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Event Notification Report for May 15, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/14/2015 - 05/15/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50998 51019 51045 51048 51049 51050 51051 51052 51057 51070

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50998
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately " tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)

- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately " tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058276; CR 10058278

"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)

- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A " x " defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058277

"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration.

- A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040).

- At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal.

- A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10060228"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

-An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

-A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10061830"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).


* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016.

"The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.
2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.

The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016):
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D.
4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10062254"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

"The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).
1. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D.
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below).

"The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018).
4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10062955"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G).
- Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G)
- Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105).
- Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10063642"

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.
- In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 [inch] deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
- In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066678"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A).

- A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066844"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025).

- Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10067163"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL.

"An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013.

- A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068138"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).


* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows;

- A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068842"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).
- A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10069898; CR 10069995"

The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51019
Rep Org: FEDERAL AGROMAN
Licensee: FEDERAL AGROMAN
Region: 1
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: 52-31107-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIGUEL RAEVERA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/28/2015
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2015
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE IN CARJACKED VEHICLE

A Federal Agroman truck was transporting a moisture/density gauge. The driver stopped at the side of the road and the truck was carjacked. The licensee contacted the Puerto Rico State Police.

Gauge: Troxler model 3430 with serial number 37246. The sources are 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241.

* * * UPDATE FROM FERNANDO CORTES TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

The following excerpted information was received from the licensee by email:

"On April 28, 2015 around 09:50am ET (Eastern Time) [the] operator of the Troxler 3430 nuclear gauge arrived to the construction site on highway PR-21 near of the old state penitentiary, known as Oso Blanco, in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. At the time [the operator] was driving a 2005 Mazda pickup truck with license plate 785-337 where compaction tests would take place. Suddenly and out of no where an individual entered the premises and drove away with the vehicle, the gauge/accessories and other personal belongings.

"At this moment, no trace of the machine (gauge/accessories) that was stolen have been found since April 28, 2015 and there is no information about its likely location to date.

"Actions that have been taken, or will be taken, to recover the material:

a. Immediately [the licensee] called the 9-1-1 Emergency Management of Puerto Rico
b. A complaint was performed with the Puerto Rico Police Department.
(Complaint num. Q-2015-1-162-4467, Badge 30858, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico)
c. Ferrovial Agroman LLC began an investigation of the incident.
d. There was an interview with an agent of Homeland Security due to the investigation of the incident.
e. The situation ('EMERGENCY' Stolen Machine) was notified to all local newspapers in Puerto Rico (Nuevo Dia, Primera Hora and El Vocero.)
f. [The licensee notified] Mr. Sattar Lodhi, Region I, from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on April 28, 2015. Also [the licensee] had communication with Mr. Hector Bermudez on April 29, 2015.
g. On April 29 of 2015, the stolen vehicle was recovered but there were no trace of the machine (nuclear gauge and accessories).
h. A picture of a similar machine was published by 'EI Vocero' newspaper.

"Procedures or measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence of the loss or theft of licensed material:

a. The method and procedure for the use and handling machine with radioactive sources was reviewed.
b. The procedure in case of any event, damage, loss, or theft of a machine with sources radioactive was also reviewed.
c. Owners, operators and authorized personnel are encouraged and oriented on the procedure before the use or the procedure in case of any emergency before the use of this instrument (Troxler 3430) Nuclear Dosimeter."

Notified R1DO (Welling), NMSS Events and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51045
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: RED RIVER PHARMACY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County: PULASKI
License #: ARK-1033-0250
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANGIE HILL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/06/2015
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED AND MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DURING SHIPMENT

The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"The Arkansas Radioactive Materials [RAM] licensee shipped a Yellow-II Radioactive Materials Package containing two 5 mCi/capsule/plastic vial of Iodine-131 via [common carrier] (overnight package) on Monday, April 27, 2015. The recipient rejected the RAM package prior to the receipt of the RAM package. The RAM package was re-routed back through the [common carrier] Memphis Distribution Center to the licensee, via [common carrier] Ground, and was received by the [common carrier] Little Rock warehouse on Tuesday, May 5, 2015. The Department was notified of the RAM package being damaged at the [common carrier] Little Rock warehouse.

"The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] responded to perform surveys and wipe tests at the [common carrier] Little Rock warehouse. The Yellow-II RAM package appeared to have one seam smashed open, the styrofoam crushed, and the lead shipping container's interior side of cap damaged. One I-131 capsule/vial appears to be inside the lead shipping container smashed; one I-131 capsule/vial appears to be missing.

"The Department performed exposure measurements and/or contamination wipes of the [common carrier] Little Rock warehouse, RAM package and RAM package contents. No contamination or exposures of concern were noted of the [common carrier] Little Rock warehouse or RAM package. The licensee identified I-131 contamination inside the lead shipping container.

"Vehicle surveys were not performed by the Department, due to the vehicle was at the [common carrier] Memphis Distribution Center. The State of Tennessee was notified of this event on Tuesday, May 5, 2015.

"It is unknown at this time if there has been any exposure(s) to the public.

"The State [of Arkansas] is awaiting a written report from the licensee and will continue to investigate this event with [the common carrier].

"The State will update this event as more information becomes available.

"Arkansas Event Number: ARK-2015-003"

* * * UPDATE FROM ANGIE D. HILL TO RICHARD L. SMITH AT 1459 EDT ON 5/11/2015 * * *

The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"The activity of prescription number 46596 (missing I-131 capsule) is 5.418 mCi/1 capsule I-131 Sodium Iodide at 11:30 am on April 29, 2015 and for prescription number 46597 is 5.005 mCi/1 capsule I-131 Sodium Iodide at 10:00 am on April 29, 2015.

"The Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) conducted interviews and performed radiation surveys at the Common Carrier's Express Warehouse in Jonesboro, Arkansas, on May 7, 2015, where the RAM package had been received by and shipped to the Common Carrier's Distribution Center. It appeared that the missing I-131 capsule/vial was not at this location.

"ADH received a telephone call from the Common Carrier's Radiation Safety Consultant on May 8, 2015. The missing I-131 capsule/vial had been found 'intact' that morning at the Common Carrier's Memphis Distribution Center, whom took possession of the material.

"The State of Tennessee has been notified by ADH.

"Licensee's Corrective Action: Change in Procedure.

"ADH considers this event closed."

Notified R1DO (Welling), R4DO (Vasquez), NMSS via email, ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51048
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MANUEL DIAZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

INDIUM-111 SOURCE LOST IN TRANSIT

A consolidated package was shipped to New York on April 7. When the shipment arrived it was missing one of the packages within the consolidated shipping container. At the time of shipment, the package contained 12.7 mCi of In-111 (half-life 2.8 days). The package was a UN 2915 Type A with a 0.1 TI (transportation index) and a weight of 3 lbs.

An investigation was conducted with the common carrier. The package was not located. It was declared lost on April 21.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51049
Rep Org: HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-03075-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SATYA BOSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

CONTAMINATION DETECTED IN SOURCE STORAGE ROOM IN 2008

The following is excerpted from statements recorded by the RSO on Aug 26th, 2009, concerning contamination discovered by the licensee in [the source storage room] Feb/Mar 2008, of their facility:

"1. A source being held in storage was discovered to have external contamination about Feb/Mar 2008. The source was being prepared for an upcoming disposal of sources. The source was in storage in a vault in the [source storage room at their facility]. This room is primarily used to do survey meter calibrations.

"2. When the contamination was discovered the techs were directed to not use the room. Any activities (detector calibrations) requiring that area were conducted by the RSO. The area was evaluated for contamination. Spots of contamination were found and found to exist only in the back room area. Decontamination of the area was done. The room was back into use for all techs to use by the summer of 2008.

"3. [The RSO] was made aware of the question of personnel contamination the spring of 2009. A device to assess such contamination is not readily available. A scanner to assess any such contamination does exist at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center. [The RSO] has recently made contact with the Commander in charge of the unit and have obtained information necessary to have access to the device. The basic detail for access is a cost of $1200 to have a scan performed.

"4. There are policies and procedures in place to deal with contamination.

"5. The question of contamination has only been raised recently and through the union as a grievance. An assessment of any contamination requires the availability of the device to obtain the information. Access to a scanner has been found and steps are to be taken to schedule the scan. The initial step will be the approval and allocation of funds to pay for the scan. Then arrangements can be made to have access to the Bethesda Naval Medical Center in order to do the scan."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51050
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DAE & ASSOCIATES LTD
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03923
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

"A representative of the licensee called [the Texas Department of State Health Services] and stated that two weeks ago a Troxler 3430 (sn 24971) had gone missing. He [the licensee] could not find it after calling his service companies and employees. He further said that the serial numbers for the sources are 75-3877 and 47-17874. He does not know what the activity of these sources is. He says that he will begin a written report. Further information will be provided in accordance with SA300 guidelines."

The licensee notified the Houston Police Department (report #0496748-15).

Texas Incident #: I-9312

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51051
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA - LOS ANGELES
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2015
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING LESS THAN THE PRESCRIBED DOSE DELIVERED TO PATIENT

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

"At approximately 1000 PDT on May 5, 2015, a medical event occurred during a Y-90 Therasphere procedure. The prescribed dose to the organ (liver) was 12,000 rem, but the delivered dose was 6,920 rem. This event meets the 10 CFR 35.3045(1)(i) 24-hour report criteria since the dose differed from the prescribed dose by more than 50 rem to an organ (5080 rem under dose) and the total dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more (42% under dose). Although the equipment indicated the entire dose had been delivered to the patient, a large amount of the dose was is still in the tubing and vial and had not actually been delivered to the patient as indicated. The licensee will contact the manufacturer to assist in finding the root cause of the malfunction to determine whether it was an equipment malfunction, operator error, or both. The treating physician is also the prescribing physician. The licensee has contacted the physician to verify if the physician has notified the patient and if there was any effect on the individual from this event. The licensee will provide the written report within 15 days as required which will also describe what actions will be taken to prevent reoccurrence."

California Report Number: 050616.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51052
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: METRO METAL RECYCLING, LLC
Region: 1
City: WATERVLIET State: NY
County:
License #: C3062
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL D. SOUCIE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN THERMO FISHER XRF ANALYZER

The following information was received from the New York Department of Health [DOH] via fax:

"The Department of Health (DOH) became aware of this incident on 5/6/15. The DOH phoned the Vice President of Metro Metal Recycling, LLC on an unrelated detail of license C3062 renewal. The licensee stated on 5/6/15 that he did not need the license anymore because on 1/27/15, his Thermo Fisher XRF, Model XLP 818, Serial Number 13149, had been stolen. He had not contacted DOH to report the stolen XRF, which contained 30 millicuries of americium-241. He did notify Colonie Police and obtained a police report. He e-mailed a copy of the police report and photographs of a damaged metal fence to DOH. The police report states that an unknown person broke the lock to their gate, broke an office window and entered the office where they stole the XRF from an unlocked desk drawer. There was no surveillance video. The guard dogs have access to the metal storage area but not the office area. The Vice President was sent an e-mail requesting additional information."

The Thermo Fisher XRF (X-Ray Fluorescence) Analyzer is used to identify metal alloys.

NY Event Report ID No.: NY-15-03

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51057
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)

Event Text

INADVERTENT INTRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL INTO THE PROTECTED AREA

"On May 7, 2015, at 1515 hours, B&W NOG-L Security management determined alcohol had been inadvertently introduced into the Protected Area through the shipping and receiving process. 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) requires that the licensee report to the Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery, the use, sale distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area. The item in question was a six pack of bottled beer which was part of a box of promotional items personally delivered by a sales representative from Graybar Electric.

"The B&W employee addressee first became aware of the package through an email and voicemail left by the salesman advising of a package delivery and indicating the presence of alcohol in the package. The B&W employee immediately contacted Shipping and Receiving management at approximately 1300 hrs. in an effort to intercept the package before delivery; however the package had already been processed into the Protected Area.

"Shipping and Receiving Management contacted the delivery driver via radio and instructed the driver not to deliver the package. The delivery driver separated the package from the delivery items. The package was removed from the Protected Area and returned to the Shipping and Receiving Manager located in the Owner Controlled Area at approximately 1500 hrs. The package was returned unopened. B&W Security Management was notified of the incident at approximately 1515 hrs.

"All items processed through Shipping and Receiving undergo security x-ray inspection. Containers of liquid are commonly processed items and therefore did not create an elevated level of suspicion which would have led to the officers conducting a visual inspection.

"B&W NOG-L Management will conduct an evaluation of the incident to include root cause analysis and corrective actions to prevent recurrence."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51070
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GUY GRIFFIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/14/2015
Notification Time: 23:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO EXCESSIVE TOXIC CHEMICALS ONSITE

"On May 14, 2015, it was determined that the number of 55 gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol analyzed to be transported and stored within the owner-controlled area (OCA) at any one time had been exceeded. It was discovered that contrary to the toxic gas analysis performed, fourteen 55-gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol were transported and stored in the OCA to support the construction of a dome being built to provide storage for FLEX equipment. The number of drums exceeded the limitation specified in the toxic gas analysis performed as part of the design project for transportation and storage could potentially impact Control Room habitability, emergency diesel generator air intake and have an adverse impact on security personnel.

"Upon determination that an unanalyzed condition existed, Operations placed the control room ventilation system in the 'isolation mode' until the number of drums on-site was reduced within the analyzed number. A substantial covering had been placed over the drums which also decreased the likelihood that any of the drums would fail and would also limit the potential dispersion of chemicals should a breach occur.

"The excess number of drums of 2-Butoxyethanol being transported and stored on-site is considered an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The allowed number of 55 gallon drums of 2-butoxyethanol allowed per the current toxic gas analysis is 4 drums. The number of drums has been reduced to 2 as of 2024 EDT.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 15, 2015
Friday, May 15, 2015