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Event Notification Report for May 30, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/29/2014 - 05/30/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49636 50147 50149

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Agreement State Event Number: 49636
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: REDMOND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR011-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/16/2013
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME_Events Resource (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following was received via facsimile:

"Event Narrative: While performing radiography operations at Microsoft Bld. 32 in Redmond, Washington, the radiography source could not be retracted from the collimator back into camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Mistras then called the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) emergency line (206 Nuclear) and an inspector was dispatched to the scene. At the scene was the RSO, Assistant RSO (trained in source recovery), assistant radiographer, and another radiographer. Assistance was being provided via telephone by QSA Global. It is not known yet if previous attempts brought the source through the camera and into the crank cable tube. However, while attempting to remedy the situation the (0-200 mR) pocket dosimeter of the radiographer had gone off scale. The radiographer was removed from the scene and his TLD has been sent in via overnight mail for emergency processing. The collimator was attached to the camera with a 2-3 inch long fitting (there was no guide tube). After disconnecting the crank cable from the camera, the crank cable was pulled back to the crank (while observing survey meters), and it was discovered that the connector at the end of the cable where it was attached to the pig tail was broken. The camera and collimator were loaded onto a dry wall cart and covered with several bags of lead shot. A moving 2 mR/hr barrier was established around the cart during this movement. The apparatus was then moved to a remote area of the parking lot. Once in the parking lot, 2 mR/hr barricades were set up. Eight foot long tools were made in order to unscrew the fitting from the collimator. Once the fitting was removed, the connector end of the pigtail was exposed and could be pulled out (with eight foot grappler) of the collimator and inserted into another camera. This procedure was practiced several times with a dummy source prior to the actual transfer. The highest dose received on the retrieval team was 93 mR. An investigation is about to begin, and Mistras was performing reenactments earlier today. More information pending."

* * * UPDATE ON 12/19/13 AT 1439 EST FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO DONG PARK * * *

The retrieval team leader received 43 mR with pocket dosimeter, the licensee RSO received 93 mR with pocket dosimeter, the assistant radiographer received 85 mR with pocket dosimeter, and the radiographer received 40 mR with pocket dosimeter.

Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME Events Resource via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/29/2014 AT 1616 EDT FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via e-mail:

"This incident has been closed as of May 29, 2014. The two sides of the crankshaft fractures were analyzed to determine the nature of the fracture mechanism. A reenactment was performed at the licensees facility. Radiographers were re-trained with respect to not attempting retrieval procedures without training or contacting the RSO, and supervision of assistants has been adequately addressed by the licensee. Details of any of these issues are available upon request."

Washington Incident #WA-13-062

Notified the R4DO (Vasquez) and FSME Resources (via e-mail).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50147
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TRAVIS ROLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/28/2014
Notification Time: 23:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2014
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING POTENTIAL MALFUNCTIONING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIREN

"One emergency siren was making noise [siren 27]. Huntersville Fire Department was contacted by someone in the area of the siren. No siren was activated. Initial investigation shows power loss to this one siren around the time of occurrence. Local news media contacted Duke Energy representative to question if sirens were set off. Continue to investigate to determine the issue with this one siren. Emergency Planning notified Mecklenburg County of failure of siren #27."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50149
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLY BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2014
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2014
Event Time: 09:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION BOUNDARY DOOR INOPERABLE

"At 0942 on May 25, 2014, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) declared both Control Room Emergency Ventilation trains inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.7.10 due to an inoperable Control Room Envelope when a control room boundary door was identified as not latching correctly during a security door check. The latch would not have been able to maintain the door closed during an event resulting in Control Room Pressurization. At this time, Security established a continuous door post and would have been able to maintain the door closed.

"At 1602 on May 25, 2014, repairs to the control room boundary door latch were completed restoring the Control Room Envelope to Operable.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This notification should have been made within 8 hours of the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) per guidance in section 3.2.7 of NUREG-1022 - Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfilment of a Safety Function, but was not recognized at that time."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 30, 2014
Friday, May 30, 2014