| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/25/2014 - 11/26/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50351 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS
"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.
"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"
In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report: 898908."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ernstes). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50619 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: SIMON CONTRACTORS, INC.
Region: 4
City: NORTH PLATTE State: NE
County:
License #: 15-02-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM DEFRAIN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 11/17/2014
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2014
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST DURING SHIPPING
The following was received from the State of Nebraska via fax:
"On November 4, 2014 Simon Contractors, a Nebraska licensee, shipped a Troxler model 3450, s/n 355 containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 (s/n 750-5840) and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be (s/n 47-3188) to Qal-Tek Associates by YRC Freight. Qal-Tek is located in Idaho Falls, ID. YRC Freight picked up the gauge from Simon Contractors in North Platte, NE on November 4, 2014. YRC transported the gauge to their terminal in Kansas City, MO. The gauge was expected to arrive at Qal-Tek on November 11. Since the gauge was not delivered, Qal-Tek contacted YRC on November 13. On November 14, YRC contacted Qal-Tek and YRC considered the gauge as lost. At 1630 [CST] on the 14th, Qal-Tek contacted Simon Contractors and notified them of the status of the gauge. Qal-Tek also contacted the NRC of the event. On Monday, November 17 at 0815 [CST], Simon called the Nebraska Health and Human Services, Office of Radiological Health to report the missing gauge."
This is the same incident as NRC Event # 50615 (reported by Qal-Tek).
* * * UPDATE FROM JIM DEFRAIN TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0920 EST ON 11/18/14 * * *
The gauge has been located by YRC Freight.
Notified R4DO (Hagar) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50620 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROSWELL PARK CANCER INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: BUFFALO State: NY
County:
License #: NYS #2923
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/18/2014
Notification Time: 09:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/04/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - I-125 SEED RETRIEVED FROM PATIENT AND THEN LOST
The following information was obtained from the State of New York via facsimile:
"A radioactive source or I-125 seed used for localization in breast surgery was misplaced by the Pathology Department at Roswell Park Cancer Institute (DOH# 2923). This event occurred on Thursday, October 9, 2014 and the source was officially determined to be lost on November 4, 2014.
"Two breast localization seeds (I-125) were not extracted from a specimen on October 9, 2014 by a Clinical Pathology Fellow. The Pathology department did, however, receive written documentation that the seeds were removed from the patient and they were sent with the specimen to the Pathology Department. The seeds were not returned to Nuclear Medicine per Institute Policy.
"An extensive search and survey was conducted of Pathology, Nuclear Medicine and Environmental Services areas. One of the two seeds was discovered in trash removed from the Pathology department. Further search and surveys of these areas were repeated but to no avail. Trash and regulated medical waste were surveyed and inspected. Over the course of the next few weeks, Radiation Safety surveyed and explored all radioactive waste in an effort to locate the lost source. Aforementioned search and surveys were again conducted without discovery of the missing seed. It was believed that the missing source would eventually be located in Institute trash or more likely Institute radioactive waste.
"All Institute trash and waste is surveyed for radioactive material. The radioactive waste may be stored in various short and long-term storage locations. Unfortunately, the seed was never found and officially declared lost on November 4, 2014.
"Corrective Action and Recommendations:
1. The incident was reviewed and discussed with pertinent Pathology staff. A training oversight was discovered and Pathology Department Fellows are now trained to anticipate radioactive seeds in breast surgical specimens and to remove them prior to surgical specimen evaluation. (Required Corrective Action)
2. Radiation Safety and Environmental Services have emphasized the importance of monitoring all trash and regulated medical waste during the annual in-service conducted on August 6, 2014 and again on October 29, 2014. (Required Corrective Action)
3. Any further information regarding this matter will be communicated to the Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection, NYS DOH [New York State Department of health]. (Required Corrective Action)"
New York State Event Report Number: NY-14-05
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50621 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ARIAS & ASSOCIATES INC
Region: 4
City: EAGLE PASS State: TX
County:
License #: 04964
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/18/2014
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On November 17, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] was notified by the licensee that a Troxler Model 3430, Gauge Serial No. 26893 containing a cesium-137 source, serial No. 750-92, activity - 0.30 GBq (8 mCi), and an americium-241 source, serial No. 47-23385, activity - 1.48 GBq (40 mCi), was damaged at a field site. The technician had placed the device at a sample location and extended the cesium source into the inspection hole. The technician then noticed a road grader driving directly at him so he ran out of the way and when he turned around the grader had run over the moisture density gauge. The licensee's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] responded to the scene to inspect and recover the gauge. The device case was severely damaged, but the licensee was able to return the cesium source to the shielded position and secure it in position. The RSO verified the americium source was still in the device. The RSO took the damaged device to their facility for disposal. No individual received any significant additional exposure due to this event."
Texas Event #I-9254 |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 50636 | Rep Org: AREVA, INC.
Licensee: AREVA, INC.
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
HAROLD CHERNOFF (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - DEFECT IN LOCA ANALYSIS FOR B&W PLANTS
The following information was summarized from the report obtained from the vendor via facsimile:
"The defect is related to the thermal conductivity model in the codes TACO3 and GDTACO which are used in the AREVA LOCA model for B&W plants. The thermal conductivity model does not adequately represent the change in conductivity with burnup for the fuel. The correction of the thermal conductivity model results in the peak cladding temperature limit in 10 CFR 50.46 (2200 degrees F) being exceeded.
"The defect exists for the following plants: Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1, Three Mile Island Unit 1, and Davis-Besse Unit 1"
If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:
Gayle Elliott
AREVA, lnc., 3315 Old Forest Road
Lynchburg, VA 24501
Ph. # 434-841-0306. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50639 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2014
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-CONSERVATISMS IN METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
"On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, at 1200 EST, the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) reviewed AREVA 10CFR50.46 Notification Letter FAB14-00625 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). This letter indicates that certain non-conservatisms were discovered in the methodology application and inputs used by AREVA for nuclear fuel core configurations with Mark-B-HTP fuel when operated under certain conditions. When corrected, this increases the Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) in excess of the value prescribed in 10CFR50.46(b)(1) under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. The DBNPS reactor core contains Mark-B-HTP fuel. 10CFR50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The DBNPS licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with and must not exceed the criterion prescribed in 10CFR50.46(b)(1).
"AREVA had provided compensatory measures in terms of plant axial imbalance limits and Fq linear heat rate limits associated with reductions in LOCA linear heat rates so that the DBNPS operates within 50.46 limits. FENOC implemented the compensatory measures at the DBNPS on October 23, 2014, per AREVA recommendations, and as a result the errors reported have no impact on current plant operation or public health and safety. Preliminary analysis of past operating conditions indicate that the DBNPS did not exceed the 50.46(b)(1) criteria for PCT. This 8-hour notification is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Based on 50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, FENOC will submit a report within 30 days for the DBNPS.
"FENOC has notified the DBNPS NRC Senior Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50640 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2014
Event Time: 12:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEFICIENCY IN METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
"On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, at 1212 EST, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy) reviewed AREVA 10CFR50.46 Notification Letter FAB 14-00631. This letter indicates that a deficiency was discovered in the uranium thermal conductivity models used in the Oconee Nuclear Station Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis of record. When the deficiency is corrected, the LOCA Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) limits may be in excess of 2200 degrees F. 10CFR50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The Oconee licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with the criterion 10CFR50.46(b)(1) and must not exceed a PCT of 2200 degrees F.
"On October 20, 2014, AREVA recommended actions in the form of reductions in LOCA linear heat rates, which were then translated into reduced axial imbalance limits for the excore and backup incore detector systems. This was done to ensure that Duke Energy operated within 10CFR50.46 limits in the event of a loss of the full incore detector system. The full incore detector system is the primary method for evaluating imbalance and the imbalance limits are unaffected by the reduction in LOCA linear heat rates. The full incore detector system is operable and meets Technical Specification 3.2.2. In addition, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip limits for imbalance are not derived from the LOCA analysis and are not affected.
"When AREVA notified Duke Energy of the deficiency, Duke Energy confirmed that existing administrative limits bound the AREVA recommended actions and as a result, the errors reported have no impact on plant operation or public health and safety.
"This event affects all three (3) units and is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Based on 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, Duke Energy will submit a written report within 30 days.
"Duke Energy has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50641 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KEITH LEDBETTER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2014
Event Time: 12:11 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEFICIENCY IN METHODOLOGY USED FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
"On Tuesday November 25, 2014, at 1211 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reviewed AREVA 10 CFR 50.46 Notification Letter FAB14-00632. This letter indicates that a deficiency was discovered in the uranium thermal conductivity models used in the ANO-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis of record. When the deficiency is corrected, the LOCA Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) limits may be in excess of 2200 degrees Fahrenheit (F). 10 CFR 50.46 paragraph (b) defines the acceptance criteria for the LOCA analysis process. The ANO-1 licensing basis PCT is evaluated for compliance with the criterion 10 CFR 50.46(b)(1) and must not exceed a PCT of 2200 degrees F.
"During AREVA's review of the issue, AREVA had provided compensatory measures in the form of reductions in LOCA linear heat rates as a contingency in case the errors were found to be substantiated, which were then translated into reduced axial imbalance limits so that ANO-1 would operate within 10 CFR 50.46 limits. As a precautionary measure pending the completed analysis, ANO-1 implemented the compensatory measures on October 20, 2014, and as a result, the errors reported have no impact on current plant operation or public health and safety. This event is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Based on 50.46(a)(3)(ii) criteria, ANO-1 will submit a written report within 30 days.
"ANO-1 has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector." |
| Research Reactor | Event Number: 50642 | Facility: U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
RX Type: 1000 KW TRIGA MARK I
Comments:
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County: DENVER
License #: R-113
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000274
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY DEBEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/25/2014
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2014
Event Time: 14:21 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WERTZ (NRR)
PATRICK ISAAC (NRR)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
| Event Text REACTOR CONSOLE KEY LEFT IN CONTROL CONSOLE UNATTENDED
"On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, a violation of Technical Specification A.1, 'Shutdown,' occurred at the USGS TRIGA research reactor. Contrary to the specification, the key to the console key switch was left in the control console, in the OFF position, while the control room was unoccupied. This condition existed intermittently for approximately nine minutes during the time period from 1421 MST to 1436 MST, when the Reactor Supervisor discovered the key. The reactor was shutdown during this time period, and the staff members were performing routine maintenance. The facility shutdown checklist had been completed, and the key had been locked in a lock box, but the key was subsequently removed from the lock box by a Senior Reactor Operator and put in the console switch for maintenance checks. The reactor was continuously occupied by reactor staff during this event, and there were no non-staff personnel present. This event is being reported to the NRC's facility inspector, NRC Operations Center, the USGS Reactor Administrator, and the USGS Reactor Operations Committee." | |