| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/04/2015 - 03/05/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50152 | Rep Org: RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: CARDIOVASCULAR INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND
Region: 1
City: PROVIDENCE State: RI
County:
License #: 7b-137-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARMA WARING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/30/2014
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (E-MA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CALIBRATION SOURCE
"On February 12, 2014, the nuclear cardiology and radiation safety staff concluded, a Cesium-137 Rod
Source; 1059 microCi on November 11/11/2003; Manufactured by Bench Mark; Serial Number: BM0837- 002-23; Model Number: BM08, was lost.
"Following discovery of the lost source, the nuclear cardiology staff and this consultant conducted an extensive search of the nuclear cardiology imaging room and hot lab in an effort to find the source. Unfortunately, we were unsuccessful in locating the calibration rod. The lost source was routinely stored in the locked hot lab cabinet in a leaded pig. The only time the source was removed from the leaded pig was to perform daily calibrations of the well counter. Through our internal investigation we were unable to ascertain the event that attributed to the missing source.
"Subsequently, contacted [the Rhode Island Department of Health], to provide official notice that the source was lost. At the time of the incident, the activity of the source was calculated at 0.083 microCi. On February 21,2014 a replacement Cs-137 Button Source; 6.60 microCi on 12/18/2009; Manufactured by NEN was added to the Sealed Source Inventory. The new source is stored in the locked hot lab cabinet in a leaded vial. The new source is used for instrument calibrations on the well counter. The nuclear cardiology staff will conduct a daily inventory of the sealed sources to assure completeness."
RI Event Reference 2014-002
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARMA WARING (VIA FAX) ON 3/5/15 AT 1535 EST
The State of Rhode Island considers this report closed.
NMED Item #120538.
Notified R1DO (Burritt) via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50351 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS
"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.
"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"
In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report: 898908."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Freeman).
* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."
Condition Report: 10000607
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai).
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
Condition Report: 10013077
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *
"During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.
"Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015
"Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report 10015417
"Condition Report 10015437"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (McCoy).
* * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *
"During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
CR 10021623
Notified R2DO (HAAG).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *
"During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria:
- Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040
- A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013
"These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10028364
"CR 10028366"
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *
"During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408.
"The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10032202"
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:
- Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and
- Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.).
"These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10035730"
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes). |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 50691 | Rep Org: ABB GROUP
Licensee: ABB GROUP
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT REGARDING KF RELAYS
"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.
"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.
"Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director"
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX ON 3/5/15 AT 1522 EST * * *
"This letter is an update to the Part 21 Notification submitted on December 17, 2014, 'Potential defect regarding KF relay zero period acceleration (ZPA) rating'.
"ABB reminds all licensees, that per ABB KF Under-frequency relays, Instruction Leaflet 41-503.21A effective April 1997, 'the normally closed contact at terminal number 2 should not be used for critical circuits due to a low fragility rating'.
"ABB [has] conducted the following actions:
-ABB has performed an initial extent of condition evaluation to determine if this situation exists in other electromechanical IE qualified relays. There are no additional findings at this time.
-ABB issued a corrective action to improve existing engineering qualification procedures that govern qualification by similarity.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Group (via email). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50849 | Rep Org: NANTICOKE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: NANTICOKE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: SEAFORD State: DE
County:
License #: 07-17618-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIANNA RETZLAFF
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 02/25/2015
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text GERMANIUM-68 SOURCES LOST DURING SHIPMENT
On 1/30/2015, two packages containing radioactive materials were shipped via common carrier from Nanticoke Memorial Hospital in Seaford, DE to Sanders Medical Products, Inc. in Knoxville, TN for disposal. One package arrived on 2/3/2015. The second package has not arrived, and on 2/13/2015, the second package was declared lost. The lost package contained two Germanium-68 source rods used in daily calibration of the hospital's PET scanner. Activity of the source rods was less than 0.3 millicuries each (0.6 millicuries total). Serial numbers for the source rods are: K4-124 and K4-125. The common carrier has completed a search for the lost package with negative results. The last known location of the lost package was in Harrington, DE where it was scanned on 1/30/2015.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50850 | Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ECS MID-ATLANTIC CHANTILLY
Region: 1
City: CHANTILLY State: VA
County: FAIRFAX
License #: 107-314-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/25/2015
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT A TEMPORARY JOBSITE
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:
"While performing testing at a temporary jobsite in Alexandria [VA], the portable moisture/density gauge (CPN MC1DR, Serial # MD40907569) was run over by a bulldozer. The sources were in the shielded position and the shielding integrity was not damaged. A survey of the gauge was performed by the licensee and readings observed were between 1 and 2 mrem/hr on contact. The gauge was packaged and returned to the office where a wipe test was taken and the analysis was performed by the manufacturer/distributor with results showing no contamination. The gauge is being returned to the manufacturer/distributor. The VRMP [Virginia Radioactive Materials Program] is reviewing the licensee's report and corrective actions."
The gauge contains two (2) sources; 50 mCi Am-241/Be and 10 mCi Cs-137.
Virginia Event Report ID # VA-15-03 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50863 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM FAIRCLOTH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 03/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2015
Event Time: 10:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text SUPPLEMENTAL WORKER FOUND WITH SYNTHETIC URINE
A non-licensed, non-supervisory supplemental worker was found with synthetic urine on their person during a search at the security entrance station. The individual's access was terminated on site and in PADS.
The NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Regional Inspector was notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50864 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARIAZ DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 03/04/2015
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2015
Event Time: 14:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELEVATED TRITIUM DETECTED ONSITE
"On March 3, 2015, PSEG [Public Service Enterprise Group] confirmed the presence of tritium at a concentration of approximately [0.01] microCurie/ml in ice samples taken in a small area immediately adjacent to the north side of the Hope Creek Turbine Building. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Nuclear Engineering was notified at 1408 [EST] on March 4, 2015, in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.
"Samples were taken and analyzed in response to ice which was observed to be forming along the exterior of the north Turbine Building wall. Sample results show detectable tritium is confined within the site boundary and there is no impact to the health and safety of the employees or the public.
"A catch containment was installed in the affected area. PSEG is continuing to evaluate this issue and develop corrective actions.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The local Township will be notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50866 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/05/2015
Notification Time: 05:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2015
Event Time: 04:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2015 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (RA)
BILL DEAN (ET)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation | Event Text UNIT 2 DECLARES UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO INABILITY TO VALIDATE A CONTAINMENT FIRE ALARM WITHIN 15 MINUTES
"The Instrument Air Containment Isolation failed closed on Unit 2. This isolated normal letdown / excess letdown and required Pressurizer level to be maintained by diverting Pressurizer level to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. The Pressurizer Relief Tank rupture disc ruptured which resulted in a fire alarm in Unit 2 Containment. The fire alarm could not be validated within 15 minutes which resulted in a declaration of an Unusual Event based on EAL HU2.1. The loss of Instrument Air to Unit 2 Containment resulted in a loss of cooling to the reactor vessel gap and support cooling systems. Due to the loss of reactor vessel ventilation systems a plant shutdown to Mode 3 has been initiated. No radioactive releases to the environment are in progress or expected to occur. The public health and safety has not been jeopardized."
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and does plan to issue a press release.
Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA).
* * * UPDATE AT 0130 EST ON 03/06/15 FROM TERRY BACON TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
"At 1725 [CST] on 3/5/15 Instrument Air to Unit 2 containment was established. Letdown was then reestablished. These actions stabilized the plant and stopped the 30 GPM [gallons per minute] identified leakage out of the PZR Relief Tank rupture disc into containment. This condition is what caused the fire detection alarm in containment, and is also Unusual Event criteria. Unit 2 containment was entered and it was confirmed that NO fire existed in containment. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0018 CST on 3/6/15 based on no fire and no identified RCS leakage into containment. The plant is currently in Mode 3. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized."
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector and does plan to issue a press release.
Notified R3DO (Stone), EO (Ross-Lee) and IRD (Stapleton).
Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA). | |