Event Notification Report for August 12, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/11/2014 - 08/12/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
503885035550356503575035850539
Agreement State
Event Number: 50388
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TESTAMERICA LABORATORIES, INC.
Region: 4
City: ARVADA State: CO
County:
License #: CO 486-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRICE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: TESTAMERICA LABORATORIES, INC.
Region: 4
City: ARVADA State: CO
County:
License #: CO 486-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRICE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/21/2014
Notification Time: 10:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2014
Notification Time: 10:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING ELECTRON CAPTURE DEVICE SEALED SOURCE
The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:
"Event description: The Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] was notified via e-mail on 8/13/2014, by TestAmerica Laboratories Inc (license # CO 486-03), that a leak test result for a Ni-63 Electron Capture Device [ECD] source had shown counts exceeding 185 Bq.
"The licensee has removed the source from service, decontaminated the instrument that the ECD was mounted on and sent the unit, containing the source, to the manufacturer for repair and source replacement.
"The email was sent to the department pursuant to Section 4.58 of the Colorado Regulations.
"The Department has requested a few additional details regarding specifics of the source (serial Number, manufacturer, etc.) at this time and will populate the NMED database as soon as they are received."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO14-I14-21
The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:
"Event description: The Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] was notified via e-mail on 8/13/2014, by TestAmerica Laboratories Inc (license # CO 486-03), that a leak test result for a Ni-63 Electron Capture Device [ECD] source had shown counts exceeding 185 Bq.
"The licensee has removed the source from service, decontaminated the instrument that the ECD was mounted on and sent the unit, containing the source, to the manufacturer for repair and source replacement.
"The email was sent to the department pursuant to Section 4.58 of the Colorado Regulations.
"The Department has requested a few additional details regarding specifics of the source (serial Number, manufacturer, etc.) at this time and will populate the NMED database as soon as they are received."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO14-I14-21
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50355
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH STINSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH STINSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 05:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 04:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 05:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 04:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
ABY MOHSENI (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
VICTOR McCREE (R2RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
ABY MOHSENI (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)
VICTOR McCREE (R2RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT FOR A HALON RELEASE NEAR THE TSC AND EOF
The licensee declared an Unusual Event because of a halon discharge in the simulator. This potentially affects access and habitability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The Unusual Event was declared under HU3.1 "toxic, corrosive, asphyxiate, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could have adversely affected normal plant operations." The fire brigade has been dispatched to determine whether a fire actually exists.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 0707 EDT ON 8/12/2014 FROM DAVID FASCHER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 EDT.
"Halon discharged into the plant simulator. There was no actual fire. Offsite assistance was requested. Local fire department and ambulance are on site. The TSC and EOF have been activated.
"The halon discharge into the simulator building is not impacting normal plant operations where the ERO [Emergency Response Organization] capabilities and staffing are still required. Therefore, activation for UE [Unusual Event] is being terminated."
The Incident Commander released the building for normal access at 0717 EDT.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease), IRD (Gott), and NRR (Thomas). Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1218 EDT ON 8/12/14 FROM CRAIG OLIVER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER * * *
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: This is an update of a previous notification which was made by telephone to the [NRC] Operations Center at approximately 0504 EDT per Event Number 50355.
"At approximately 0421 EDT on 08/12/2014, the Halon fire suppression system in the Plant Simulator actuated by releasing the Halon. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0432 EDT on the basis that a release of toxic or asphyxiating gas had occurred on site (Emergency Action Level HU3.1). Emergency response personnel reported to the site and prepared to perform emergency response activities.
"The site fire brigade was dispatched. The local fire department was called and emergency personnel were dispatched to the site.
"The reason for the Halon discharge is not known at this time and is under investigation. No actual fire was observed. The Plant Simulator is located in the same building with the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) and primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Since the Halon discharge occurred in this building, the site incident commander restricted access to these two primary Emergency Response Facilities, rendering them unavailable for use. The NOUE was terminated at 0700 EDT. Normal access to the TSC and EOF was restored at 0717 EDT.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: This event had no effect on the operating units, and there was no adverse impact on nuclear safety or on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Offsite fire department personnel assisted by on site fire brigade have validated that no fire condition existed. The building has been ventilated and normal access restored. The failure of the Halon System is being tracked for restoration in accordance with station fire protection documents."
Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Daytime EO (Thomas).
The licensee declared an Unusual Event because of a halon discharge in the simulator. This potentially affects access and habitability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The Unusual Event was declared under HU3.1 "toxic, corrosive, asphyxiate, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could have adversely affected normal plant operations." The fire brigade has been dispatched to determine whether a fire actually exists.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 0707 EDT ON 8/12/2014 FROM DAVID FASCHER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 EDT.
"Halon discharged into the plant simulator. There was no actual fire. Offsite assistance was requested. Local fire department and ambulance are on site. The TSC and EOF have been activated.
"The halon discharge into the simulator building is not impacting normal plant operations where the ERO [Emergency Response Organization] capabilities and staffing are still required. Therefore, activation for UE [Unusual Event] is being terminated."
The Incident Commander released the building for normal access at 0717 EDT.
The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease), IRD (Gott), and NRR (Thomas). Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1218 EDT ON 8/12/14 FROM CRAIG OLIVER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER * * *
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: This is an update of a previous notification which was made by telephone to the [NRC] Operations Center at approximately 0504 EDT per Event Number 50355.
"At approximately 0421 EDT on 08/12/2014, the Halon fire suppression system in the Plant Simulator actuated by releasing the Halon. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0432 EDT on the basis that a release of toxic or asphyxiating gas had occurred on site (Emergency Action Level HU3.1). Emergency response personnel reported to the site and prepared to perform emergency response activities.
"The site fire brigade was dispatched. The local fire department was called and emergency personnel were dispatched to the site.
"The reason for the Halon discharge is not known at this time and is under investigation. No actual fire was observed. The Plant Simulator is located in the same building with the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) and primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Since the Halon discharge occurred in this building, the site incident commander restricted access to these two primary Emergency Response Facilities, rendering them unavailable for use. The NOUE was terminated at 0700 EDT. Normal access to the TSC and EOF was restored at 0717 EDT.
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: This event had no effect on the operating units, and there was no adverse impact on nuclear safety or on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Offsite fire department personnel assisted by on site fire brigade have validated that no fire condition existed. The building has been ventilated and normal access restored. The failure of the Halon System is being tracked for restoration in accordance with station fire protection documents."
Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Daytime EO (Thomas).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50356
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI POTENTIAL INOPERABILITY DISCOVERED DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING
"At 0238 hours [EDT] on Tuesday, August 12, 2014, with Pilgrim Station at 100 percent power in the Run Mode with reactor coolant pressure at approximately 1025 psig and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System previously removed from service for maintenance, a condition with the potential to impact the operability of the HPCI System was discovered. The HPCI System was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. Upon HPCI initiation, the indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator FI-2340-1-1 was 0 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) with the flow controller in the manual mode. The indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator Fl-2340-1-1 remained at 0 GPM throughout the duration of the surveillance. Alternate flow indication indicated the expected HPCI flow rate. The flow controller in manual was capable of controlling at the demanded HPCI turbine speed. The HPCI turbine speed was manually varied with a corresponding change in the HPCI flow computer point reading. Activities to restore the flow indicator capability are in progress.
"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause of the flow indicator issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee will be notifying the state.
* * * RETRACTION FROM O'ROURKE TO KLCO ON 10/03/2014 AT 1254 EDT * * *
"Subsequent investigation determined that HPCI Flow Instrument SQRT-2340-10 output signal was 0 mA and did not change in response to the actual HPCI flow rate. With the SQRT-2340-10 output signal at 0 mA, the HPCI Flow controller would demand maximum HPCI injection flow in the AUTOMATIC control mode. Circuitry within the control system limits the maximum HPCI flow to 5250 GPM at a turbine speed of 4165 RPM. Engineering analysis has concluded that the HPCI pump operating limits (net positive suction head and low pressure suction trip) would not be exceeded in a maximum HPCI flow state. Therefore, the HPCI System was operable and capable of performing its residual heat removal and accident mitigation functions.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report is being retracted.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
"At 0238 hours [EDT] on Tuesday, August 12, 2014, with Pilgrim Station at 100 percent power in the Run Mode with reactor coolant pressure at approximately 1025 psig and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System previously removed from service for maintenance, a condition with the potential to impact the operability of the HPCI System was discovered. The HPCI System was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. Upon HPCI initiation, the indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator FI-2340-1-1 was 0 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) with the flow controller in the manual mode. The indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator Fl-2340-1-1 remained at 0 GPM throughout the duration of the surveillance. Alternate flow indication indicated the expected HPCI flow rate. The flow controller in manual was capable of controlling at the demanded HPCI turbine speed. The HPCI turbine speed was manually varied with a corresponding change in the HPCI flow computer point reading. Activities to restore the flow indicator capability are in progress.
"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause of the flow indicator issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee will be notifying the state.
* * * RETRACTION FROM O'ROURKE TO KLCO ON 10/03/2014 AT 1254 EDT * * *
"Subsequent investigation determined that HPCI Flow Instrument SQRT-2340-10 output signal was 0 mA and did not change in response to the actual HPCI flow rate. With the SQRT-2340-10 output signal at 0 mA, the HPCI Flow controller would demand maximum HPCI injection flow in the AUTOMATIC control mode. Circuitry within the control system limits the maximum HPCI flow to 5250 GPM at a turbine speed of 4165 RPM. Engineering analysis has concluded that the HPCI pump operating limits (net positive suction head and low pressure suction trip) would not be exceeded in a maximum HPCI flow state. Therefore, the HPCI System was operable and capable of performing its residual heat removal and accident mitigation functions.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report is being retracted.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50357
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SITE STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
Millstone removed their site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, from service for scheduled maintenance. Expected duration of maintenance is 8 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford.
Millstone removed their site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, from service for scheduled maintenance. Expected duration of maintenance is 8 hours.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50358
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE DAMMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GENE DAMMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 12:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 12:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
"At approximately 1248 CDT, on August 12, 2014, Emergency Planning was notified by the siren vendor that Pierce County inadvertently actuated sirens at 1239 [CDT] while performing a cancel test. Fifty two (52) of the 123 sirens were actuated county wide for approximately 15 seconds before Pierce County could cancel activation. Per F3-5.2, Response to a False Siren Activation, this requires a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) 4 hour non-emergency report. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. The sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time.
"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
"At approximately 1248 CDT, on August 12, 2014, Emergency Planning was notified by the siren vendor that Pierce County inadvertently actuated sirens at 1239 [CDT] while performing a cancel test. Fifty two (52) of the 123 sirens were actuated county wide for approximately 15 seconds before Pierce County could cancel activation. Per F3-5.2, Response to a False Siren Activation, this requires a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) 4 hour non-emergency report. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. The sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time.
"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Part 21
Event Number: 50539
Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
Licensee: ALLEN BRADLEY
Region: 4
City: KILLONA State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARL RICH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: ALLEN BRADLEY
Region: 4
City: KILLONA State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARL RICH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 10/15/2014
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 15:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2014
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 15:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - DEFECTIVE ALLEN BRADLEY RELAY
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a dedicated basic component from manufacturing specifications, which could have possibly caused a substantial safety hazard.
"On 04/23/2014, Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit A automatically started unexpectedly. It was determined that the equipment inadvertent actuation occurred due to an Allen Bradley Type 700RTC relay failure. The failure mode resulted in the associated equipment actuating as it would to perform its safety function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations. The failed relay was replaced on 4/25/2014.
"Independent failure analysis performed by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) on an Allen Bradley model 700RTC000020U1 relay that failed in service at Waterford 3 Nuclear Station (WF3) identified that the relay's L22 coil was electrically open. Detailed destructive analysis of the L22 coil revealed corrosion of the winding in multiple locations. Corrosion products removed from various locations near the failure site on the L22 coil contained significant concentrations of chlorine. The independent failure analysis concluded the in-plant failure observed at Waterford 3 was caused by corrosion near the start end of the relay's L22 coil winding. The source of the corrosive material that damaged the winding was not apparent; however, based on review of storage practices at Waterford 3, it is likely that it was introduced during manufacture of the coil. On 8/12/2014, Waterford 3 engineering determined this relay condition was a PART 21 deviation. The qualifying vendor (Qual Tech NP) has been contacted and they have provided the completed failure analysis to the manufacturer (Allen Bradley).
"Entergy concluded that for the application of this relay where a malfunction occurred, it did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 10/10/2014, at approximately 1233 CDT, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that had this relay type been installed, with the same deviation, in other safety related normally energized applications, it could possibly have resulted in a substantial safety hazard, and thus is a PART 21 defect.
"The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed 10/14/2014."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a dedicated basic component from manufacturing specifications, which could have possibly caused a substantial safety hazard.
"On 04/23/2014, Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit A automatically started unexpectedly. It was determined that the equipment inadvertent actuation occurred due to an Allen Bradley Type 700RTC relay failure. The failure mode resulted in the associated equipment actuating as it would to perform its safety function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations. The failed relay was replaced on 4/25/2014.
"Independent failure analysis performed by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) on an Allen Bradley model 700RTC000020U1 relay that failed in service at Waterford 3 Nuclear Station (WF3) identified that the relay's L22 coil was electrically open. Detailed destructive analysis of the L22 coil revealed corrosion of the winding in multiple locations. Corrosion products removed from various locations near the failure site on the L22 coil contained significant concentrations of chlorine. The independent failure analysis concluded the in-plant failure observed at Waterford 3 was caused by corrosion near the start end of the relay's L22 coil winding. The source of the corrosive material that damaged the winding was not apparent; however, based on review of storage practices at Waterford 3, it is likely that it was introduced during manufacture of the coil. On 8/12/2014, Waterford 3 engineering determined this relay condition was a PART 21 deviation. The qualifying vendor (Qual Tech NP) has been contacted and they have provided the completed failure analysis to the manufacturer (Allen Bradley).
"Entergy concluded that for the application of this relay where a malfunction occurred, it did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 10/10/2014, at approximately 1233 CDT, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that had this relay type been installed, with the same deviation, in other safety related normally energized applications, it could possibly have resulted in a substantial safety hazard, and thus is a PART 21 defect.
"The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed 10/14/2014."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.