| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/24/2015 - 02/25/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50826 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 00:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2015
Event Time: 16:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL VENT BOUNDARY INOPERABLE
"On February 16, 2015, at 1644 [CST], Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Envelope Boundary was declared inoperable when it was discovered that Door 158, Auxiliary Building to 122 Control Room Chiller Room, would not latch. Both trains of Control Room Special Ventilation were declared inoperable and Tech Spec LCO 3.7.10 Condition B was entered. In addition, with the Control Room Envelope Boundary inoperable, Tech Spec 3.7.11 Condition E was required to be entered due to both Control Room Chillers inoperable. The required actions of Tech Spec 3.7.11 Condition E required both Units to enter Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3. As a mitigating action, station personnel were dispatched to secure Door 158. This condition was corrected on February 16, 2015, at 1709 [CST] when the deadbolt was engaged to maintain Door 158 closed. Tech Specs 3.7.10 Condition B, 3.7.11 Condition E, and 3.0.3 were all exited at 1709 [CST] February 16, 2015.
"This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.
"Based on immediate implementation of mitigating actions and restoration of the Control Room Envelope, the protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"This event has been entered into the sites Corrective Action Program.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE AT 1220 EST ON 02/24/15 FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"After discussions and interviews with personnel involved, it was determined that the Aux Building Operators found Door 158 latched. After passing through the door, the Operators checked to ensure the door was latched and discovered it was sticking and required assistance to latch by agitating the latch operating mechanism. The door was checked additional times and the door would latch with assistance. The Operators ensured the door was latched and notified the Control Room at 1644 [CST]. When the Operators installed the dead bolt and padlock at 1709 [CST], the door was still latched. As the door was never left unlatched and was always able to latch, the door was operable and there was no loss of safety function.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50828 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOJI ORTEGO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 02/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2015
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
Walmart store #2949 in Long Beach, CA, reported the loss of two exit signs containing tritium. The signs were replaced with non-tritium exit signs and were scheduled to be collected for disposal. The production date and activity of the missing signs are unknown at this time.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50847 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL MARVEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/24/2015
Notification Time: 01:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2015
Event Time: 21:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE SIGNAL
"At 2140 EST on 02/23/2015, Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid reactor high pressure signal (1096#). The reactor high pressure signal was caused by the closure of the 1C inboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV), causing reactor pressure to rise, exceeding the reactor protection system (RPS) setpoint of 1096# pressure.
"The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the main steam bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using the feedwater system.
"The closure of the 1C inboard MSIV appears to have been caused by a loss of primary containment instrument gas (PCIG) pneumatic supply to the valve. Instrument air was aligned to the remaining MSIV's.
"Limerick Unit 1 will remain in Hot Shutdown until repairs can be made."
All rods inserted into the core during the scram. No relief or safety valves actuated during the transient. The electric grid is stable and supplying all plant loads. There was no affect on Unit 2.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, and Berks, Chester and Montgomery counties. | |