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Event Notification Report for December 3, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/02/2014 - 12/03/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50509 50527 50637 50638 50649 50650

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50509
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/04/2014
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2014
Event Time: 14:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE EXCEEDS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

"The total as-found Minimum Pathway Leakage Rate for the Primary Containment exceeded Level 1 acceptance criteria. Acceptance criteria of 321 (Standard Liters per Minute) SLM was not met. This criteria is equivalent to 1.0 La, the maximum allowable Primary Containment Leakage rate as prescribed by Technical Specification 5.5.6.c.1.

"This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as 'The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded .. ' All other Level 1 acceptance criteria were met.

"All as-left containment leakage requirements for startup have been met."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1646 EST ON 12/02/2014 * * *

"On October 4, 2014, FitzPatrick reported that the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the containment leakage rate testing program. This was primarily due to the drywell exhaust Penetration X26A/B. Penetration X26A/B Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) results were initially indeterminate, and therefore conservatively assumed to exceed the primary containment leakage acceptance criteria.

"The excessive leakage was assumed for Penetration X26A/B due to LLRT results for two (2) containment isolation valves (CIV). The subject CIVs are installed in series on Penetration X26A/B. The upstream valve is not isolable from primary containment, therefore, LLRT testing for these two CIVs is performed simultaneously via pressurization through a test connection between the two valves. During the LLRT, Penetration X26A/B was pressurized to 44.42 psig. The required test pressure for this penetration is 45.3 psig. As the required test pressure was not achieved, the LLRT results were initially indeterminate. Excessive leakage was conservatively assigned to the penetration resulting in the failure of the primary containment leakage acceptance criteria. This condition (failure of the primary containment leakage acceptance criteria) was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.

"A subsequent engineering evaluation addressed the leakage for Penetration X26A/B, and concluded that the LLRT test results did not reflect failure of the primary containment leakage acceptance criteria.

"The installed configuration prevents testing these valves individually; however, troubleshooting activities indicated no detectable leakage through the downstream valve. The upstream valve was removed and inspected. The results of the inspection confirmed that all LLRT leakage was attributable to the upstream valve. Following maintenance activities, the valve was reinstalled and Penetration X26A/B was retested. The post-maintenance LLRT resulted in a total leakage of 0.078 SLM for Penetration X26A/B.

"The resultant total primary containment leakage rate determined on a minimum pathway basis was below the operability limits of 192 and 321 SLM (0.6 La and 1.0 La, respectively). Primary containment remained operable throughout Cycle 21; no degraded condition existed. Therefore, this [event notification] is being retracted."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dentel)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50527
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SERVICE WATER PUMPS INOPERABLE

"At 0226 [EDT on 10/12/14], the 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Screen differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was discovered closed while performing the monthly bubbler blow down activity. The associated 25 Service Water Pump was operable at this time. The differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV, in the closed/discovered position would have prevented the operation of the 25 Service Water Traveling Screen due to high differential pressure. The 25 Service Water Traveling Screen needs to be operable to support 25 Service Water Pump operability. 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Water Screen was restored to operable after differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was reopened. The station subsequently verified all Unit 1 and 2 high side and low side differential pressure transmitter valves positions were correct.

"At 0600 [EDT on 10/12/14], it was identified that the last manipulation of differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was on 9/7/14. Based on the last known manipulation it is assumed that differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV remained closed from that time until the condition was discovered. Review of other activities performed from 9/7/2014 to present determined that surveillance testing of 21 Service Water Pump resulted in 21, 22, and 23 Service Water Pumps being inoperable on 9/18/2014 for several hours. During that surveillance, combined with the mis-positioned instrument valve on 25 Service Water Pump, five of the six Service Water Pumps would have been inoperable which may have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of 25 Service Water Traveling Screen inoperability."


* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT CORDREY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1543 EST ON 12/2/2014 * * *

"The purpose of this call is to retract event number 50527. On October 12, 2014, at 1307 EDT, notification was made to the NRC Operations Center by Salem Unit 2 reporting a condition under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ...(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

"Subsequent to this report, Salem Unit 2 determined that the condition in which the 25 Service Water (SW) pump may have been considered inoperable, in conjunction with the other SW loop being out of service, was not occurring at the time of discovery and was thus not reportable under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).

"Further analysis of the event determined that the valve mis-positioning of the 25 SW pump traveling screen differential pressure transmitter which defeated the auto-start function of the traveling screen, did not impair the safety function of the traveling screen to minimize carryover of debris to the suction of the 25 SW pump. Thus, during the time in question, the 25 SW pump remained operable which maintained one loop of SW operable during the period of time the other service water loop was removed from service for pump testing. One loop of SW with two pumps operable from different safety related buses is capable of performing the safety function of the SW system during a design basis accident.

"This event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Dentel)

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Agreement State Event Number: 50637
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: 06462
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA STUCK SOURCE

The following was received via email:

"On November 25, 2014, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that on November 24, 2014, an INC IR100 radiography camera, Serial # 4374 with an Iridium-192 source, Model 32, Serial #W951, Activity - 1887 GBq (51 Ci) failed to operate properly at a field site. While the source was being cranked out, the drive cable went too far when the stopper in the pistol grip failed, resulting in the inability to reengage the drive cable and retrieve the source back into the camera. The licensee's RSO responded to the scene to inspect and retrieve the source. No individual received any significant additional exposure due to this event. The RSO received the highest dose of 23 mrem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9256

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 50638
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: CARILLION CLINIC
Region: 1
City: ROANOKE State: VA
County:
License #: 770-051-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The following was received via email:

"A patient arrived for a rest/stress imaging procedure on 11/24/14. The rest dose was written to be 8 mCi Tc-99m, and the stress dose was written to be 24 mCi Tc-99m. The patient received the rest dose as written and the scan was performed. The patient was then to receive the 24 mCi stress dose, but instead received a 5 mCi stress dose (same drug, but only 21% of the intended activity) that was intended as the rest dose for another patient. Once the error was discovered, the patient was informed of the error and sent home with the intention of rescheduling the procedure at a later date. The licensee will submit the 15 day report to VRMP [Virginia Radioactive Materials Program] at which time the corrective actions will be reviewed and verified during their next inspection. "

Virginia Incident #: VA-14-23

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * RETRACTION ON 11/25/14 AT 1637 EST FROM MIKE WELLING TO DONG PARK * * *

This report is being retracted, because it does not meet 10CFR35.3045 criteria.

Notified R1DO (Noggle) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50649
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/03/2014
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2014
Event Time: 20:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 62 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF CONDENSATE PUMP

"Initiated a manual Unit 1 reactor trip due to imminent failure of 1P-25B Condensate Pump. Unit 1 had commenced a rapid down power due to the degradation of the pump. The event is reportable under 10CFR50.72.(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a manual actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical and 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for an actuation of specified system (6) PWR auxiliary feedwater system. Auxiliary feedwater system actuation was due to low steam generator water levels in both 'A' and 'B' Steam Generators, an expected system response during a reactor trip. Decay heat removal is by forced circulation and is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater system and condenser steam dumps.

"After the trip, both main steam generator feedwater pumps were secured due to feed pump suction pressure remaining low post trip.

"All other plant systems functioned as required. All control rods fully inserted in the core due to the manual trip. There was no ECCS actuation. Off-site power has been maintained throughout the event."

No primary or secondary safety relief valves lifted during the reactor trip. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no effect on Unit 2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50650
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HURT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/03/2014
Notification Time: 05:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2014
Event Time: 00:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"An unexpected main turbine trip causing a reactor trip occurred on 12/03/2014 [at 0022 CST] with the plant operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. As part of the plant design, an expected, valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred in response to the reactor trip. As part of the Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, the 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to 'D' Steam Generator throttle valve did not throttle as expected and was manually isolated. All other systems functioned normally in response to the plant conditions. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at 0 percent power. Safety related buses are receiving normal off-site power and the grid is currently stable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Steam generator levels are being maintained by the AFW system and decay heat is being removed by the main condenser. No primary or secondary safety relief valves lifted during the transient.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, December 03, 2014
Wednesday, December 03, 2014