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Event Notification Report for August 4, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/01/2014 - 08/04/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50282 50304 50308 50311 50334 50336 50337 50338

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50282
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE CONQUEST
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/15/2014
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2014
Event Time: 09:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - LOW CONTAINMENT SPRAY FLOW RATE

"At 0942 [CDT] on 7/15/2014, the 2A Containment Spray chemical additive flow was found out of tolerance low during surveillance testing. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition in that insufficient chemical additive flow might have resulted in lower than assumed containment spray pH values during past periods.

"Based on the above, this is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Actions are in progress to restore the 2A Containment Spray chemical additive flow to within tolerance. The 2B Containment Spray system is operable per Technical Specification 3.6.6 and is capable of providing required chemical additive flow.

"The required flow is 18 to 67 gallons per minute (gpm), however, the measured flow was 17.96 gpm.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES PETTY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1729 EDT ON 8/1/14 * * *

"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #50282 (July 15, 2014). This ENS report was made for the 2A Containment Spray chemical additive flow which was found out of tolerance low during surveillance testing. At the time of reporting, it was concluded that this was an unanalyzed condition in that insufficient chemical additive flow may have resulted in lower than assumed containment spray pH values during past periods. This was reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(11)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"On Wednesday, July 29, 2014, Braidwood Generating Station concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted based on the completion of Engineering Change 398884, 'Evaluation Of 2A CS NaOH Spray Additive Test Results And Discussion of IRs 1682209 and 1683413.'

"The Engineering Change concluded that the approval of the alternate source term (AST) license amendment resulted in the elimination of a minimum containment spray (CS) spray pH value. The current containment release analysis does not credit the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) to CS spray for fission product removal from the containment atmosphere. The long-term retention of captured fission products in the sump water assumes the sump water pH is greater than 7. This is established by the transfer of the containment spray additive tank (CSAT) contents to the sump during CS system operation. To transfer the maximum CSAT inventory to the sump within 8 hours, a minimum NaOH eductor flow of approximately 10 gpm is required. The minimum NaOH injection flow for the 2A CS eductor system exceeded 10 gpm so the eductor injection flows meet the criteria to transfer CSAT inventory to the containment recirculation sump within the expected minimum CS system operating time. The out of tolerance flow values recorded at the time of the initial ENS notification are acceptable.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified the R3DO (Lara).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50304
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GEOSERVICES LLC
Region: 1
City: KNOXVILLE State: TN
County: KNOX
License #: R-47218-A16
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 07/24/2014
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

The following was received from the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"During a routine radioactive materials inspection of GEOServices LLC, a Tennessee Division of Radiological Health inspector found a portable moisture/density gauge, Troxler model 3401-B, containing Cs-137 (8 mCi) and Am-241/Be (40 mCi) that had been struck by a tractor at a construction site located somewhere in Knox County TN. The accident occurred in the month of December 2010. The RSO of GEOServices did not contact DRH about the accident. The RSO did not perform any surveys on the damaged moisture/density gauge. The RSO packaged the damaged moisture/density gauge and returned it to GEOServices' licensed storage location. Once the device was discovered by Tennessee Div. of Radiological Health, surveys were performed. Surveys indicated that the sources were not damaged and were not leaking. The device was packaged by the RSO and returned to Troxler for disposal."

Tennessee Incident Number: TN-14-110

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 50308
Rep Org: KAW VALLEY ENGINEERING, INC.
Licensee: KAW VALLEY ENGINEERING, INC.
Region: 4
City: JUNCTION CITY State: KS
County:
License #: 15-26870-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVEN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/25/2014
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/24/2014
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST TROXLER MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

While working at a jobsite on the Fort Riley, Kansas federal reservation, the technician had just finished the standard count on a Troxler moisture/density gauge when he received a telephone call to go to another job site for a meeting. The technician placed the gauge back in its case but did not shut the case or lock the case and left it on the tailgate of the truck. When the technician arrived at the second jobsite, an individual approached the technician and told him that he had observed a yellow case fall off the back of the truck near the Camp Forsythe fire station. The technician immediately went back to the fire station. By the time he arrived, fire department personnel had already secured the case with the gauge inside. The technician estimates that the gauge was out of his possession for approximately 8 - 10 minutes. A leak test was performed with no leakage noted and sent to Troxler for further analysis. The gauge will remain out of use until leak results are received from Troxler.

The gauge is a Troxler model 3430 moisture/density gauge containing 9 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241/Be.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 50311
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROCKY MOUNTAIN RECYCLING
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/25/2014
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/25/2014
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GENERAL LICENSED MATERIAL

The following information was provided by the State of Colorado via email:

On July 21, 2014, the State of Colorado was made aware of a stolen generally licensed device. The general license holder was contacted on July 24, 2014 to gather additional information. The general license owner, Rocky Mountain Recycling was planning to perform a demonstration for a company in Dallas, Oregon. During the night of June 25, 2014, the analyzer was stolen from a vehicle parked overnight in Dallas, Oregon. A police report for the stolen material was filed in the city of Dallas, Oregon. The device manufacturer is Thermo Niton, model XLp, serial number 6199, containing 30 milliCuries of Am-241. The investigation is ongoing. No report was made to the Oregon Radiation Protection Services.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50334
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES FIANT
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/31/2014
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2014
Event Time: 17:29 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION

"On 07/31/2014 at 1729 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) identified an unanalyzed condition involving the three class 1E 4160 volt buses on Unit 1 and on Unit 2. Following a postulated main steam line High Energy Line Break (HELB) in the Turbine Building, steam could enter the 4160 volt bus rooms through ventilation ducts that exhaust to the turbine deck where the steam lines are located. New analysis identified that the relative humidity (RH) of the 4160 volt bus rooms could reach 100%, which exceeds the design RH used in the analyses for the protective devices in the room. The high-humidity could possibly prevent the protective devices from operating as intended and could therefore result in the unavailability of the 4160 volt buses to supply power to engineered safety feature systems.

"This concern is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"Compensatory measures were taken to isolate the ventilation ducts between the 4160 volt bus rooms and the turbine deck, thereby preventing steam entry into the 4160 volt bus rooms, assuring the protective devices would not be subjected to conditions exceeding the design RH. With this compensatory measure all three 4160 buses on each unit are assured of performing their expected design function following the postulated main steam line break.

"This concern did not result in any adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.

"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."

In addition to the 10 CFR sections listed in the header of this event notification, the licensee is also reporting this under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

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Part 21 Event Number: 50336
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROSALIE NAVA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/01/2014
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - SAFETY-RELATED VALVES ASSEMBLED WITH NON-SAFETY RELATED LEVERS

Crane did not provide safety related levers, for manual type safety valves, on a recent shipment. Crane was advised by their customer that valves provided for AP1000 PV10 Scopes (VDS 101 and VDS 150) should have had safety-related levers.

Crane believes the only affected valves are those that have been provided on the AP 1000 project.

If you have questions please contact;
Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality
Phone 630-226-4940
Fax 630-226-4646
Email RNAVA@cranevs.com

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50337
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANIEL PIPKIN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/02/2014
Notification Time: 03:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2014
Event Time: 21:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TEST RETURN VALVE LEAKAGE

"River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray system inoperable at 2142 [CDT] on 8/1/2014.

"The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system at River Bend Station includes a test return line to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The test return line is isolated by two motor operated valves (MOVs) with both having a safety function to close on an ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. While the HPCS pump is normally aligned to the CST, the credited source of water for the pump is the suppression pool. Accordingly, the pump suction is realigned to the suppression pool on low level in the CST or when suppression pool level rises to a certain point. Station personnel identified leakage past the test return valves to the CST. In evaluating this condition, engineering personnel noted that the observed leakage past the two MOVs might be sufficient to deplete suppression pool inventory such that it would not be capable of performing its specified function for the duration of the 30 day mission time. The issue of concern is that once HPCS is aligned to the suppression pool post-LOCA, pool inventory would be lost to the CST through the leaking test return valves.

"Based on that concern, the HPCS pump suction valve from the suppression pool was disabled in the closed position to preserve pool inventory. This action caused the HPCS system to be declared inoperable at 2142 [CDT]. This action results in a 14 day shutdown LCO and is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The HPCS pump remains available with its suction aligned to the CST. Assuming normal makeup water supplies are available, the HPCS system can be realigned to the suppression pool if necessary.

"This condition continues to be evaluated and rework options are being developed.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50338
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/03/2014
Notification Time: 20:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2014
Event Time: 15:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT PAGER NOTIFICATION SYSTEM MESSAGE

"This event is being reported per 50.72(b)(2)(xi), 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.'

"At 1549 CDT, August 3, 2014, the National Weather Service inadvertently issued a Civil Emergency Message over their pager notification system during preparations for an upcoming [Cooper Nuclear Station] Emergency Drill. A follow up message was issued by the National Weather Service at 1601 CDT stating that the Civil Emergency Message was a test message and should be disregarded.

"A media/press release is planned."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, August 04, 2014
Monday, August 04, 2014