| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/20/2014 - 03/21/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49900 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: OXEA CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BISHOP State: TX
County:
License #: LO6079
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE WITH STUCK OPEN SHUTTER
The following Agreement State Report was received from the State of Texas via telephone and email:
The Texas Department of State Health Services received a report from the licensee concerning a stuck open shutter on a level gauge mounted on a tank. The gauge is in operation with the shutter in the normal open position. The failure to the shutter to close was discovered during routine testing. The licensee will contact the Texas Radiation Program Licensing for authorization to continue using the gauge until repaired. The device does not represent any harm to workers or to the public and a vendor will repair the gauge in 3-4 days.
Follow up information will be provided in accordance with SA 300.
The gauge shutter is normally open during operation. The device is a Thermo Fisher Scientific model 5201 with a 100 mCi Cs-137 source.
TEXAS INCIDENT # I-9165. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49912 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER'S HAND
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 13, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee's Site Radiation Safety Officer (SRSO) that one of its radiographer trainees may have received an overexposure while performing radiography at a field site on March 12, 2014. The radiographers were using a QSA880D camera containing a 69 curie iridium - 192 source. At 2100 hours [CDT], the radiographers had completed a shot and the trainee went to the camera to disconnect the guide tube from the camera. The trainee stated while attempting to disconnect the guide tube he observed the reading on the dose rate meter had gone back up. The trainee backed away from the camera and the source was returned to the fully shielded position. It is unknown at this time where the source was located in the guide tube. The SRSO stated the trainee may have been in contact with the guide tube for as long as 15 seconds. The SRSO stated the radiographer trainer was near the trainee during the event. The SRSO stated the trainee's self-reading dosimeter was off scale. The SRSO did not know if the trainee's alarming rate meter was alarming at the time of the event. The SRSO stated he was not at the licensee's facility when he contacted this Agency, but he was returning to the facility. The SRSO stated he would provide additional information as soon as they had a chance to interview the individuals involved. The Agency contacted the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer who stated they were on their way to the company's facility to do reenactments and preliminary dose assessments. The SRSO stated the trainee's dosimetry had been collected and will be sent for processing. No other individual received an exposure due to this event. The Agency contacted the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) and informed them of the event. REAC/TS agreed to provide the licensee with assistance when requested. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-9167
* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER TO KLCO ON 3/14/14 AT 0957 EDT VIA FAX * * *
"The Agency was contacted by the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) at 1700 [CDT] on March 13, 2014 and provided with additional information on the event. The CRSO stated they had interviewed the radiographers involved in the event and discovered a second radiography trainee was involved. The CRSO stated the three individuals were shooting welds on a tank. The two radiography trainees were inside the tank in a man lift basket operating the camera. The camera would hang on the side of the tank. The radiography trainees would place the collimator to perform the shoot and then back off from the camera the distance of the control cables, approximately 35 feet, and operate the camera. The trainer was in a man lift outside the tank placing film. The CRSO stated the camera had been retrieved from the wall of the tank and placed in the basket with them while they waited to set up for the next shoot. The radiography trainees stated they were in the basket for as long as 15 minutes, with the source not fully shielded. The radiography trainee who tried to remove the guide tube stated he had difficulty removing the guide tube, so the 10 to 15 second estimate for the time he spent trying to remove the guide tube was accurate. The radiography trainee stated when they retracted the source to the fully locked position, it took about one quarter turn of the crank handle to fully retract the source.
"During the interviews with the radiographers, it was discovered that the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube was not wearing any personnel monitoring devices. He had left them in the truck. The other radiography trainee was wearing their dosimetry, but failed to turn the alarming rate meter on. The CRSO stated the dosimetry will be sent to their dosimetry [lab] for processing.
"The CRSO stated they had contacted REAC/TS for assistance. They have taken the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube to the hospital for blood samples to be provided to REAC/TS. The radiography trainee will be taken to a medical facility again on March 14, 2014.
"The Agency contacted the CRSO at 0700 [CDT] on March 14, 2014, and asked the condition of the radiography trainee's hand. The CRSO stated they were not aware of any issues with the individual's hand. The Agency discussed the previous event in Texas with similar circumstances. The consultant for the licensee working with the CRSO was also the consultant in the previous event and is providing the licensee with information gained in that event.
"The licensee currently plans to have the Site RSO to manage the health aspects of this event. The CRSO will manage the investigation of the event. The CRSO stated the former Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director for NRC Region IV will meet them in La Porte on March 14, 2014, to help with the reenactment."
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK ON 3/15/14 AT 2120 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *
"On March 15, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that based on the reenactment of the event, they have calculated the exposure to the hand of the radiography trainee to be 3,680 rem. The calculation is based on the trainee's hand being 0.5 centimeter from the source for 10 seconds. The licensee reported the whole body deep dose equivalent was 6.0 rem for the trainee. The licensee stated they examined the trainee's hand today and did not see any visual effects of the exposure. The licensee stated the trainee has not experienced any pain in his hand. The licensee stated they will continue to monitor the trainee's hand. The licensee stated they are still corresponding with REAC/TS.
"The badge for the second trainee in the basket was read by the dosimeter processor and reported to be 3.327 rem. The licensee stated based on the reenactment they believed the reading to accurately reflect the individual's exposure."
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (Dudes), FSME Resources via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49933 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SEAN BLOOM
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/20/2014
Notification Time: 00:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2014
Event Time: 22:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text POTENTIAL LEAK DISCOVERED AROUND PRESSURIZER HEATER BANK
"This report is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"During an inspection, a small amount of boric acid residue was noted in the vicinity of the Pressurizer heater components. Subsequent examination revealed a small flaw in Pressurizer Backup heater Bank B element 11. This component is part of the primary system boundary. Repair options are being evaluated. Currently, Unit 3 is in Mode 5 in preparation for refueling. The repair will be performed prior to restart."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49934 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JONATHAN PICARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/20/2014
Notification Time: 08:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2014
Event Time: 10:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49935 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CRAIG OLIVER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/20/2014
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2014
Event Time: 09:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FIRE-RELATED UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD IMPACT CREDITED SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS
"This is a non-emergency notification. In preparation for converting from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) Standard 805, an update to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed which identified circuit configurations where fire damage, under certain postulated fire scenarios, could impact the ability to safely shut down following a fire, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
"Affected fire areas are CB-23E, RB1-N, RB1-S, RB2-N, RB2-S, TB1, DG-07, and DG-16E. A fire in one of these areas could potentially affect the post fire capability of the following safe shutdown systems: 1) Containment Overpressure Protection, 2) Emergency Bus Load Shed, 3) Control Room HVAC, or 4) Emergency Diesel Generator Building HVAC.
"This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Fire protection compensatory measures (i.e. roving fire watches) currently exist in the affected fire areas.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The safety significance is minimal. Fire watches were already ongoing in these areas prior to the time of discovery. The conditions identified here are based on hypothetical fire scenarios that have not actually occurred.
"This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (i.e. CR 676576). Previous similar events were reported in NRC Event Reports 47341 and 49222, and in Brunswick LERs 1-2011-002 and 1-2013-002.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49937 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL GRESH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 03/20/2014
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2014
Event Time: 14:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2014 | Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text FERMI DECLARES ALERT DUE TO A FIRE IN AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TURBO CHARGER LAGGING
At 1405 EDT on 3/20/14, Fermi Nuclear Station declared an Alert due to a fire in the lagging of an Emergency Diesel Generator Turbo Charger. The Alert notification was based on EAL HA02, fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.
The fire in the EDG-11 turbocharger lagging occurred during testing. The fire was extinguished using handheld CO2 fire extinguishers and a reflash watch was set. EDG-11 has been removed from service and damage is minimal. The plant is shutdown in Mode 4 for Refueling Outage 16. All parameters associated with the reactor are stable. RHR Pump D remains in service in Shutdown Cooling and is unaffected by the EDG-11 fire.
There has been no other impact on the plant electrical systems or shutdown cooling and Fermi Nuclear Station remains in an Alert pending further evaluation. The NRC remained in Normal Mode.
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, and FDA. Notified NuclearSSA via email only.
* * * UPDATE FROM SAM HASSOUN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1535 EDT ON 3/20/13 * * *
"At 1359 [EDT on 3/20/14], with the plant in Mode 4, a fire was confirmed on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-11 turbocharger. At 1402, the fire was extinguished with a CO2 extinguisher. An ALERT was declared at 1405 and Assembly and Accountability was ordered by the Emergency Director. The Assembly and Accountability was completed satisfactorily by 1441. The fire was from oil soaked lagging on the engine turbocharger. The insulation was removed and the engine exhaust header was inspected. The damage was limited to only the lagging. The room has been ventilated using the Engine room fans and has been cleared of all of the smoke. The Emergency Director terminated the event at 1532 [EDT on 3/20/14]. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3RA (Pederson), NRR (Dorman), R3DO (Lara), IRD (Grant), IRD (Morris), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Tennant). Notified NuclearSSA via email only. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49938 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM PROELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/20/2014
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2014
Event Time: 10:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation | Event Text APPENDIX R FIRE DOOR FAILED TO CLOSE AND LATCH
"At 1020 CDT, door 410B did not automatically close and latch as required. Door 410 B is an Appendix R fire door that is required for divisional separation of safe shutdown equipment. Due to the doors inability to close and latch as required, divisional separation could not be assured in the event of a fire. A continuous fire watch was established once the deficiency was discovered. The door was repaired and verified to be working properly. The door was non-functional for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes from the time of discovery.
"Health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition and there has been no actual condition needing the door to close and latch.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |