 therapy waste from MedStar Washington Hospital (NRC licensee in Washington, D.C.). The waste was an immediate concern; temporarily closing the facility, with some I-131 contamination of facilities. Surveys indicated hot spot contact readings as high as 30 mR/hr with areas of general contamination. A private radiation consultant, Radiation Service Organization (RSO), was called and responded to the scene on 5/16/15. The area is being remediated and has now been reopened. Maryland is investigating the incident."
Stericycle is not licensed to receive radioactive waste. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51084 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TONY KLEDZIK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 09:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2015
Event Time: 16:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVE ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"At 1629 EDT on March 26, 2015, the plant received a Division 1 balance of plant outboard containment and drywell isolation signal. The isolation signal was received while removing fuses to establish a clearance for the replacement of an average power range monitor bypass switch. The removal of two fuses removed power to the manual initiation logic resulting in an isolation signal.
"The following component actuations occurred: valves 1P51F0150 and 1P51F0652, isolating service air to the containment and drywell; valves 1G61F0155 and 1G61F0170, isolating the containment and drywell floor drain sumps; valves 1D17F0071A and 1D17F0079A, isolating the drywell radiation monitor; valves 1D17F0081A and 1D17F0089A, isolating the containment radiation monitor; valve 1P11F0080, isolating the containment pools drain; valves 1P50F0060 and 1P50F0150, isolating the containment vessel chilled water system; valves 1P53F0070 and 1P53F0075, isolating the upper and lower airlock local leak rate air supply; valves 1P52F0160 and 1P52F0170, isolating the upper and lower airlock air supply; valve 1P22F0015, isolating mixed bed water to the drywell; and valve 1P54F0395, isolating fire protection carbon dioxide to the drywell.
"This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to the loss of power to the manual initiation logic. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The inadvertent isolation signal was the result of a human performance error.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51085 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL BALL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2015
Event Time: 04:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 5, 2015 at 0435 CDT, during replacement of a failed fuse (2-FU1-64-16A-K33A), Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic received the B half of the Unit 2 Group 6 isolation signal. This caused initiation of the B and C Standby Gas Treatment, B Control Room Emergency Ventilation, isolation of the Unit 2 reactor zone and all three refueling zone ventilations. This was not a valid initiation of PCIS.
"Operations personal responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured that all equipment operated as designed, and returned the affected systems back to service.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as PER 1010651.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51086 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MOT HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 10:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2015
Event Time: 00:14 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START DUE TO ACTUATION OF UNDERVOLTAGE CIRCUITRY
"At 0014 PDT on 05/22/2015, Columbia experienced an unexpected momentary loss of SM-7, a Division 1 4.16 kV vital bus, resulting in a start of Emergency Diesel DG-1 . Additionally, under voltage circuitry prevented Standby Service Water pump 1A from starting to support DG-1 in response to the valid under voltage condition, and operators tripped the diesel at 0016 PDT. The SM-7 bus was reenergized by a 115 kV offsite source through backup transformer TR-B.
"The cause of this event was an inadvertent trip of under voltage circuitry while connecting test equipment in preparation for Diesel and Loss of Power logic testing. Division 1 was inoperable due to ongoing maintenance during the current refueling outage and was not being relied upon for decay heat removal or core circulation.
"Columbia is in Mode 5 with a coolant temperature of 96 degrees F, water level is at the normal refueling flooded level with fuel pool cooling gates removed. Division 2 is providing required electrical power and supporting components required for decay heat removal and inventory control. There was no impact to Shutdown Safety Assessment."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51087 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MIKE MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 13:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2015
Event Time: 10:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 3 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
"On Friday, May 22, 2015 at 1002 EDT, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch in the Start-Up position and the reactor at approximately 3 percent core thermal power, while returning to power from Refueling Outage Number 20, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation.
"Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and no Emergency Operating Procedure entry conditions existed.
"All plant systems responded as designed.
"Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 400 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Startup Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations).
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified.
"The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency."
The licensee will be issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE FROM EVERETT PERKINS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1110 EDT ON 5/24/2015 * * *
The following was provided by the licensee as clarifying information to the first paragraph of the original event notification:
"As a conservative measure, the operating crew had previously started reducing power from 20 percent core thermal power when it was first noticed that main condenser vacuum was degrading. This was well before any low condenser vacuum alarms were received.
"During the shutdown, after already securing the main turbine, the operating crew established benchmark values for degrading condenser vacuum for a normal plant shutdown and for a manual reactor scram should vacuum continue to decline to preclude an automatic scram."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Dwyer). | |