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Event Notification Report for July 21, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/18/2014 - 07/21/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49667 50267 50268 50269 50271 50274 50284 50285 50286 50287 50288

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Part 21 Event Number: 49667
Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTIAN RHEAULT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/20/2013
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - CRACKING IN KCR-13 STANDBY BATTERY JARS

The following was received via facsimile:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On October 22, 2013, C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Entergy Nuclear Northeast that a KCR-13 battery installed at the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center had developed a small crack in the polycarbonate jar material. The jar is a safety related component with the primary function of containing electrolyte. C&D does not believe that significant quantity of electrolyte was lost through this crack, because there was a normal level of electrolyte in the battery. This unit has been replaced, and the unit was sent by Entergy to an outside lab, Lucius Pitkin (LPI) of New York, NY, for analysis. As C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin, C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. No formal report from Entergy or LPI Is expected before the expiration of the 60 day limit from the date C&D was notified of the issue. Thus, C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D KCR-13 batteries of this interim report. [C&D is also] initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any U.S. licensee using such batteries.

"Concurrent actions underway to complete the evaluation: a) On receipt of the final report by LPI/Indian Point by C&D, C&D shall evaluate the findings and the causes for failure. Maximum time 14 days from receipt of the report. b) In conjunction with the licensees identified in section vi, C&D will recommend maintenance assessment of all KCR-13 batteries at these locations to determine their status, and specifically the presence of any evidence of potential defects via visual examination. For any cells exhibiting the presence of potential defect, C&D shall further recommend that they be returned for analysis. Estimated completion date of analysis is thirty (30) days from the receipt of the returned batteries."

KCR-13 batteries are used in Indian Point and Monticello Nuclear Plants.

For further information contact:
Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
Office Phone 215-619-7830
Email bmalley@cdtechno.com


* * * UPDATE AT 1110 EST ON 02/24/14 FROM CHRISTIAN RHEAULT TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

The following updated information was received from C&D Technologies:

"Subject: Updated Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation regarding cracking in KCR-13 Standby Battery Jars

"As previously stated, C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin. C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error until a final report Is issued by Lucius Pitkin. Although several requests to both Indian Point and Lucius Pitkin have been made, a receipt date for the analysis results is still indeterminate."

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
Office Phone 215-619-7830
Email bmalley@cdtechno.com

Notified R1 (DeFrancisco), R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 Group (via email).


* * * UPDATE AT 0927 EDT ON 5/9/2014 FROM ROBERT MALLEY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via fax:

"C&D has recently received and is evaluating the report from Lucius Pitkin and will perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. The planned final evaluation should be completed by May 31, 2014 at which time it is anticipated that a final report will be issued."

Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Riemer), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).


* * * UPDATE AT 1640 ON 7/18/2014 FROM CHRISTIAN RHEAULT TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

The information provided in the C&D facsimile serves as C&D's final analysis of the issue.

Conclusion: While the images do show indications of environment stress cracking (ESC) and fatigue, the lack of chemical evidence of the actual agent makes it difficult to determine the source of the material. Polycarbonate (the container material) has known stress cracking agents for example esters, aliphatic hydrocarbons, aromatic hydrocarbons, halogenated hydrocarbons, ketones, etc. and the C&D Installation and Operation Manual clearly states that the only approved material for contact with the jar and cover (other than materials used in the construction of the battery) for cleaning purposes is water and sodium bicarbonate. If one of the previously mentioned materials came into contact with the jar, it could have caused the ESC that was observed.

The standing recommendation to system operators is to limit any chemical that can come into contact with the battery to only approved materials. In the event that an unapproved material contacts the battery, the unit should be cleaned and observed for any subsequent damage caused by the agent.

Notified R1DO (Cahill), R3DO (Pelke), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).

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Agreement State Event Number: 50267
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL - HAZLETON
Region: 1
City: HAZLETON State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0106
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/10/2014
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/13/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BRACHYTHERAPY UNDERDOSE

The following information was received via fax:

"This medical event (ME) was self-identified by the licensee during an audit. A patient who had undergone an iodine-125 (I-125) prostate brachytherapy procedure was reported to have a 'D90' dose of 43% of the written directive. The licensee radiation safety officer and physician are in contact regarding this ME. It is unknown at this time if the patient has been notified.

"The Department [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] is waiting for the required 15 day written report from the licensee. The Department will then conduct a reactive inspection."

PA Event Number: PA140017

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 50268
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01883-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DARREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/10/2014
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL UNDERDOSE

The following information was received via fax:

"On July 9, the licensee's radiation safety officer called to report a potential medical event had occurred the previous afternoon. The Agency was advised that an interstitial treatment could not be completed involving a High Dose Rate afterloader (HDR) at the University of Illinois at Chicago. As a result of safety features built into the HDR's programming, the first fraction of a four fraction treatment of 300 rad was automatically terminated and the source returned to the safe/stored position after only 6 rad had been delivered when unexpected resistance was detected in the source wire as it moved to the second dwell position. Subsequent attempts to clear the path and reinitiate the treatment were unsuccessful. As a result, an underdose of 98% of the fraction occurred. The HDR unit was subsequently re-run through its quality assurance tests for positioning accuracy with no anomalies noted. The patient was notified of the event immediately.

"A week before, the patient had 3 catheters surgically placed near the pelvis and their location relative to the treatment site verified by CT scan with an additional scan just before treatment was initiated. After reviewing the scan the written directive was modified to call for 18 dwell positions in three channels for a duration of 101 seconds. Four fractions were going to be completed on successive days. The scan suggested the possibility of the catheters being moved as a result of distention of some internal organs. Although the 'dummy' wire successfully traversed the initial path, and the active wire reached the first treatment position, after the initial 2 seconds of programmed dwell time, the HDR unit detected an unexpected delay in the wire moving to the second dwell position, presumably due to constriction of the pathway, and automatically retracted the active wire to the safe store position. With the assistance of the manufacturer's off site technical advisor, the error code was cleared and attempts were made to reinitiate the treatment however, the 'dummy' wire could not traverse the path and the treatment abandoned.

"In this instance the device performed as designed and subsequent quality assurance tests confirmed the device was operating as expected. Although no effect on the patient is expected from the event, physicians are determining what course of treatment options are available at this time. The licensee was advised of the requirement to submit a written report of the event in accordance with the regulations. Pending additional developments and submission of the report, this matter remains open for now."

The HDR Afterloader has a 5 Ci Ir-192 source and was being used to treat a cancer in the pelvic area.

Illinois Report Number: IL14011

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50269
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 1 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM G. CARR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/10/2014
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2014
Event Time: 09:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 0

Event Text

NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR FOUND IN VIOLATION OF FITNESS-FOR-DUTY POLICY

"A non-licensed employee supervisor has been found in violation of the Duke Energy Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 [Hammann]."

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Agreement State Event Number: 50271
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY
Region: 3
City: CHESHIRE State: OH
County:
License #: 00006GL0265
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/11/2014
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION

The following information was received via e-mail:

"The licensee reported the malfunction of the shutter mechanism on a fixed gauge. The device is stuck in the closed position. Repair to the shutter will be made by the manufacturer, Ohmart-Vega. A date for their site visit to repair the shutter is pending. Information about the source is shown below:
Manufacturer: Ohmart/Vega
Model: SH-F2
Serial #: 13549338
Source Serial #: 1224CO
Isotope: Cs-137
Initial Activity: 500mCi"

Ohio Report Number: OH 2014-019

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 50274
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GEO/ENVIRONMENTAL ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: KNOXVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-47158-D16
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILLY FREEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/11/2014
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2014
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"Tennessee Div. of Radiological Health was notified on 7/11/14, by a representative form Geo/Environmental Associates, that a CPN Model MCI, portable moisture density gauge containing 10 mCi, Cs-137 and 50 mCi, Am-241 was run over by a bulldozer at a construction site in Kentucky while working under reciprocity in that state. Initial surveys performed on the device indicate the source was not damaged and there was no loss of sources from the device. The device is being returned to it's home storage site in Knoxville, Tennessee and will be assessed by state inspectors with further investigation."

The gauge was surveyed and is showing 40 mR/hr on contact.

Tennessee Report Number: TN-14-138

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY BILLY FREEMAN TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 0913 EDT ON 07/14/2014 * * *

The State of Tennessee is retracting this event due to the fact that this event notification should be made by the Commonwealth of Kentucky where the event occurred.

Notified R1DO (Cahill) and FSME Events Resource via email.

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Part 21 Event Number: 50284
Rep Org: VELAN INC.
Licensee: VELAN INC.
Region:
City: MONTREAL, CANADA State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR APOSTOLESCU
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/18/2014
Notification Time: 08:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTS ON 2 INCH BONNETS

The following information was received from Velan Inc by facsimile:

"SUBJECT NOTIFICATION: 2 INCH BONNETS, VELAN PART NUMBER 6943-014

"On May 16, 2014 [Velan] received notification from Westinghouse Electric Co. (WES) that 2 bonnets supplied by Velan to WES in early 2013 for installation at Comanche Peak exhibited the following issues:
- The bonnets were intended to be exact replacements for the bonnets built to drawing E73-020 Rev E (OEM is Velan) except for material change to SA-182 FXM-19. Bonnets were visually inspected when received at site. No issues were noted; both bonnets appeared to be identical.
- In April 2013, Unit 1 bonnet was installed in valve 1-8109. No issues were noted with the installation. The new bonnet was put into service.
-In April 2014, Unit 2 installation was scheduled to begin. After the disassembly of the valve, the old and new bonnets were compared. It was noted that the backseat dimensions are different between the 2 bonnets. The increase in backseat diameter on the new bonnet would cause the stem to not backseat. The decision was made to re-install the old bonnet and send the new bonnet back to the OEM, Velan.

"On June 10, 2014 the bonnet, identified in the last bullet above, arrived at Velan Plant 2.

"The review by the [Velan] Evaluation Committee was finalized on July 17 and concluded that:
-Four similar bonnets were delivered to WES on three different occasions in 1988 and early 90's
-The stem head diameter is 01.312 [inches] so, when opening, the stem may pass through the stem bore of the bonnet and not seat on the backseat.
-On opening, if the limit switches on the actuator do not function, the stem may enter the packing chamber. The packing may be deformed and a leak may develop. Stem travel is limited by the disc contacting the bonnet and/or the end of the stem thread stopping on the actuator drive nut.
-If the actuator and packing flange nuts are removed, there is the potential for the stem to blow out of the valve.
-The packing chamber depth will result in more packing being installed in the valve. This may result in a higher packing friction load on the actuator when operating and reduce the actuator margin.
-The smaller packing chamber will not affect safety. A different diameter packing may be required. The gland bushing diameter (01.744 inches) is less than the packing chamber diameter and will work correctly.

"These bonnets were fabricated against ASME Sec. Ill for installation in Class 2 systems. Not knowing exactly the nature of the application we cannot determine if the [above identified] potential issues may pose a significant safety hazard and therefore we have informed WES by way of a similar letter."

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Part 21 Event Number: 50285
Rep Org: ITT ENGINEERING VALVES, LLC
Licensee: STERIS ISOMEDIX SERVICES
Region: 1
City: LANCASTER State: PA
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: S. T. DONOHUE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 07/18/2014
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - IMPROPER IRRADIATION OF SAMPLES FOR BALL VALVE SEATS AND DIAPHRAGMS

The following information was received from ITT Engineered Valves, LLC by facsimile:

ITT is submitting this report based on an NRC Inspection finding at Steris Isometric Services in Whippany, NJ, where samples may have received 3-9% less than the minimum target dosage specified during testing.

"ITT is in the process of determining how best to approach our customers with this information, and how to work with them to determine whether a defect as defined by 10 CFR Part 21 does exist. To that end, we are reviewing the impact of the variability on all projects that required radiated samples, particularly ball valve seats and diaphragms including the entire Ml diaphragm product line, and what effect if any this will have on our results and conclusions. We are also reviewing any ongoing projects with radiated samples from Steris, and making the necessary adjustments."

Name and address of the individuals informing the Commission:

S. T. Donohue
ITT Engineered Valves, LLC
33 Centerville Road
Lancaster, PA 17603
stephen.donohue@itt.com
Senior Principal Engineer
(717) 509-2200

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50286
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RICH BOWEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/18/2014
Notification Time: 15:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2014
Event Time: 20:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISORY CONTRACT EMPLOYEE

A non-licensed supervisory contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50287
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/20/2014
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2014
Event Time: 14:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT

"At 1454 EDT on 20 July 2014, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 entered the Action for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The action was entered because UHS temperature exceeded the limit of 100 degrees F due to a natural event. This report is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) because UHS capability to remove residual heat is impacted. At 1800 EDT the NRC verbally approved a natural event Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) which allows the ultimate heat sink temperature to exceed 100 degrees F up to 103 degrees F. Unit power levels have been maintained at Unit 3 100% and Unit 4 95%.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50288
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: B. Le CROY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/20/2014
Notification Time: 21:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2014
Event Time: 19:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SMALL KEOWEE HYDROELECTRIC STATION OIL DISCHARGED TO THE KEOWEE RIVER

"On 7/20/2014, at 1700 hours EDT, a spill of approximately five (5) gallons of Teresstic 68 lube oil was identified in the Keowee Hydroelectric Station (KHS) tailrace. Teresstic 68 oil is used at the station as an equipment lubricant. The KHS tailrace feeds into the Keowee River that leads into Lake Hartwell. The estimated area of the oil sheen is approximately 30x50 feet and a cleanup response is currently in progress. The cause of the spill was attributed to a faulty oil float switch in the KHS unwatering pump that allowed the oil to spill into the KHS tailrace (Keowee River).

"South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) and the National Response Center were notified of the spill on 7/20/2014 at approximately 2002 and 1953 hours [EDT] respectively.

"This event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notifications to the SCDHEC and the National Response Center.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

"Initial Safety Significance: The oil did not contain any plant produced radiological material and while contained, poses no safety risk with respect to the health and safety of the public.

"Corrective Action(s): The oil spill sheen is isolated to an approximate 30x50 foot area of the Keowee River. Because the KHS is currently not operating, the water spill area is stagnant, i.e., there is little or no movement of the water containing the oil sheen. The source of the leak has been contained and an investigation is underway to determine the actual cause of the spill. There was no impact on plant operations. The event was entered into the station's corrective action program."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, July 21, 2014
Monday, July 21, 2014