|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/20/2015 - 04/21/2015
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50351 |
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
90 |
Power Operation |
90 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS
"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.
"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"
In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report: 898908."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Freeman).
* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."
Condition Report: 10000607
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai).
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
Condition Report: 10013077
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *
"During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.
"Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015
"Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report 10015417
"Condition Report 10015437"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (McCoy).
* * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *
"During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
CR 10021623
Notified R2DO (HAAG).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *
"During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria:
- Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040
- A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013
"These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10028364
"CR 10028366"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *
"During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408.
"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10032202"
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and
- Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.).
"These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10035730"
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2047 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Imperfections in three penetration seals (2Z43-H037C, 2Z43-H038C, and 2Z43-H177C) located in the 2A Battery Room separating Unit 2 Fire Areas 2004 and 2005
- Imperfections in fire penetration seal 2Z43-H644C located in the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Area 2006 and 0007A
- Imperfections in the grout between two tiers of concrete masonry wall and at the intersection of the walls in the upper northeast corner of the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Areas 2006 and 0007A
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10041392, CR 10041394, and CR 10041397"
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer)
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1619 EDT ON 3/17/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, a fire penetration seal was observed to contain imperfections that did not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration seal 1Z43H542C is located between the U1 Corridor, Fire Area 0001, and the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008, in the Unit 1 Control Building.
"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10041766"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).
* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1648 EDT ON 3/18/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Gap in the concrete masonry wall at penetration seal 1Z43-H547C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)
- Gap in the annulus around the 2 inch continuous run penetration seal located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)
- Gap in penetration seal 1Z43-H059C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10042532; CR 10042530; CR 10042526"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1814 EDT ON 3/31/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, a fire wall was observed to contain a gap behind a 3 inch square plate attached to the thru-bolt anchor that did not meet acceptance criteria and caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. The affected fire barrier is located between the U2 RPS MG Set Room (Fire Area 2013) and the U2 Annunciator Room (Fire Area 2015).
"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10048449"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Walker).
* * * UPDATE FROM KEN HUNTER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/13/15 AT 1722 EDT * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Gap around penetration 1Z43H805D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) and the Unit 1 Transformer Room (Fire Area 1019).
- Gaps in a fire barrier around a unistrut, below penetration 1Z43H012D, that are approximately 7 deep and into the CMU core located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K)
- Gap in the top corner of the wall, above 1Z43H842D that protrudes into the CMU approximately 7 deep located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K)
- Two anchor bolt holes east of penetration 1Z43H810D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Heissierer).
* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO CHARLES TEAL ON 04/14/15 AT 1728 EDT * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 5" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the west wall in Unit 1 East 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1017 and Fire Area 1016).
- A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the east wall in the Unit 1 West 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1016 and Fire Area 1017).
- A «" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H522D located between the Unit 1 West 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1016) and U1 East 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1017).
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10055316; CR 10055377"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2000 EDT ON 4/16/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- A 1" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H622D in the west wall of the Unit 1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0014K).
- A 1/4" wide x 1/4" long x 7" deep gap was identified near a ground wire, above penetration 1Z43H595D, at the top of the east wall of the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1020 and Fire Area 1104).
- A 3" wide x 1/4" tall x 7" deep gap was identified at penetration 1Z43H617D on the south wall of the Unit 1 Working Floor (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1013).
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10056548; CR 10056555; CR 10056582"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Bartley).
* * * SEE EN #50998 FOR CONTINUATION OF UPDATES * * * |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 50972 |
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: LYNN State: MA
County:
License #: NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA E. DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA |
Notification Date: 04/10/2015
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM-226 SOURCE FOUND IN LOAD OF SCRAP METAL
The following report was provided by the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] provided an on-site response to Turner, Inc., Lynn, MA, a scrap metal facility that had previously received a source back from Prolerized, another scrap metal facility in Everett, MA.
"The source was originally detected by a radiation detector at the Prolerized site where the dose rate of the source, shielded by scrap metal in a truck, was measured to be 0.1 mrem/hr inclusive of a background of 0.05 mrem/hr.
"The Agency surveyed the source at the Turner, Inc. site with a multi-channel analyzer and identified the source to contain radium-226 with a contact dose rate of 113 mrem/hr. The detector of the analyzer was approximately 1 cm from the source. Based upon the survey performed, the source contains approximately 15 microCuries of radium-226 and therefore is immediately reportable in accordance with 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1).
"The source is rectangular and measures approximately 7.5 mm length by 2.5 mm width and height and is without any observed marking or serialization. The source might be of type used for calibration of a liquid scintillation counter.
"The source is in a plastic bag, inside a container that is segregated, secured and shielded from workers at the scrap metal facility.
"Turner, Inc. had obtained the services of a radiation safety consultant who had originally isolated the source from the truck and secured the source at Turner, Inc. Exposures, if any, to the public and workers from the source are negligible due to the storage location and interposed shielding.
"The Agency continues to investigate and considers this event to be open."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50978 |
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT. SCOTT CHRISTOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA |
Notification Date: 04/12/2015
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2015
Event Time: 12:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED OFFSITE DUE TO HEAT EXHAUSTION
"On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1230 CDT, an Xcel Energy employee performing activities in the drywell (currently shut down for a planned refueling outage), experienced heat exhaustion. Upon discovery, the plant emergency medical team was dispatched to aid the individual. The individual was immediately transported, via ambulance, to a local hospital for treatment without verification that no contamination existed. Accompanying the individual were two (2) radiation protection individuals. The individual was transported out of the Protected Area at approximately 1250 CDT. Because the potentially contaminated individual could not be surveyed prior to being transported offsite, the individual was considered potentially contaminated. As such, this event is being reported as an 8-hour prompt report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii).
"On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1340 CDT, the radiation protection personnel that accompanied the individual to the medical facility reported that the individual, ambulance, gurney, hospital travel path and exam room were determined not to be contaminated. As a result, no follow-up status report is planned.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee will be notifying the State Duty Officer. |
| Non-Agreement State |
Event Number: 50982 |
Rep Org: ST VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENT
Licensee: ST VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENT
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-00133-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILL BREEDEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/13/2015
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2015
Event Time: 08:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE |
Person (Organization):
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
Event Text
DUMMY WIRE JAMMED DURING BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT
A patient was receiving brachytherapy treatment using a SAVI device that used 11 channels. The patient was treated with 2 channels when the dummy wire jammed in the out position. The patient was prescribed a fractional dose 340 cGy, but received only received 60 cGy.
There are no adverse effects expected to the patient. The prescribing physician has been informed.
The licensee has contacted a company to repair the device and has ceased all operations until repairs can be made.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50997 |
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2015
Event Time: 22:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
N |
0 |
Defueled |
0 |
Defueled |
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - DISCOVERY OF A PROHIBITED ITEM IN THE PROTECTED AREA
The licensee discovered evidence of prohibited material inside the protected area. The material has been removed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 50998 |
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
90 |
Power Operation |
90 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)
- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately ¬" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)
- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately ¬" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.
"CR 10058276; CR 10058278
"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)
- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)
- A gap ¬" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A ¬" x «" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.
"CR 10058277
"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey). |
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