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Event Notification Report for March 23, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/20/2015 - 03/23/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48798 50886 50892 50911 50914 50915 50916

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Part 21 Event Number: 48798
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CRYDOM, INC
Region: 1
City: DANBURY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - DUAL ALARM MODULES THAT MAY CONTAIN FAULTY DIODES IN SINGLE STATE RELAYS

The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:

"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before
2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.

"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.

"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.

"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."

Affected components:

DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional),
Part number EIP-E287PA-1

SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional),
Part number EIP-E289PA-1

DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3

SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-4

DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3

SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-4, -20

DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number
NUS-A131PA

Affected Facilities:

Beaver Valley
Farley
Ginna
Indian Point 2/3
Kewaunee
North Anna
Prairie Island
Surry
Turkey Point

* * * UPDATE AT 1625 EDT ON 3/20/2015 FROM VINCE CHERMAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax. Only information that has changed is being attached below.

"Thirteen plants were notified during the original notification. On March 10, 2015, one affected plant reported that when one SSR failed, its output consisted of high frequency noise at a reduced duty cycle. This noise caused overheating and failure of resistors in an RC filter connected to the alarm module output. Plants experiencing SSR failures should check downstream elements for possible consequential damage. Scientec has not received any other reports of this condition. The condition was reevaluated and the Part 21 evaluation was revised. The evaluation concluded that this newly identified condition does not impact the original defect as reported."

Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Roach), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50886
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ST. JUDE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79037-Ll5
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE ARNOTT
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 03/13/2015
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RESEARCH IRRADIATOR DOOR FAILED TO OPEN

The following was received from the State of Tennessee via email:

"The door to a J. L. Shepherd Mark 1-68 irradiator containing 10,000 curies (assayed 2/11/2002) of Cesium 137, being used to irradiate mice, would not open. The source was determined to be in the safe position. St. Jude trustworthiness-approved radiation safety and biomedical engineering (BME) personnel responded and attempted to extract the mice without success. A call to the licensed service representative went unanswered. The Associate Radiation Safety Officer who was present approved BME [personnel] to take measures to disengage the door. This involved breaking security seals on the timer control mechanism and door interlock box. Also, the lock on the interlock box was cut since the key was not present. Strict radiological controls were employed including; badging all personnel, survey meter present, continuous health physicist presence, confirmation of source in safe position, and unplugging irradiator to ensure the source could not move. The animals were extracted without incident. The irradiator was locked and removed from service. The service representative came March 11, 2015, and repaired the unit such that it was fully operational. Evidently, the door interlock switch that had been replaced in January had failed."

TN Event Report ID Number: TN-15-036

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Agreement State Event Number: 50892
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BIG WEST OIL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: NORTH SALT LAKE State: UT
County:
License #: UT 0600256
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 03/13/2015
Notification Time: 19:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2015
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER OPEN IMPROPERLY DURING MAINTENANCE WORK

The following is a synopsis of information received from the State of Utah:

Two workers entered a confined space to perform work near a fixed gauge. One of the workers remained in the area for 9 minutes and the other remained in the area for 90 minutes. It was later determined that the fixed gauge shutter had not been closed. Surveys conducted by the licensee to measure dose rates in the area where the workers had been present indicated dose rates ranging from 0.5 mR/hr to 4 mR/hr. Utah inspectors performed confirmatory measurements that indicated dose rates between 0.97 mR/hr and 2.2 mR/hr.

Utah Event ID Number: UT150001

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Part 21 Event Number: 50911
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL LLC
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS SWANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/20/2015
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART-21 REPORT - VALVE SEAT LEAKAGE DEFECT

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile:

"A valve plug originally supplied as a spare parts order was returned to Fisher after the customer discovered a machining error was present on the plug. The Type 461 valve plug has a groove machined across the seating surface of the plug. This groove is required to provide a controlled leak rate thru the valve when the plug is on the seat. The issue recently identified shows that the machined groove did not extend through the full length of the seat. This could lead to a situation in which the intended/required leakage for this design is not fully achieved."

Affected plants are: Waterford-3 and St Lucie.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50914
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE STROPE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/21/2015
Notification Time: 04:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2015
Event Time: 00:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOORS OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY

"At 0030 CDT, on March 21, 2015, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were opened concurrently by two separate individuals. The doors being open at the same time caused a failure to meet SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.2 to verify that either the outer door(s) or the inner door(s) in each Secondary Containment access opening are closed. The identified condition caused Secondary Containment to be considered inoperable per TS LCO [Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.6.4.1. Upon discovery, immediate action was taken to close the doors. The doors were open concurrently for a momentary amount of time. The action to close the door allowed SR 3.6.4.1.2 to be met, and restored Secondary Containment to an operable status.

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50915
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LEE ROY ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/21/2015
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2015
Event Time: 05:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREGORY ROACH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO CONDENSATION IN STEAM LINE

"At 0537 CDT on March 21, 2015, following the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system quarterly pump and valve surveillance, after HPCI was removed from service, an alarm for the HPCI Turbine Inlet High Drain Pot Level did not reset. This indicated that LS-23-90 (HPCI Steam Supply Drain High Level Bypass) did not reset, which could be an indication that condensate exists in the steam line. The system responded as designed but the alarm did not clear as expected. Without assurance that the condensate has been removed from the HPCI steam line, HPCI remains inoperable for reasons other than the planned surveillance. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery.

"The health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition with no initiating event in progress.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The State of Minnesota will be notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50916
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GEORGE VOISHNIS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 03/22/2015
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2015
Event Time: 14:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO APRM HI HI SIGNAL

"RPS Actuation (scram) on a Hi-Hi APRM [average power range monitor] signal [which] occurred due to a pressure spike following a failure of the EPR (Electric Pressure Regulator). All Rods Inserted. All systems responded normally. No other safety system actuations occurred. Plant will proceed to a cold shut down condition."

The plant is in a normal electrical lineup. Core cooling is being maintained by the bypass valves to the condenser.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local and state governments. A press release is planned by the licensee.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, March 23, 2015
Monday, March 23, 2015