| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/12/2014 - 11/13/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50592 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICE INC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 00087
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS | Notification Date: 11/04/2014
Notification Time: 10:41 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [Est]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE ON INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On November 3, 2014, the Agency was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that one of his crews was unable to retract a 34.9 curie cobalt-60 source into a QSA Global 680A exposure device. The crew was performing radiography at a field site [in Houston, TX] using a magnetic stand to support the guide tube and collimator. The stand fell on the guide tube crimping the guide tube in two places about one inch apart. The radiographer attempted to retract the source, but it would not go past the crimped section of the guide tube. The radiographer returned the source to the collimator.
"One of the radiographers contacted the site RSO(SRSO). A recovery team was sent to the location to retrieve the source. The team slid a steel plate below the collimator. The guide tube was pulled to free the collimator from its holder causing it to drop onto the steel plate. The collimator was approached from the shielded side and using a pair of tongs, the collimator was rolled to face the outlet port towards the steel plate. Six bags of lead shot were placed on the collimator. The dose rate at the crimped section of the guide tube was then measured at 200 millirem per hour. Additional bags of lead shot were placed on the collimator. The licensee's first attempt to remove the crimps in the guide tube using channel locks was unsuccessful. The licensee then removed the outer coating on the guide tube in the areas the tube was crimped and then used channel locks to remove the crimps. This was successful and the source was returned to the fully shielded position.
"The highest exposure to any individual involved in the event was seven millirem. The licensee reported no exposures were received to members of the general public due to this event. The guide tube was taken out of service. The exposure device and crankout device were inspected and returned to service. The source was leak tested, but the results have not been received.
" Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9250 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50604 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRANNON PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2014
Event Time: 02:02 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text NO FUNCTIONAL SMOKE DETECTION CAPABILITY IN CONTAINMENT
"At 0202 [CST] on November 12, 2014, it was determined that Unit 2 had no functional smoke detection capability in the containment. During post modification testing on the smoke detection system, it was discovered that both trains of detection were not functional. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"[Farley] Condition Report: 892818.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50606 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HINES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/12/2014
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2014
Event Time: 08:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. His access to the facility was terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50607 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: FRED POLLAK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:31 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2014
Event Time: 15:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"On November 12, 2014 at 1548 [EST], Unit 2 was manually tripped due to a lowering 2B steam generator level caused by the spurious (slow) closure of 2B Main Feedwater Isolation Valve, HCV-09-2B.
"All CEAs [control element assemblies] fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as expected with the 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Channel 2 (AFAS 2) actuating on low 2B steam generator level. Decay heat removal is from main feedwater to the 2A steam generator and manual control of auxiliary feedwater to the 2B steam generator, with steam bypass to the main condenser.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the AFAS 2 actuation."
During the transient, no relief or safety valves lifted. The grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup at normal operating pressure and temperature. The cause of the feedwater isolation valve malfunction is under investigation. There was no effect on Unit 1.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |