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Event Notification Report for January 16, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/15/2015 - 01/16/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50351 50717 50721 50723 50724 50737 50739 50740

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50351
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS

"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.

"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"

In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Condition Report: 898908."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).


* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ernstes).


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.

"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Freeman).


* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."

Condition Report: 10000607

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Desai).


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *

"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

Condition Report: 10013077

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50717
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HARRY HOWLE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/06/2015
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2015
Event Time: 00:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 86 Power Operation 86 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - ALCOHOL FOUND IN PROTECTED AREA

On January 6, 2015, at approximately 0001 EST, a partially empty can of beer was found by a security officer. Site Security took possession of the can and it was removed from the protected area. An investigation has been initiated by Site Security. This condition has been documented in TVA's corrective action program. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol within the protected area.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ZACHARY KITTS TO JEFFREY HERRERA AT 1503 EST ON 1/15/15 * * *

Additional information provided by the Licensee of the origination of the beer can.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50721
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: BUILDING AND EARTH SCIENCES
Region: 1
City: COLUMBUS State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1485-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARTY SIMONTON
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/07/2015
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received via email:

"This morning, the Columbus, GA Police Department was dispatched to the Building and Earth Sciences business located at 5045 Millgen Court in Columbus. It was reported that unknown person(s) had stolen a Model 3440 Nuclear Density Gauge Serial Number 22740. The gauge had been locked and secured in the back of a truck in the facility and the individual(s) had taken bolt cutters and cut the chains securing the device. No further information is available at this time."

The stolen gauge contains approximately 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Americium-241.

A regional law enforcement bulletin was issued and the Columbus, GA and Atlanta, GA FBI field offices were notified.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 50723
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: WOMACK ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: FT BRAGG State: NC
County:
License #: 32-04054-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KACEY MCGEE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3047(a) - EMBRYO/FETUS DOSE > 50 mSv
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

UNINTENDED DOSE TO FETUS

On December 11, 2014, a patient was receiving a thyroid ablation treatment containing 97 mCi of I-131. A pregnancy test performed prior to the treatment was negative. On December 29, 2014, the patient reported to the medical center that it had been determined that she was pregnant on the day of the treatment, and that the gestational age of the fetus was determined to be 4 weeks at the time of the thyroid ablation treatment.

The US ARMY Fort Bragg Radiation Safety Officer was notified of this event on January 5, 2015 by the authorizing physician of the exposure to the fetus via email. The calculated dose to the uterus was 20.43 Rad. The expected impact to the fetus was determined to be either miscarriage or no effect. The medical center is performing a root cause analysis to determine any potential corrective actions. The licensee will ensure the patient has been notified of the potential medical consequences to the fetus of this treatment.

* * * UPDATE AT 1510 EST ON 01/12/15 FROM KACEY McGEE TO S. SANDIN * * *

The patient was informed by the medical staff on 12/31/14. The root cause investigation is on-going.

Notified R1DO (Burritt) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50724
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: THERAGENICS
Region: 1
City: BUFORD State: GA
County:
License #: GA 885-5
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOEL MIMS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/08/2015
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED IN STRAND LAB

The following information was provided by the State of Georgia via facsimile:

"Theragenics was packing radioactive seeds for transport to customer when one of the seeds was lost in the strand lab and could not be found. This was an Iodine 125 seed manufactured by Medi-Physics, model Oconoseed 6711. At the time of production the seed had a radioactivity of 0.696 mCi, but by the time of the report had decayed to 0.492 mCi radioactivity.

"On November 12, 2014, licensee personnel were filling an order for stranded seeds when a seed could not be accounted for. After searching the lab area continually and personnel when they left the lab (portal monitor scanning), the seed still has not been found. The licensee made a report via phone notification of the missing seed on December 12, 2014.

"License has conducted refresher training for employees who work in the lab areas. An emphasis was noted on handling technique, especially during mid-late October through November, when the change in weather and humidity have traditionally resulted in an increase of seed-handling errors, i.e., seeds 'popping' out of tweezers during manipulation. Additionally, the strand lab is scheduled for its semi-annual cleaning (per General Lab Practice) on December 19-20, 2014. During that process, crews will look for this seed and the one that was reported missing from September 2014."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50737
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA KEITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 01/15/2015
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2015
Event Time: 08:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

A&B SWITCHGEAR ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR LATCH DISCOVERED NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY

"On January 15, 2015 a high energy line break door affecting both trains of safety related switchgear rooms was discovered not latching after passage. The boundary was not operable for approximately 19 minutes. The door has been repaired.

"Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

The State of Connecticut Department of Energy, and Environmental Protection and Waterford Dispatch were also notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50739
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: THERON ROWBOTHEM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/15/2015
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2015
Event Time: 15:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO HOSPITALIZED INJURED EMPLOYEE

"This notification is being made in accordance with NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 Section 3.2.12, News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.

"On January 15, 2015 at 0720 CST, with Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) at 100% power, an on-site injury occurred on ANO-2.

"An individual fell while descending stairs and was injured. Pope County EMS transported the individual to a local medical facility. No contaminated individuals were transported off-site. No individuals were contaminated during the event. The individual was admitted to the local hospital.

"29 CFR 1904.39(a) requires a report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), US Department of Labor with twenty-four (24) hours after the in-patient hospitalization of one or more employees as a result of a work-related incident. At 1545 CST, ANO determined that this is a 24-hour OSHA reportable occurrence."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50740
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HEIM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/15/2015
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2015
Event Time: 17:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INADEQUATELY SEALED PIPING PENETRATIONS AND POSTULATED FLOODING EVENT

"On November 19, 2014, inadequately sealed piping penetrations were discovered in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) piping and valve gallery walls that could have allowed a postulated flooding event to potentially impact both RHR pumps. The same configuration was identified on both Units. Following analysis of the postulated flooding leakage sources and flow paths, it was discovered that there was a time when an unacceptable volume of flood water could have entered the pipe and valve gallery areas. This condition was found to have been previously corrected on 12/16/14, following changes to Operations flood mitigation strategies and installation of seals in upstream pipeway trenches. Therefore, this issue is reported as an unanalyzed past condition that had the potential to adversely impact the RHR pumps.

"This condition was determined to be reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, January 16, 2015
Friday, January 16, 2015