United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2015 > April 15

Event Notification Report for April 15, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/14/2015 - 04/15/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50351 50958 50959 50963 50984

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 50351
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS

"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.

"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"

In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Condition Report: 898908."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).


* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ernstes).


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.

"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Freeman).


* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."

Condition Report: 10000607

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Desai).


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

Condition Report: 10013077

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *

"During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.

"Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015
"Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105

"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Condition Report 10015417
"Condition Report 10015437"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

* * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *

"During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

CR 10021623

Notified R2DO (HAAG).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *

"During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria:
- Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040
- A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013

"These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10028364
"CR 10028366"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

* * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408.

"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10032202"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and
- Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.).

"These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10035730"

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2047 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Imperfections in three penetration seals (2Z43-H037C, 2Z43-H038C, and 2Z43-H177C) located in the 2A Battery Room separating Unit 2 Fire Areas 2004 and 2005
- Imperfections in fire penetration seal 2Z43-H644C located in the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Area 2006 and 0007A
- Imperfections in the grout between two tiers of concrete masonry wall and at the intersection of the walls in the upper northeast corner of the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Areas 2006 and 0007A

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10041392, CR 10041394, and CR 10041397"

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer)

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1619 EDT ON 3/17/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a fire penetration seal was observed to contain imperfections that did not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration seal 1Z43H542C is located between the U1 Corridor, Fire Area 0001, and the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008, in the Unit 1 Control Building.

"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10041766"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1648 EDT ON 3/18/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- Gap in the concrete masonry wall at penetration seal 1Z43-H547C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)
- Gap in the annulus around the 2 inch continuous run penetration seal located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)
- Gap in penetration seal 1Z43-H059C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10042532; CR 10042530; CR 10042526"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1814 EDT ON 3/31/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a fire wall was observed to contain a gap behind a 3 inch square plate attached to the thru-bolt anchor that did not meet acceptance criteria and caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. The affected fire barrier is located between the U2 RPS MG Set Room (Fire Area 2013) and the U2 Annunciator Room (Fire Area 2015).

"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10048449"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Walker).

* * * UPDATE FROM KEN HUNTER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/13/15 AT 1722 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- Gap around penetration 1Z43H805D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) and the Unit 1 Transformer Room (Fire Area 1019).
- Gaps in a fire barrier around a unistrut, below penetration 1Z43H012D, that are approximately 7 deep and into the CMU core located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K)
- Gap in the top corner of the wall, above 1Z43H842D that protrudes into the CMU approximately 7 deep located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K)
- Two anchor bolt holes east of penetration 1Z43H810D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Heissierer).

* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO CHARLES TEAL ON 04/14/15 AT 1728 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 5" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the west wall in Unit 1 East 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1017 and Fire Area 1016).

- A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the east wall in the Unit 1 West 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1016 and Fire Area 1017).

- A " wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H522D located between the Unit 1 West 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1016) and U1 East 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1017).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10055316; CR 10055377"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 50958
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ALCOA WORLD ALUMINA ATLANTIC
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: 05186
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARAS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/06/2015
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE BROKEN SHUTTER

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On April 6, 2015, the licensee radiation safety officer reported that a density measuring device, ThermoFisher Scientific model 5201, with Texas Nuclear Source Cesium-137, 100 millicuries, serial number GV-2806 had a broken shutter. The shutter block is disconnected from the arm. A ThermoFisher Scientific service technician has been contacted and scheduled to repair the gauge at the site. The shutter remains in the closed position until repairs are completed. There is no exposure hazard to any individual. Updates will be provided in accordance with SA300 guidelines."

Texas Incident Number: I-9297

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 50959
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: JANX
Region: 1
City: MONTROSE BOROUGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1363
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH M. MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/06/2015
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INABILITY TO RETRACT A RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email/fax:

"An 84 curie iridium-192 (lr-192) source being housed in a Source Production & Equipment Company (SPEC) 150 industrial radiography camera could not be retracted back into the exposure device. The source eventually was able to be retrieved without any over exposures to either the workers or the general public..

"The cable broke and became dislodged from the gear mechanism within the exposure device itself. The cable was manually pulled to return the lr-192 source to its locked position within the exposure device. It is unknown at this time why the cable broke."

PA Event Report ID No.: PA150009

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 50963
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: BAYER MATERIALSCIENCE LLC
Region: 4
City: BAYTOWN State: TX
County:
License #: 01577
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/07/2015
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON A FIXED GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Texas via fax:

"On April 7, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that they were unable to close the shutter on a Berthold Model LB 300 IRL Type 1 source holder containing three Cobalt - 60 sources. The licensee found the problem during routine checks. The RSO stated they had contacted the manufacturer for assistance. The RSO stated there was no increased risk of exposure to members of the general public or the employees at the facility. This Agency contacted the manufacturer on April 7, 2015 and requested the seal source and device (SSD) data sheet for the device. At 1206 hours [CDT], the Agency received an email from the manufacturer containing the SSD sheet for the gauge. The email also stated the gauge had been repaired and was now operating properly. The specifics of the event were not provided by the RSO as he was still investigating the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9298

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 50984
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ALLAN BRIESE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/15/2015
Notification Time: 02:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2015
Event Time: 19:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SODIUM HYDROXIDE SPILL ONSITE EXCEEDING REPORTABLE QUANTITY

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"Arizona Public Service Co. made an offsite notification to the National Response Center regarding an approximately 3500 gallon caustic (8% sodium hydroxide) spill due to an improper valve lineup. The spill occurred at the Water Reclamation Facility (produces water for cooling towers and power plant and is located outside the Security Owner Controlled Area) in the area of the Fire Protection tanks (additional liquid was contained in a containment structure at the release location, and in a nearby concrete lined storm ditch on site). The release has been isolated, the immediate area has been barricaded. The quantity released exceeded the Reportable Quantity for sodium hydroxide (RQ of 1,000 pounds) and was therefore reported. Additionally, the state [Arizona] and county [Maricopa] have also been notified. There was no impact to the operation of the power units, aquifer or personnel onsite or offsite.

"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Wednesday, April 15, 2015