| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/30/2015 - 02/02/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50663 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 12/10/2014
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOOR FOUND CLOSED
"At 1830 [CST] on December 9, 2014 Door 410B, a HELB (High Energy Line Break) door between the east and west sides of the ground floor of the reactor building, was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double doors that are normally open to provide a HELB energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The closed HELB door has the potential to impact safe shutdown by exposing both divisions of safe shutdown components to unanalyzed environmental conditions. With the potential loss of both divisions of safe shutdown equipment, no safe shutdown path would exist. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HELB door was immediately opened and returned to normal configuration. Door 410A remained open during the time that Door 410B was closed and provided an available, but not yet analyzed, release path that could have mitigated the consequences of this event. The health and safety of the general public was not impacted as a result of this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JON LAUDENBACH TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/30/15 AT 1513 EST * * *
"Further analysis has determined that the condition did not significantly degrade plant safety.
"Door 410B in the Reactor Building was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double door (Doors 410A and 410B) that normally open to provide a High Energy Line Break (HELB) energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The condition of one half of the double door closed was not previously analyzed.
"A subsequent completed engineering evaluation analyzed this condition, Door 410B being closed and Door 410A being open, for the following environmental conditions: peak compartment temperatures, block wall differential pressure, radiation dose, and flooding. The environmental conditions found the Reactor Building in response to Door 410B being closed with 410A being open does not affect the operability of safety related equipment housed within the Reactor Building or the ability to safely shut-down the plant and maintain the plant shutdown condition following a HELB event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Dickson). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50750 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 14:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2015
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)
| Event Text DRY CONVERSION PROCESS IMPROPERLY ANALYZED IN THE CURRENT INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
"During a GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at approximately 3:00 PM (EST) yesterday (1/21/15) that a quantitative risk assessment associated with the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) cylinder cold trap operation was improperly analyzed in the current ISA. The item relied on for safety (IROFS) and other controls associated with preventing overfilling the cold trap system remained available and reliable. However, the initiating event frequency for a particular accident sequence was determined to be higher than that documented resulting in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"At no time was the postulated condition present; therefore no potential unsafe condition occurred. The affected equipment has been shut down and an investigation is underway to provide additional corrective actions and determine extent of condition.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will be notifying the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Division and the New Hanover City of Environmental Management.
The NRC Region II office and NRC Project Manager will be notified. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50755 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: MOREHOUSE BIOENERGIES, LLC
Region: 4
City: BASTROP State: LA
County:
License #: GL-2379
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 01/23/2015
Notification Time: 14:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2015
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING 10 MILLICURIE CS-137 SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Assessment Division via fax:
"On 11/21/2014, Berthold Technologies reported that Morehouse Bioenergies, LLC called to replace a density gauge source, 10 mCi Cs-137, for a gauge they were installing on a process. However, Berthold Technologies had sold and shipped the whole unit to BioEnergies in March 2014. The reorder peaked the interest of Berthold Technologies who notified the LDEQ. Attempts to reach Drax Biomass International, Inc., the radiation responsible company and owners of Morehouse Bioenergies, LLC, were unsuccessful on numerous occasions.
"Berthold Technologies supplied shipping documents, quarterly distribution records and signed records of receipts for the source/gauge. The record of receipt was signed and transferred back to the construction foreman and the site on March 25, 2014. The location of the source from March to November 2014, is unknown and continues to be a mystery.
"This site is a wood yard for manufacturing wooden pellets. Its location is in the deep woods of north Louisiana and is only accessible from the state of Arkansas. The scintillation detector has been installed, but the box with the Cs-137 source is nowhere to be found. All communication with Drax Biomass International, Inc. is done by remote access and usually by return phone call.
"The gauge was a Berthold Technologies unit shielding Model LB 7440-F-CR, Serial Number 37625-11972. The source was 10 mCi of Cs-137 serial number 0038/13.
"Event Location: The Morehouse Bioenergies, 7070 Carl Road, Bastrop, LA 71220. This was a construction site for a wood pellet plant. An investigator made a site visit, but there was only a person with Haskell Contractors to interview.
"Event Type: This was a loss of control incident that has not been resolved to this date. The freight company delivered the gauge to the site and it has since disappeared. This incident is considered still open."
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Radiation Assessment report number: LA-150003, T160317.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50756 | Rep Org: DANBURY HOSPITAL
Licensee: DANBURY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: DANBURY State: CT
County:
License #: 06-08544-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUTH SHANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/23/2015
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text RECEIVED DOSE DIFFERED FROM PRESCRIBED DOSE OF I-125
On December 17, 2014, a patient had a 123 microCurie I-125 seed implanted in her breast as part of a treatment plan for non-palpable breast cancer. The treatment plan was to remove the seed after 5 days.
Due to illness, the patient was unable to return to the hospital to have the seed removed until January 7, 2015. This resulted in the patient receiving an 83.6 cGy exposure versus the prescribed 18.4 cGy exposure.
The prescribing physician and the patient were notified. No permanent damage due to the exposure is expected.
The licensee coordinated this report with NRC Region 1 Senior Health Physicist Penny Lanzisera.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50757 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SAM NAKAMINE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/23/2015
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2015
Event Time: 11:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS DUE TO OIL SHEEN ON INTAKE BAY
"On 1/23/2015 at 1150 EST, an oil sheen was verified to be in the waters of the U.S. (Sequoyah's Intake Forebay). At 1221 [EST], a notification to the National Response Center [report #1106407] was made as a result of the oil sheen (< 1 pint total). The source of the oil is from temporary connections in support of maintenance. Cleanup efforts are in progress.
"The following additional agencies have also been notified: EPA Region 4, Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA)."
The licensee also notified the Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50758 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: N/A
Region: 1
City: JERSEY CITY State: NJ
County:
License #: G/L
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNY GOODMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/23/2015
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOAD OF GARBAGE REJECTED AT LANDFILL DUE TO ELEVATED RADIATION READINGS
The following information was obtained from the State of New Jersey via email:
"A Pennsylvania landfill rejected a load of garbage based on elevated radiation readings (188 uR/h) and sent it back to NJ. PA identified the nuclides as Mn-54 and Co-57. [A New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)] inspector went to the NJ garbage facility to verify the readings and nuclides.
"[NJDEP informed] the waste facility that [they] would be coming to observe the separation/isolation process, but [before the] inspector got there, they had already done everything. According to the facility personnel, there was a bag of metal parts (they opened it up), but had double bagged it by the time [the inspector] got there. [The] inspector got 23 mR/h on contact, 849 uR/h at 1 foot and 62 uR/h at 1 meter. Discussions revealed that no one picked it up with their hands and they were not near the source for very long. [NJDEP] identifier/Ortec readings confirm Co-57 and Mn-54 also Co-60 and Co-56. It appears to be activated metal. [A certified contractor] has been hired to package [the material]. He will be there sometime later next week. [The inspector did] not see any identifying markings. [The inspector] also took wipes of the bag and the floor area where it was dumped. These were clear. The garbage that was taken out along with the source was scanned and found to be background. That material will remain in NJ. [The] inspector surveyed the original truck with the remainder of the garbage, and [it] was found to be clear. They are running [the truck] through their portal monitor and if ok, will send [it] back to PA. The truck did not leave from this facility originally so it did not go through a monitor before going to PA. The activated metal has been isolated and secured."
* * * UPDATE FROM JENNY GOODMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1331 EST ON 1/26/15 * * *
The following update was received via email from the State of New Jersey via email:
"Upon NJDEP arrival at the waste facility on 1/23/15, the [landfill] facility staff had already isolated the material causing the radiation levels. The bag of waste they isolated measured as follows with a 1.5 by 1.5 NaI probe:
Near contact: 23 mR/hr
At ~1 foot: 840 microR/hr
At ~3 feet: 62 microR/hr
At ~6 feet: 10 microR/hr
Background: 3-4 microR/hr
"The tipping floor, where material had been laid out, and the three individuals involved in sorting the load were surveyed with a pancake probe. No radiation levels above background were detected. A wipe of the bag revealed no removable contamination.
"[NJDEP] surveyed the truck carrying the remainder of the MSW [Municipal Solid Waste] load and detected no elevated [radiation] levels. The truck was released to return to the PA landfill. [NJDEP] has not received an update from the facility to confirm acceptance of that material.
"[NJDEP] obtained a spectrum with the Ortec Detective-EX which identified Co-56, Co-57, Co-60, & Mn-54. A manual review of the spectrum additionally indicated Co-58. These isotopes are typical for metal activated from operation of an accelerator. Today, [NJDEP] contacted the DNDO [Domestic Nuclear Detection Office] JAC [Joint Analysis Center] for secondary reachback analysis of the spectrum. [NJDEP] received verbal confirmation of the isotopes detected. A written report is expected by tomorrow. Subsequently, [NJDEP] received a telephone call from an FBI bomb tech who had been informed of [NJDEP's] request for analysis. [The FBI] was seeking confirmation that there was no suspicious packaging or other threat associated with the package. [NJDEP] explained that we routinely find items in the waste stream and there was no specific threat or suspicious packaging.
"[NJDEP] is still awaiting follow-up from the waste facility to confirm acceptance of the remainder of the load released Friday and details for their plans for disposal. [NJDEP] will plan to return when their consultant packages the material to see if any other information can be gathered to identify a possibly point of origin for the material."
Notified R1DO (Cahill), ILTAB (Wray), and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50781 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL D WILSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 01/31/2015
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2015
Event Time: 14:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL RPS ACTUATION DUE TO OSCILLATIONS IN THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM
"At 1431 EST on 1/31/15, Oconee Unit 3 was manually tripped due to oscillations in the feedwater system in anticipation of an automatic trip. At 1427 EST, Unit 3 began experiencing small feedwater oscillations. Specifically, 3FDW-32, the 3A main feedwater control valve, appeared to be oscillating with corresponding feedwater flow oscillation. Feedwater oscillations continued to grow in magnitude and at 1431 EST a manual trip was directed by the Unit 3 control room supervisor. The shutdown was orderly and the unit is currently stable and in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Units 1 and 2 were unaffected by the trip and are currently 100% power (Mode 1).
"Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Following the reactor trip, a main steam relief valve (MSRV) failed to reseat as expected. Emergency Operating procedure guidance was utilized to reduce main steam system pressure by approximately 80 psig to reseat the valve (valve reseated at 1506 EST). All of the main steam relief valves are now seated. In addition, the 3B condensate booster pump experienced a mechanical seal leak (approximately 4-5 gpm). The pump was subsequently secured at 1447 EST.
"All other post trip conditions were normal and all other systems performed as expected. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable."
All rods fully inserted. Main Feedwater is feeding the steam generators and decay heat is being removed to the Main Condenser. The cause of the trip is under investigation. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | |