Event Notification Report for February 11, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/10/2015 - 02/11/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50812
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREGORY L. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREGORY L. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/11/2015
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2015
Event Time: 08:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2015
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2015
Event Time: 08:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM SUCTION PATH ISOLATION
"While performing 3-SR-3.5.1.2(HPCI) High Pressure Coolant Injection System Monthly Valve Position Verification, Operators closed the supply breaker for 3-FCV-2-166, CST #3 EMERGENCY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE, in order to verify the valve is in its required OPEN position. When the breaker was closed, the position indication 3-ZI-2-166 indicated OPEN and it was observed that the valve was traveling closed. The operator at the breaker reported that the breaker contactor energized when the breaker was closed. Control Room Operators re-opened 3-FCV-2-166 using the hand switch in the control room and when the valve indicated full open, directed the operator in the field to open the breaker for 3-FCV-2-166. Valve 3-FCV-2-166 isolates both the HPCI and [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] RCIC suction path from the Condensate storage tank, both HPCI and RCIC were declared inoperable.
"The duration of the loss of suction path the HPCI and RCIC was 4 minutes.
"Applicable Technical Specification required actions were entered for the concurrent HPCI and RCIC inoperability and exited when the suction path was restored.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
"While performing 3-SR-3.5.1.2(HPCI) High Pressure Coolant Injection System Monthly Valve Position Verification, Operators closed the supply breaker for 3-FCV-2-166, CST #3 EMERGENCY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE, in order to verify the valve is in its required OPEN position. When the breaker was closed, the position indication 3-ZI-2-166 indicated OPEN and it was observed that the valve was traveling closed. The operator at the breaker reported that the breaker contactor energized when the breaker was closed. Control Room Operators re-opened 3-FCV-2-166 using the hand switch in the control room and when the valve indicated full open, directed the operator in the field to open the breaker for 3-FCV-2-166. Valve 3-FCV-2-166 isolates both the HPCI and [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] RCIC suction path from the Condensate storage tank, both HPCI and RCIC were declared inoperable.
"The duration of the loss of suction path the HPCI and RCIC was 4 minutes.
"Applicable Technical Specification required actions were entered for the concurrent HPCI and RCIC inoperability and exited when the suction path was restored.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50813
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOSH FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOSH FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 02/11/2015
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2015
Event Time: 19:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2015
Notification Time: 23:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/11/2015
Event Time: 19:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NINE MILE POINT MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.
"At 1941 EST on 02/11/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 1 second. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.
"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'
"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified."
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.
"At 1941 EST on 02/11/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 1 second. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.
"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'
"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified."