Event Notification Report for November 13, 2014

LOST SR-90 SOURCE

During an underway replenishment in the Fifth Fleet area of operations, a storage box containing a CH53 helicopter blade with an in-blade inspection system (IBIS) was dropped over the side and is irretrievable due to the depth of the water. The IBIS contained a 500 microCuries Sr-90 source.

The licensee has notified their NRC Project Manager (Seeley).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 - MILLER AIR CYLINDER SEALS DEDICATION ISSUE

The following was received from the licensee via fax:

"This is to notify the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, we have identified a potential issue and are submitting our evaluation of the event.

"Description: Flowserve supplied a quantity of two Size 6 Class 900 Anchor Darling Double Disc gate valves with tag numbers CV-3027 and CV-3056 to Palisades Nuclear Plant in 2007. The valves are actuated by Miller air cylinders and have a safety function to maintain the system pressure boundary by remaining fully open during injection and to subsequently move to the fully closed position upon receipt of a recirculation actuation signal. This Miller air cylinder is not spring-assisted and thus uses air to perform the safety-related function. As such, the air cylinder, any tubing, and seals associated with the air system would also be considered safety related. When the valve was tested prior to shipment, the actuator was dedicated as an assembly and performed adequately. However, the seals containing the air system in the Miller Air Cylinder and Flow Control valve were not individually dedicated as a basic component - that is, the seal material was not verified. There is no indication that the material is defective, but in addition to the functional testing at the Flowserve facility, the material of the seals should have been checked and verified. The Flow Control Valve was ordered with Nitrile (Buna-N) seals while the Air Cylinder was ordered with Viton seals. While the seal materials were not verified, the only possible seal material for these items would have been Viton, Buna-N, or EPR.

"Scope: Flowserve has performed a review of all other air cylinders provided from the Raleigh facility over the last 12 years and found no other instances of this issue. Therefore, the scope of this notification is limited to only the two tag numbers 01-3027 and CV-3056 at Palisades Nuclear Plant.

"Proposed Action: Flowserve will provide safety-related replacement seal kits for all seals containing the air system for the CV-3027 and CV-3056 valves. This will be sent on a zero dollar purchase order to Palisades Nuclear plant and will be completed as soon as Flowserve receives the purchase order."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of California via email:

"On November 13, 2014, at approximately 0648 [PST], the RSO of Heider Engineering Services, Inc., RML #6463-36, contacted Cal OES [California Office of Emergency Services] concerning the moisture/density gauge, Troxler, Model 3430, serial number 63801 (Cs-137, 0.3 GBq, Am-241, 1.50 GBq) that had been stolen from a transport vehicle in front of a private residence at 140 North Shasta Way, Upland, CA 91786, between the evening of November 12, 2014 and approximately 0600 [PST] November 13, 2014 when the Authorized User left his home to go to the worksite. The Authorized User has contacted Local Law Enforcement officials in Upland, CA to request an investigation of the private residence where the Troxler radioactive gauge was taken and to take the report of the authorized user that was in possession of the gauge prior to the theft. A copy of the theft report will be sent to RHB Brea [California Radiological Health Branch -Brea] as part of this report. The RSO will utilize local papers to attempt to retrieve the stolen gauge as well as notifying local servicing vendors of radioactive gauges to be alert of the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up for any of their services.

"The investigation will continue to determine if the radioactive gauge can be recovered in a reasonable time frame. This is being reported to the NRC Operations Center as a 24-hour report under 10CFR30.50(b)(2) since the radioactive gauge has been stolen and it cannot be determined what condition the sources are currently in."

CA 5010 NUMBER 111314

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IMPACTING LICENSABLE MATERIAL

The following report was received from the State of Tennessee via email:

"[Tennessee Department of Environment Conservation] TDEC was notified on 11/13/14, by a representative of [Toxco, Inc. d/b/a Toxco Materials Management Center] TMMC that a fire had occurred [at approximately 0900 EST] in an area in Building B where evaporation of liquid radioactive wastes was being conducted. Four employees attempted to extinguish the fire but were unsuccessful. The City of Oak Ridge fire department responded to the site and extinguished the fire. Four TMMC employees were sent to the local hospital for smoke inhalation related symptoms and are being evaluated for potential intake of radioactive materials. Air sampling of the building and area were performed during the event. The samples are being evaluated for results and consideration of potential impacts. [Tennessee] State inspectors are onsite investigating. The quantity of mixed fission product involved is unknown at this time. [Tennessee Department of Health] DRH inspectors are onsite and detailed information will be forthcoming."

State Event Report ID NO: TN-14-211

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CHECK SOURCE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On November 14, 2014, the agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee, Weatherford International, that a 10 microCurie Americium-241 source [Serial # A1-531] was lost from its R&D facility in Houston, TX. The source was identified as missing during an inventory on 11/10/2014. After searching the company's R&D facility, the loss was reported to the [Texas] Department of State Health Services. The licensee's RSO suggested the source may have been swept out with trash. The source was last verified to be in its storage location December of last year [2013]. The company keeps a log of source usage and searched each use location in the building. The source is only used in the same building where it is stored."

Texas incident # I-9252

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL

"An employee with a chemical burn on his left wrist reported to the onsite dispensary located within the restricted area. First aid was administered. A whole body radiological survey of the employee and plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the lower legs of the employee's plant issued coveralls, 2,300 dpm/100cm2. The employee was able to return to work following treatment. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the entire course of the event."

The licensee notified NRC Region-2 (Hickey).