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Event Notification Report for July 24, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/23/2014 - 07/24/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49908 50297 50299 50301 50302

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Part 21 Event Number: 49908
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: ASCO VALVE, INC.
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LISA SCHICHLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - UNSEATING OF VALVE SPRING ON SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE

"This concerns an evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding a malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV), which has been observed to impair control rod scram performance. As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 21.21(d). The SSPV manufacturer (ASCO Valve, Inc.) has not yet concluded its own investigation under 10CFR 21, and the results of that investigation are needed as input for the GEH evaluation. The manufacturer has issued an Interim Report, which provides confidence that this condition is limited to a very small portion of the suspect population.

"A malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve was attributed to the disengagement of the valve spring from the valve plunger. The effect of the malfunction is to degrade scram performance of an affected control rod. The safety significance of this condition cannot be determined at this time, but several mitigating and compensatory functions have been identified."

This evaluation affects Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2-3, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, and Browns Ferry 1-3.

* * * UPDATE AT 1502 EDT ON 07/23/14 FROM LISA SCHICHLEIN TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

"Subject: Completed Evaluation of Part 21 Potentially Reportable Condition Notification: Unseating of Valve Spring on SSPV

"This letter provides information concerning an evaluation now completed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding the malfunction of Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves (SSPVs), which have been observed to impair control rod scram performance. As stated herein, GEH has concluded this condition is Not Reportable for two of the affected plants (Enrico Fermi 2 and Columbia Generating Station plants), but GEH does not have sufficient information to fully evaluate the safety significance of the condition for the remainder of the potentially affected plants. Given that, GEH closes this 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation with a Transfer of Information to potentially affected licensees, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(b) and will communicate the determination of Not Reportable to the identified plants where sufficient information was available to make that determination.

"Although the Enrico Fermi 2 and Columbia Generating Station plants are included in the attached list of U.S. plants potentially affected, inspections of all suspect SSPVs remaining at those plants indicate that no other SSPVs at those plants exhibit the condition (as informally reported to GEH), and therefore those plants were determined to not have a reportable condition.

"This letter closes the supplemental 60-Day Interim Report Notification (MFN 14-010 R0), provided on March 13, 2014, per 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

"If you have any questions, please call me at (910) 819-4491.

"Sincerely,

"Dale E. Porter
"Safety Evaluation Program Manager
"GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC"

Notified R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Musser), R3DO (Orth), R4DO (Miller) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50297
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LINDAHL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/23/2014
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2014
Event Time: 07:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On Wednesday, July 23 at 0748 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location.

"The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 2 hours.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"NRC Regional Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 50299
Rep Org: SOR INC.
Licensee: SOR INC.
Region: 4
City: LENEXA State: KS
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELANIE DIRKS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/23/2014
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NRR PART 21 (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE SWITCHES

The following information was originally received in NRC Region IV on July 16, 2014 via email. Relevant portions of the submittal are provided below without graphs, tables or pictures.

"SOR is a supplier of basic components to the nuclear power industry. The components of concern for this notification are SOR nuclear qualified Pressure and Temperature switches with TA housings manufactured from 2004 through 2009.

"The defect being reported is a potential out of tolerance condition concerning the machined sealing surface for an environmental seal on the SOR nuclear TA housing. Other switches with a similar defect have the potential to not meet their intended safety function.

"Summary: SOR Inc. began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 6/4/14 upon receipt of three SOR pressure switches, model number 5TA-B45-U8-C1A-JJTTNQ (SN's 041100627, 041100628, and 041100629). These were returned from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY) due to inspections which questioned the suitability of the sealing surfaces on the face of the housings where the cover O-ring seals.

"The product evaluation was concluded on 6/24/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. If the switch housing has an inadequate machined sealing surface, the potential exists for steam permeation into the switch housing during accident conditions. This could result in an increase in set point as well as allow moisture into the housing potentially causing electrical consequences such as current leakage or a short. It is anticipated that the above noted condition represents a small percentage of the total number of housings from this batch of castings. Also, the potential risk is thought to be small due to a second redundant seal on the cover. This condition is being reported as a conservative measure.

"Evaluation: There are 2 (redundant) environmental seals on the cover of the nuclear TA housing. One O-ring seals on the undercut of the cover threads (151 O-ring). This seal is not in question and is not part of this evaluation. The other O-ring seals between the face of the enclosure and the O-ring groove on the cover (042 O-ring). This is the seal that is the subject of this evaluation.

"Redundant O-ring seals are used on the SOR 'TA' cover to minimize steam permeation into the housing during LOCA or HELB conditions. The consequences of permeation are that it can result in an increase in the set point and also allow moisture into the housing which could have electrical consequences. The returned switches have a suspect sealing surface on the face of the housing where one of the two O-rings (the 042 O-ring) is intended to seal. For the purposes of this Part 21 evaluation, consideration needs to be given to whether this suspect sealing surface could result in increased permeation into the switch enclosure.

"Switches #041100627 and 041100628 both have an area on the face of the housing where the casting did not have sufficient material for cleanup when the housing was machined. This area was characterized by use of the SOR CMM and measuring the area where the O-ring is expected to seal.

"Switch #041100629 was different from #041100627 and 041100628 in that it had one small indentation in the sealing surface which was immeasurable but does not meet surface finish requirements.

"The TA housings on the returned switches are clearly out of tolerance. It is SOR's position that the environmental seals on any switch with a similar defect has the potential to not meet its' intended safety function. . .

"Evaluation of Previous Shipments: SOR has validated shipments for a quantity of 56 pressure and temperature switches with the subject TA housing.

"Potentially affected customers/utilities include: TVA/Watts Bar, TVA/Browns Ferry, TVA/Sequoyah, Entergy Nuclear/Vermont Yankee, Entergy Operations/River Bend, Southern California Edison, Third Qinshan Nuclear/QSNPP-3-A (TQNPC), Fairbanks Morse Engine, STP Nuclear Operating Co., Hydro Quebec /Gentilly II, Progress Energy/Shearon Harris, Control Components Inc./Korea Hydro Nuclear Shin-Kori & Wolsong, Control Components Inc./KHPN Shin Kori 3 & 4, Korea Hydro & Nuclear/KHPN Yonggwang NPP #5, Konan Engineering/Yonggwang Nuclear, and First Energy/Davis-Besse Nuclear. (Total Potentially Affected = 56.

"Root Cause: The returned TA housing castings did not meet print and therefore did not allow enough material for cleanup of the machined sealing surface.

"Permanent Corrective Action: SOR internal documentation is being changed to require 100% inspection of the raw casting height. Also, the 1/8 [inch] minimum finish dimension is being added to the housing machining drawings.

"Action by Nuclear Power Plant: SOR recommends that the application for each switch noted in the above table be reviewed to determine if it is being used in a LOCA or HELB application. If so, SOR recommends an inspection to visually check for an adequate sealing surface of the housing . This inspection is also recommended for switches that have not yet been installed. The minimum required sealing surface is 1/8 [inch] (0.125 [inch]). After inspection, all units should have the 042 and 151 O-rings replaced if the units do not exhibit the deviation.

"SOR will send replacement O-rings at no charge upon request. If units are found that do not meet the acceptance criteria, they will be replaced free of charge by SOR. Contact SOR Director of Customer Service, Greg Barber for the replacements:

"Greg Barber
"913-956-3059
"gbarber@sorinc.com"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50301
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE CONQUEST
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/23/2014
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2014
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2014
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
CYNTHIA PEDERSEN (R3RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (NSIR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED BASED ON SHOTS FIRED IN THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA

"At 1943 CDT on 7/23/14, Braidwood Station declared Unusual Event HU1 due to gunshots fired within the Owner Controlled area (OCA). This was a security condition without a Hostile Action. Both Units remain in Mode 1, 100% reactor power throughout the event.

"Local Law enforcement was contacted and investigated. Security stood down from the Security Condition at 1956 CDT."

The Control Room was informed at 1930 CDT by Security of fourteen (14) gunshots heard inside the OCA.

The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 2311 EDT FROM JOE CONQUEST TO S. SANDIN * * *

"Braidwood Station Terminated an Unusual Event, HU1 at 2134 CDT. Local Law Enforcement Agency called an 'AII Clear' and station security restored the normal security posture at 1956 CDT."

The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Orth), NRR (Lund) and IRD (Gott) via email.

Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO, Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50302
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES SOUTHERTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/23/2014
Notification Time: 22:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2014
Event Time: 20:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

COMMON SITE TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA

"At 2027 [EDT] on 7/23/2014, meteorological data was lost to both Salem and Hope Creek. At the time, there were storms in the vicinity which are the apparent cause of the temporary loss of data. Both Salem and Hope Creek lost wind direction information. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities.

"At 2036 [EDT], meteorological data was restored to the control rooms. Plant operations at Hope Creek and both Salem Units 1 and 2 were not affected. All three units remain at full power.

"The licensees notified the NRC Resident Inspectors."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, July 24, 2014
Thursday, July 24, 2014