Event Notification Report for September 11, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE CANNOT BE RETRACTED

The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via fax:

"On September 12, 2014, LA DEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] received a notification from the [licensee] Radiation Safety Officer [RSO]. [The RSO] stated a crew was making exposures at a fab shop [in Walker, LA] at approximately 1730 CDT. The exposure device was on an I-beam when the device slid off of the beam onto the front guide tube outlet connection. The radiographer realized the source could not be retracted back into the shielded position.

"The lead radiographer contacted the RSO and received instructions on how to secure/shield the area from potential/unnecessary exposures. An assistant RSO, was dispatched to the site to perform the retrieval and he arrived approximately 1830 CDT. [The assistant RSO] was able to retract/shield the source when he removed the crimped drive cable. The source retrieval was completed approximately 1920 CDT. The crew members exposures were both less than 30 mrem and the assistant RSO's exposure was less than 100 mrem.

"The exposure device and associated equipment (crank out control and source guide tube) were shipped to QSA Global for a materials evaluation. The equipment was evaluated and passed the quality assurance requirements for Type B radiography equipment. The male connector on the source guide tube was replaced and was returned to the customer. The equipment involved in the incident and returned to the customer after the repair and evaluation: QSA 880 Delta, s/n D9829. QSA source model A424-9, Ir-192 source, s/n 16863C with an activity of 69 Ci. QSA control model SAN88225R and a Swivel End Stop QSA GST TAN48906.

"[The licensee] is Departmental [LA DEQ] approved and licensed to perform source retrievals."

License No.: LA-15838-Lol, AI#s. 12540; 165525.

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-140010

FITNESS FOR DUTY - PROGRAMMATIC FAILURE

"On September 11, 2014, at 1400 hours, it was determined that four (4) personnel in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not subject to random testing requirements of the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program. The personnel involved do not have unescorted access to the Protected Area, but they do respond and perform duties as a member of the ERO. The affected individuals are now included in the random FFD testing pool.

"10CFR26.4(c) requires all persons who are required by a licensee in 10CFR26.3(a) and, as applicable, (c) to physically report to the licensee's Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility by licensee emergency plans and procedures shall be subject to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of this part.

"This event is a 24-hour reportable event per 10CFR26.719(b)(4) - Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within the protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."

FITNESS FOR DUTY - PROGRAMMATIC FAILURE

"On September 11, 2014, at 1400 hours, it was determined that four (4) personnel in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not subject to random testing requirements of the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program. The personnel involved do not have unescorted access to the Protected Area, but they do respond and perform duties as a member of the ERO. The affected individuals are now included in the random FFD testing pool.

"10CFR26.4(c) requires all persons who are required by a licensee in 10CFR26.3(a) and, as applicable, (c) to physically report to the licensee's Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility by licensee emergency plans and procedures shall be subject to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of this part.

"This event is a 24-hour reportable event per 10CFR26.719(b)(4) - Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within the protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."

SHIELD BUILDING VENT GAS RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 1009 CDT on September 11, 2014, 1R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Unit 1 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 1R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-22 prior to its removal from service. The duration of this maintenance is scheduled for 8 hours and will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK OUTSIDE THE CAMERA

The following information was received via e-mail:

"On September 11, 2014, at 1241 hours [CDT], the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that one of their radiography crews reported they were unable to fully retract a 46 curie iridium - 192 source into a SPEC 150 exposure device. The RSO stated the radiographers had completed an exposure and cranked the source back to the exposure device. The radiographer picked up their dose rate meter and observed the reading was 30 millirem an hour. The radiographer also observed that the locking mechanism had not tripped. The radiographer contacted the RSO. An individual qualified to perform source retrieval was sent to the scene. The radiographer did not approach the exposure device. The RSO stated the source retrieval person should reach the location in about an hour. Awaiting information from RSO. Update will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Report #: I-9232

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf