Event Notification Report for February 05, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/04/2015 - 02/05/2015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50789
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DIRK DRINKARD
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DIRK DRINKARD
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 02/05/2015
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2015
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2015
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2015
Event Time: 11:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION NON-FUNCTIONAL
"At approximately 1130 EST on 2/5/15, the site discovered degradation of the technical support center ventilation air handling unit. Compensatory measures were established during the period that the ventilation system was non-functional. The TSC ventilation system was subsequently restored to functional status."
The TSC ventilation system was restored at approximately 1834 EST on 2/5/15. The issue was a failure of the automatic TSC air recirculation function due to a tripped circuit breaker.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 1130 EST on 2/5/15, the site discovered degradation of the technical support center ventilation air handling unit. Compensatory measures were established during the period that the ventilation system was non-functional. The TSC ventilation system was subsequently restored to functional status."
The TSC ventilation system was restored at approximately 1834 EST on 2/5/15. The issue was a failure of the automatic TSC air recirculation function due to a tripped circuit breaker.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50790
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GRANT FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GRANT FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/05/2015
Notification Time: 20:47 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2015
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2015
Notification Time: 20:47 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2015
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOSS OF SEA WATER INTAKE BAY LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION DUE TO LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR
"On January 27, 2015, during winter storm JUNO, there was a loss of instrument air at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). Follow-up evaluations of the plant events that occurred on that day revealed that the loss of instrument air resulted in a loss of water level indicators in the seawater intake bays. The affected instruments, LI-3831 A/B, are utilized in assessing conditions for entry into the Emergency Action Levels. PNPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EP-IP-100.1 specified a compensatory action of 'visual inspection required' should these instruments be unavailable. However, there was not a clear linkage between the EPIP compensatory actions and the operations procedure for loss of instrument air. Neither the EPIP nor operations procedure identified the specific actions necessary to perform the local monitoring action. Based on the above, we have concluded that this event was reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The review of the event revealed actual sea water levels in the intake bay did not meet plant specified EAL entry conditions at any time during the winter storm and therefore no plant equipment was impacted. The capability to assess intake bay water level locally in the intake bay was available.
"Subsequent to the winter storm event, the instrument air system and sea water bay level instrumentation were restored to service. Public health and safety were not adversely affected.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."
"On January 27, 2015, during winter storm JUNO, there was a loss of instrument air at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). Follow-up evaluations of the plant events that occurred on that day revealed that the loss of instrument air resulted in a loss of water level indicators in the seawater intake bays. The affected instruments, LI-3831 A/B, are utilized in assessing conditions for entry into the Emergency Action Levels. PNPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EP-IP-100.1 specified a compensatory action of 'visual inspection required' should these instruments be unavailable. However, there was not a clear linkage between the EPIP compensatory actions and the operations procedure for loss of instrument air. Neither the EPIP nor operations procedure identified the specific actions necessary to perform the local monitoring action. Based on the above, we have concluded that this event was reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The review of the event revealed actual sea water levels in the intake bay did not meet plant specified EAL entry conditions at any time during the winter storm and therefore no plant equipment was impacted. The capability to assess intake bay water level locally in the intake bay was available.
"Subsequent to the winter storm event, the instrument air system and sea water bay level instrumentation were restored to service. Public health and safety were not adversely affected.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."