| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/10/2015 - 04/13/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50801 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 02/10/2015
Notification Time: 10:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2015
Event Time: 02:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text VOIDS IDENTIFIED THAT RESULT IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION
"On February 10, 2015, Prairie Island Unit 1 was shutdown in Mode 3 during a planned outage. Ultrasonic testing in support of Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) void verifications identified existing voids with calculated volumes in excess of the OPERABILITY limits specified by the procedure. This rendered both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) systems inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 0250 [CST].
"The station took prompt actions to vent the identified voids. The void at 1 RH-12 was vented to within acceptable limits allowing LCO 3.0.3 to be exited at 0538 on February 10. Venting at 1RH-11 is in progress.
"Voiding was identified at location 1-RH-11 with a calculated volume of 62.21 cubic inches with an OPERABILITY limit of 11.62 cubic inches.
"Voiding was identified at location 1-RH-12 with a calculated volume of 350 cubic inches with an OPERABILITY limit of 22.84 cubic inches.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as Safety Injection was available and the time both trains of RHR were INOPERABLE was limited.
"This event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM TOM HOLT TO JEFF HERRERA AT 1444 EDT ON 4/11/15 * * *
"Further analysis was performed on the two void locations, 1RH-11 and 1RH-12. Based on this additional analysis from AREVA, it was determined that the void located at 1RH-11 (RHR Train A) was operable. The calculations for past operability at inspection location 1RH-11 provides reasonable assurance that a void of 65 cubic inches will not generate forces that will fault any piping and supports. The void location at 1RH-12 (RHR Train B) was considered inoperable due to exceeding current procedural operability limits. The void located at 1RH-11 was determined to be nonconforming due to exceeding procedural design basis limits.
"Therefore, with RHR Train A determined to be operable, this event was not an 8-hour notification for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, nor a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R3DO (Skokowski). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50954 | Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/05/2015
Notification Time: 06:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2015
Event Time: 11:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
70.50(b)(4) - FIRE/EXPLOSION
| Person (Organization):
SHAKUR WALKER (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Event Text UNPLANNED CHEMICAL REACTION
"On April 4,2015, at approximately 1151 [EDT], a chemical reaction occurred in a 2-liter bottle of cleanup materials. The bottle was located in a storage rack. The chemical reaction caused the bottle to breach, releasing some of the contents into the immediate area around the storage rack. There were no individuals in the area where the bottle was stored when the breach occurred. The area has been roped off and is in the process of being cleaned up. There were no personnel injuries or exposures. The event is currently being investigated.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50973 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/11/2015
Notification Time: 01:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2015
Event Time: 23:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 37 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM CAUSED BY MAIN TURBINE TRIP DUE TO DEGRADING MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM
"At 2346 EDT on April 10, 2015, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to a main turbine trip caused by loss of turbine steam seals and degrading main condenser vacuum.
"Unit 2 reactor was being shutdown for a refueling outage. At approximately 37 percent power, turbine steam seals were lost resulting in a degrading vacuum. The vacuum degraded quickly, resulting in a main turbine trip before the reactor operator could insert a manual scram. At 37 percent power, the turbine trip caused an automatic scram. This occurred during a transfer from normal steam seal supply to the auxiliary boiler supply. All control rods [fully] inserted. Reactor water level lowered to +2 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolation. No ECCS actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling]. No steam relief valves opened. The reactor recirculation pumps tripped on EOC-RPT due to the turbine trip at power.
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the cause of the loss of turbine steam seals is underway.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA [Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency] and press release will occur."
Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Turbine steam seals were restored to the normal steam supply and condenser vacuum was restored. Decay heat is being removed via the steam bypass valves to the condenser. Unit 2 is proceeding with their cooldown to support the scheduled refueling outage. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50974 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/11/2015
Notification Time: 05:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2015
Event Time: 00:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF RUNNING FANS
"On April 11, 2015 at 0051 EDT, Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2, loss of required differential pressure.
"The inoperability was caused by a loss of normal Zone 2 differential pressure due to loss of running fans and failure to start of standby fans. The cause is being investigated.
"Engineering and maintenance personnel implemented a Temporary Engineering Change, which allowed restoration of one set of fans and dampers. Normal secondary containment differential pressure was restored. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was exited at 0320 EDT.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
Temporary Engineering Change consisted of removing air to a previously running fan discharge damper so it would close and allow standby fans to start. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50976 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: LONNIE CRAWFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/11/2015
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2015
Event Time: 09:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text DRYWELL LEAKAGE POINT IDENTIFIED
"On 4/11/15, Unit 2 drywell entry was performed during a planned Unit 2 refueling inspection outage. At 0958 EDT, the licensee identified leakage from a weld on the 3/4 inch seal vent piping connected to the 2A reactor recirculation pump seal area. The location is within the reactor recirculation loop isolation valves, therefore it is isolable from the reactor vessel. The piping is ASME Class 2 and is a reactor coolant pressure boundary. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery.
"This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50977 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES PIKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/11/2015
Notification Time: 22:15 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2015
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SAFETY INJECTION TANK OUTLET PIPING LEAK
"During investigation of a small leak on the 2B2 Safety Injection Tank inside Saint Lucie Unit 2 containment, a through wall flaw was identified on Class 2 piping associated with the 2B2 Safety Injection Tank. The 2B2 Safety Injection Tank was declared inoperable on April 11, 2015 at 1204 EDT and Unit 2 entered a 24-hour shutdown action statement for Technical Specification 3.5.1.b. On April 11, 2015 at 2100 EDT, Unit 2 initiated a plant shutdown in compliance with Technical Specifications.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i)"
The electrical grid is stable and no safety-related equipment that would affect a safe shutdown was out of service at the time of the report.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50979 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN WALKOWIAK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 04/12/2015
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2015
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY
"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) to notify the NRC of a temporary loss of the Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary. The safety function of the CRE boundary is to ensure the in-leakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the in-leakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. In addition to an intact CRE boundary maintaining CRE occupant dose from a large radioactive release below the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequence analysis for DBAs, it also ensures the occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.
"The loss of the CRE boundary was due to a failed latching mechanism for a CRE boundary door used for normal passage of personnel into and out of the CRE. The failure of the door to latch as designed is considered a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery, and is therefore reportable as required by paragraph 50.72(b)(3), 'Eight-hour reports.'
"Procedural controls have restored the safety function of the CRE boundary by mechanically locking the subject door in the closed position through the use of a specifically designed mechanical strong-back until a permanent repair is made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |