Event Notification Report for March 05, 2015

UNIT 2 DECLARES UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO INABILITY TO VALIDATE A CONTAINMENT FIRE ALARM WITHIN 15 MINUTES

"The Instrument Air Containment Isolation failed closed on Unit 2. This isolated normal letdown / excess letdown and required Pressurizer level to be maintained by diverting Pressurizer level to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. The Pressurizer Relief Tank rupture disc ruptured which resulted in a fire alarm in Unit 2 Containment. The fire alarm could not be validated within 15 minutes which resulted in a declaration of an Unusual Event based on EAL HU2.1. The loss of Instrument Air to Unit 2 Containment resulted in a loss of cooling to the reactor vessel gap and support cooling systems. Due to the loss of reactor vessel ventilation systems a plant shutdown to Mode 3 has been initiated. No radioactive releases to the environment are in progress or expected to occur. The public health and safety has not been jeopardized."

The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and does plan to issue a press release.

Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA).

* * * UPDATE AT 0130 EST ON 03/06/15 FROM TERRY BACON TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

"At 1725 [CST] on 3/5/15 Instrument Air to Unit 2 containment was established. Letdown was then reestablished. These actions stabilized the plant and stopped the 30 GPM [gallons per minute] identified leakage out of the PZR Relief Tank rupture disc into containment. This condition is what caused the fire detection alarm in containment, and is also Unusual Event criteria. Unit 2 containment was entered and it was confirmed that NO fire existed in containment. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0018 CST on 3/6/15 based on no fire and no identified RCS leakage into containment. The plant is currently in Mode 3. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized."

The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and does plan to issue a press release.

Notified R3DO (Stone), EO (Ross-Lee) and IRD (Stapleton).

Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO ASSISTANT RADIOGRAPHER

The following information was obtained from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"We [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] have been notified by Desert NDT (OK-32104-01) located in Elk City, OK, that the dosimetry report for the February 2015 monitoring period showed a dose of 5780 mR for one of their assistant radiographers. They also report that the individual's daily pocket dosimetry readings for this period do not correlate with this result. The investigation is ongoing."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RESEARCH IRRADIATOR DOOR FAILED TO OPEN

The following was received from the State of Tennessee via email:

"The door to a J. L. Shepherd Mark 1-68 irradiator containing 10,000 curies (assayed 2/11/2002) of Cesium 137, being used to irradiate mice, would not open. The source was determined to be in the safe position. St. Jude trustworthiness-approved radiation safety and biomedical engineering (BME) personnel responded and attempted to extract the mice without success. A call to the licensed service representative went unanswered. The Associate Radiation Safety Officer who was present approved BME [personnel] to take measures to disengage the door. This involved breaking security seals on the timer control mechanism and door interlock box. Also, the lock on the interlock box was cut since the key was not present. Strict radiological controls were employed including; badging all personnel, survey meter present, continuous health physicist presence, confirmation of source in safe position, and unplugging irradiator to ensure the source could not move. The animals were extracted without incident. The irradiator was locked and removed from service. The service representative came March 11, 2015, and repaired the unit such that it was fully operational. Evidently, the door interlock switch that had been replaced in January had failed."

TN Event Report ID Number: TN-15-036

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WELL LOGGING TRITIUM SOURCE BROKEN OPEN DURING MAINTENANCE

The following report was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:

"On June 10, 2015 the licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] reporting that an Agency inspector was at the site inspecting the facility. The inspector informed the licensee that a reportable event occurred and was not reported as required. The licensee was making notification that on March 5, 2015, during repair of a pulsed neutron generator tool, the work counter, internal casing and housing of the tool had contamination from a sealed tritium tube. The tube was manufactured by Thermo Fisher, ID 163-D101-S, on April 19, 2013 at an activity rating of 3 curies. The licensee explained that during the check on the tool, readings were seen on the meter. The area was checked and the contamination found and cleared from the tool and counter. The area was tested with wipes and counted. The highest count was 680 cps [counts per second]. The area was wiped clean and the clean up material is in a sealed drum awaiting disposal. The amount of contamination was calculated and the licensee explained he read through the regulations and determined the level of exposure was not reportable. The calculated dose was not provided. No badges were sent to the processor for reading. The tool itself was salvaged and reworked into a new usable tool with a new serial number. A detailed description of the event was requested from the licensee. Investigation into this case is ongoing. Update will be made in accordance with SA300 guidelines."

Texas Report: I-9319

* * * RETRACTED AT 1000 EDT ON 6/12/15 FROM IRENE CASARES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following retraction was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"More complete information was obtained from the licensee. The pulse neutron generator tool was damaged and the tritium tube was leaking material, contaminating the internal tool and the countertop during repair process. The employee working on the tool noticed increased readings on his survey instrument and immediately checked the tritium tube to find the contamination. The material was confined to the tool and countertop. The tube activity is listed as 3 curies. The employee notified his radiation safety officer of the damaged tool and a dose rate was calculated. The RSO had calculated 40,800 CPM = 680 CPS (background was 120 CPS), 680 CPS x .20 [microSv]/hour (calibration factor) = 136 [microSv]/hour, 136 [microSv]/hour = 0.0136 REM / hour for the dose. The release did not exceed regulatory limits and was not in an operable condition when being repaired. The contaminated area did not require restricted access and the quantity of material did not meet the annual limits on intake exposure. The radioactivity detected in the tool was remediated immediately and contaminated waste [was placed in a] drum for disposal. No aspect of the event met any reporting criteria. It has been determined this was not a reportable event."

Notified the R4DO (Werner) and NMSS Events Notification (via email).