| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/25/2014 - 04/28/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50022 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRADDOCK LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/10/2014
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2014
Event Time: 05:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSED EMPLOYEE
A licensed employee violated the site Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) policy. The affected individual will be evaluated under for-cause FFD testing. The employee's plant access has been suspended.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 0100 EDT ON 04/25/14 FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee provided additional clarifying information.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. Notified R3DO (Cameron). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50041 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MARCO INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: KILGORE State: TX
County:
License #: 06072
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/17/2014
Notification Time: 08:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
FSME_EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On April 16, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that on April 15, 2014, a radiography source disconnect had occurred at a temporary field site in or near Martinsville, Texas at approximately 4:45 PM. The camera was a QSA 880D with a 22 curie iridium-192 source. The source was retrieved. No exposure to the public resulted from this event. The cause of failure is unknown at this time, but a crank malfunction is suspected. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9184 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50042 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: ROXANA State: IL
County:
License #: IL 01136-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 04/17/2014
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT TO SAFE POSITION
The following was received from the State of Illinois via email:
"On Wednesday at midday, the Regional Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for the licensee's South Roxana, IL area was called by their two man crew working at the WRB Refinery in Roxana, IL. The crew reported that following a sixth 'shot' on an elevated tank from an overhead platform, the source to the radiography camera would not retract into the safe position. The source had previously been 'run out' to a distance of just over 7 feet into a collimator, and although the crank and assembly rotated freely without notable restriction through two ninety degree turns, the source would not enter the camera. The crew reported that the guide tube had not been affected during the previous shots and noted that the equipment had regularly passed the routine maintenance inspection prior to that day.
"The Regional RSO assembled his emergency response equipment kit and arrived at the site approximately 30 minutes later. The crew had maintained a perimeter and advised responsible site safety personnel of the matter with instructions to ensure the affected area was to remain off limits until the situation was resolved. The Regional RSO inspected the guide tube and set up and like the crew was unable to retract the source. Calls were then placed to the company's regional management and to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency to advise of the situation. The set up was disassembled and the collimated end point placed into a shielded configuration using bags of lead shot so that the full length of the guide tube could be more closely inspected. Minor dents and obstructions of the guide tube were noted and although when corrected by the Regional RSO, would still not allow the source to be safely returned. With the help of the radiography crew, the camera and guide tube assembly was subsequently moved to a more accessible lower platform by the Regional RSO to allow for additional inspection and to create a more direct path. The source however would still not retract into the camera. Dose rates with the source in the collimator were measured as 390 millirem at 8 feet and 695 millirem at 6 feet which was the closest distance the Regional RSO remained in. Additional support from the regional office was requested to thoroughly patrol the boundaries of the area as it appeared additional time was going to be required and the camera would need to be lowered further to gain better access for potential repairs.
"While additional equipment was being collected from the regional office, the manufacturer was advised of the situation and consulted. The manufacturer suggested the issue may lie with the drive cables from the reserve crank end and they would likely have to be disconnected from the source cable. When the additional equipment arrived, the crank housing was disconnected from the camera following the manufacturer's suggestion and from a distance, the cable was manually retracted. The source subsequently was returned to the shielded and locked position with no further difficulties. The total time for recovery was approximately two and a half hours.
"Later, close inspection of the drive crank assembly showed that the reserve section of the crank had been subjected to heat or burned such that the exterior plastic covering had melted along approximately 3 inches of its length. Upon testing, this damaged section prohibited movement of the cable past this point. It's surmised that the crank assembly may have come to rest against an uninsulated section of the piping while taking shots that morning at the refinery that led to the burning/melting of the protective covering over the braided cable which led to the inability to retract the source.
"A check of the Regional RSO direct reading dosimeter showed less than 80 millirem as a result of the recovery operation. Members of the radiography crew received a total dose for the day of less than 100 millirem. The camera was last inspected by the manufacturer on March 14, 2014 and the manufacturer's associated equipment on February 4, 2014 by the Regional RSO. The associated equipment is being returned to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair/replacement."
Illinois event # IL14007 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50044 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MIKE MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/18/2014
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 20:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO REACTOR HEAD VESSEL PENETRATION INDICATIONS
"On April 18, 2014, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 identified 3 reactor vessel head penetrations (9, 43 and 51) that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The reactor vessel head contains a total of 66 penetrations and the volumetric inspection efforts are complete.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
* * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1302 EDT ON 4/26/14 * * *
"On April 26, 2014, V. C. Summer Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 finalized the inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations. Confirmatory dye penetrant inspections determined that penetrations 15 and 22 also did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service.
"The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50059 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: EDWARD CARRERAS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/25/2014
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2014
Event Time: 11:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"A review of industry Operating Experience identified that there were unprotected DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building to other separate fire areas. Fuses used to protect the motor power conductors appear to be inadequate to protect the control conductors. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one area can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.
"This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50060 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SUNYONG KWON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/26/2014
Notification Time: 01:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2014
Event Time: 22:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text STACK RADIATION MONITOR REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"System Affected: Millstone Station Stack Radiation Monitor, RM-8169
"Actuations and Their Signals: None
"Causes: Preplanned Maintenance
"Effect of Event on Plant: None
"Actions Taken or Planned: Completed testing and restored operability" (on 4/26/14 at 0037 EDT)
"Additional Information: None"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50061 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG LaMARCA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/27/2014
Notification Time: 01:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2014
Event Time: 23:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text MINIMUM PATHWAY LIMIT OF MSIV COMBINED LEAKAGE EXCEEDED DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"On 4/26/14 at 2322 EDT it was determined that the combined leakage for Main Steam Isolation Valves (including MSIV's, Main Steam Line Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and RCIC Steam Supply) per SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.1.3.12 exceeded the minimum pathway limit of 300 scfh [standard cubic feet per hour]. The MSIV Combined leakrate of 309 scfh exceeded the limit of 300 scfh with the Local Leak Rate Test failure of the HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve.
"This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), as it was discovered that the required leakage limits were exceeded."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50062 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SLIETER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 04/27/2014
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2014
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT-OF-SERVICE
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) cooling system is not operating properly. The temperature of the TSC is currently 80 degrees F. The TSC is still capable of being pressurized."
If needed, facilities in the Admin building are available for use as the back-up TSC.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50063 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK REID
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/27/2014
Notification Time: 23:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2014
Event Time: 20:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 51 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO AN AUXILIARY TRIP ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR
"At approximately 1932 [CDT] on 4/27/2014, the System Operations Center (SOC - Dispatcher) informed Unit 2 of a system wide grid emergency and ordered both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to come off line as soon as possible.
"At approximately 2012 [CDT], Unit 2 automatically tripped from 51% power due to an Auxiliary Trip on CPCs (Core Protection Calculator) due to Axial Shape Index (ASI) trip. All Control Element Assemblies inserted into the core. Both vital and non-vital 4160V and 6900V buses remain powered from Startup #3 Transformer. All Systems responded as designed.
"At 1932 [CDT], Unit 1 commenced a Rapid Plant Shutdown at a rate 5-7% per min with the intention to take the turbine offline and leave the reactor critical at 10-12% power on the Turbine Bypass Valves. When the Unit 2 reactor tripped, Unit 1 stopped the power reduction and stabilized the plant at approximately 19% Reactor Power and 125 Generated Megawatts. With SOC concurrence, Unit 1 stabilized power and was told to limit site output to <200 MWe.
At 1932 CDT, Unit 1 began a down power from 100% power and Unit 2 began a down power from 95% power. On Unit 2, decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with stable offsite power. The system wide grid emergency is believed to be caused by tornados in the region.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State. | |