Event Notification Report for February 09, 2015

STACK HIGH RANGE RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

The Unit 2 Stack High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-8168) was removed for service for planned maintenance. There is no significant effect of this planned maintenance on the plant.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut and Waterford township.

PART 21 REPORT - POSSIBLE ASSEMBLY ERROR IN SOLENOID VALVE

"[The licensee] has discovered a possible assembly error that may result in compromising the capability to isolate the solenoid housing internals from a LOCA environment on some of our solenoid valve models that use grafoil packing for sealing the NEMA 4 enclosure. We are in the process of identifying the valve models affected and will notify all customers affected."

Description of Defect/Non-Compliance:

"As noted on MRR997W the packing ring which seals the solenoid on valve model V526-5631-36 used in Qualification and Production were not matched to the procedure invoked on valve drawing."

SAFETY INJECTION TANK LEVEL RESULTS IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION

"On October 14, 2013 a calculation for the containment internal structural analysis was revised and accepted by the station. This calculation limited the Safety injection tank level to 74%. On October 16, 2013 Safety injection tank level was raised to 100% for approximately 13 hours in preparations for plant start-up. While the plant was safely in a cold shutdown condition, this represents a reportable unanalyzed condition. This issue is of a historical nature and does not question the current operability of any plant systems or structures. This was self identified during a Fort Calhoun calculation review."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM MICHAEL PEAK TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2335 EDT ON 3/12/15 * * *

"Following review of the reported event, attendant calculations and associated documentation, engineering personnel determined that the condition described in event notification EN50800 did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

"Revision 1 of a calculation for the containment internal structural analysis demonstrated that when the safety injection tanks 'B' and 'D' are 100% filled in an outage condition, approximately a 10% safety margin is maintained. This revision was the calculation of record at the time the safety injection tank levels were raised above 74%, in October, 2013.

"Revision 2 of the calculation was completed to remove excess conservatism and to provide a closer representation of available margin. In addition, margin was also improved by limiting tank level to 74%. However, improving margin by limiting tank level to 74% does not result in an unanalyzed condition when tank level is 100%, as adequate margin remains.

"Therefore this event is being retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Okeefe).

AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT DELIVERED TO THE WRONG LOCATION

The following information is an excerpt from a report received from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:


"On 02/09/2015, the Director of Regulatory Affairs for QSA Global Notified the [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] LDEQ about an incident where the common carrier delivered a 'crate/container' of [Radioactive Materials] RAM to the Baton Rouge, LA address that was intended for Seoul, South Korea. The call was received approximately 9:00 am CST at the Department. The caller stated the shipment was Ir-192 wafers/disc that were to be assembled into radioactive sealed sources. [The Director of Regulatory Affairs for QSA Global] stated he believed the shipment involves Category #1 quantities that should be reported.

"The delivery error resulted in a partial shipment bound for Asia being delivered to the Corporation's Baton Rouge, LA location.

"One of the Asia bound containers was 'bound/attached' to the container destined for Baton Rouge location at the Memphis Hub belonging to the common carrier. The other container went on to Asia. The international paperwork would document the partial receipt of the first container and the other when it was delivered. The common carrier was notified of the incorrect delivery. The common carrier was to pick up the Asia container on 02/10/2015 at QSA Baton Rouge facility and take it to the common carrier terminal in Kenner, LA. Then the container would be forwarded to Asia from Kenner, LA.

"Three containers, each having radioactive material in excess of Category 1 quantities were being shipped from the QSA Global Burlington, MA facility. Two were addressed to Seoul, South Korea and one was being shipped to Baton Rouge, LA. The labeling on one of the Korean containers was not legible or missing and it was bound to the container going to Baton Rouge, LA. After the delivery was made to Baton Rouge and the shipment was being surveyed/assessed it was learned they had received a wrong container and was in excess of the licensed activity for Ir-192.

"The Baton Rouge facility was compliant for the IC principles and Radiation Safety procedures/aspects for the receipt activities. The Department, LDEQ, determined that it would grant an emergency verbal activity increase for this situation. This would hold the radioactive material safe and secure until the common carrier could retrieve the excess material. The NRC, Region IV, was made aware of this situation on 02/09/2015, and the circumstances involving the common carrier error. Region IV was told QSA Global Burlington was going to be making the proper notifications/reports to the regulatory agencies. This was the information provided by [The Director of Regulatory Affairs for QSA Global].

"However, on the morning of 02/10/2015, the NRC Region IV notified LDEQ that a report about this situation could not be located within his agency. [the Director of Regulatory Affairs for QSA Global] was notified and he was unaware the notifications had not been made. He stated he would look into the situation. A call was placed to the Baton Rouge facility around 9:00 am [EST]. At that time, it was learned the common carrier was at the Baton Rouge facility to retrieve the container of radioactive material and forward it to South Korea. At this time LDEQ is still waiting on [The Director of Regulatory Affairs for QSA Global]'s explanation for the notifications not being made.

"A fact finding discussion resulted in a plan of control and containment until the common carrier could take possession of the container.

"LDEQ considers this incident closed."

Louisiana Event Report ID No: LA15004