Event Notification Report for January 28, 2015

SAFETY SYSTEM WILL NOT FUNCTION AS REQUIRED

"At 1957 EST on 01/28/2015, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, it was discovered that a modification installed during the fall 2013 refueling outage at H. B. Robinson inadvertently cross connected both trains of reactor protection. This cross connection resulted in both trains of safety injection being required to actuate in order to produce a reactor protection reactor trip. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) since it was determined that an automatic safety system does not function as required.

"The cross connection of the reactor protection trains presented an unanalyzed condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). An additional unanalyzed condition was identified in which the 'A' and 'B' DC Train systems were cross connected by the same condition and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) condition that could prevent fulfillment of safety functions.

"At no time during this occurrence was the public or plant staff at risk as a result of this event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

This condition did place the unit in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for the reactor protection system and the DC vital buses, but the condition causing the issue was cleared at 2048 EST prior to any lowering of reactor power.

The licensee will be notifying appropriate State, local and other government agencies as required.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AFFECTED BY VALVE CLEARANCE

"At 0535 CST on 1/28/15, control room staff identified that valve EJHV8716A, RHR A To SIS [Safety Injection System] Hot Leg Recirc Loops 2&3 [isolation valve], had been closed per clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 to support maintenance on the A RHR system. Closing valve EJHV8716A placed Wolf Creek in TS 3.0.3. At 0550 CST on 1/28/15, power was restored to valve EJHV8716A and the valve was opened, allowing the unit to exit from TS 3.0.3. Subsequent reviews of clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 identified that valve EJHV8809A had been energized and closed per direction of the clearance order. TS 3.0.3 was reentered at 0635 CST due to discovery of this condition. At 0650 CST, valve EJHV8809A was opened and deenergized allowing exit from TS 3.0.3."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED VENTILATION MAINTENANCE

"The Comanche Peak Primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be unavailable during planned maintenance on the EOF ventilation system.

"On January 28, 2015, CPNPP [Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant] began planned work to improve the reliability of the EOF ventilation system. The EOF will be unavailable for approximately three weeks. During the time the primary EOF is unavailable, the affected ERO members will respond to the Backup EOF in Granbury, Texas for any declared emergency event. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time the primary EOF is unavailable.

"The extended unavailability of the primary EOF is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the primary EOF availability is restored."

* * * UPDATE ON 03/11/2015 AT 1811 EDT FROM BRIAN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"The availability of the Comanche Peak Primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been restored following planned maintenance on the EOF ventilation system.

"On January 28, 2015, CPNPP (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) began planned work to improve the reliability of the EOF ventilation system. The unavailability of the primary EOF was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report serves as a follow-up to Event Number 50773."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The R4DO (Okeefe) was notified.

SITE STACK RADIATION MONITOR FAILURE

The Millstone site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, failed and was declared inoperable at 0849 EST on January 28, 2015. Repairs are in progress.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off-site response capability, or off-site communications capability.

The Instrument and Controls Department is conducting troubleshooting and repair. The cause of the radiation monitor failure was pump failure.

Estimated return to service is 1600 EST on 1/29/15.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and Local authorities.