United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2014 > March 13

Event Notification Report for March 13, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/12/2014 - 03/13/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49877 49901 49902 49903 49904 49905 49906

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 49877
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: RENOWN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 16-12-0016-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2014
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE MEDICAL EVENT WITH Y-90 SIR-SPHERES MICROSPHERES

The following information was received by email:

"On February 21, 2014 a physician in the department of Interventional Radiology (IR) at Renown Regional Medical Center in Reno, NV prescribed a patient with 26.73 mCi of Y-90 to the liver. This isotope is listed on the RAM license 16-12-0016-01 as item K, sealed sources (Sirtex Medical Limited SIR-Spheres microspheres). This case was approached in the same manner as the previous 20+ cases. The physician felt that the entire dose was appropriately delivered, therefore he went to air and flushed the catheter. The case was ended without incident. After the dose calculations were performed, it was found out that only 54.2% of the dose was delivered. The technicians investigated the delivery system and found that the majority of the undelivered isotope was in/around the 3-way stop system. The company representative [SIRTex] was [at the licensee's site] and after lengthy discussion with the physician, it is felt that the stop might have been defective. The patient and the referring physician were notified."

Nevada Event: NV140006

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49901
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRIN GARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 08:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PYRO PANEL MAINTENANCE RESULTS IN LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

"At 0841 [CDT] on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1344 EDT ON 3/12/14 * * *

The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49902
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TODD PERKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A POSTULATED HOT SHORT THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS2 Main Turbine Emergency Lube Oil pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage this cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

"Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the town of Waterford.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49903
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL FRESCHETTE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A POSTULATED HOT SHORT THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to fire safe shutdown requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS3 Main Turbine Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and Main Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage the cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by the approved fire protection program.

"Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the town of Waterford.

To top of page
Part 21 Event Number: 49904
Rep Org: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Licensee: VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: SPRINGFIELD State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIMMY SHIEH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - AP-1000 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES LEAKAGE

The following was excerpted from a fax received from Valcor Engineering Corporation:

"Background:

"Valcor was chosen by WEC [Westinghouse Electric Corporation] as a supplier to the AP-1000 for the ASME Section Ill Class 1, 2 and 3 Solenoid Operated Valves. As part of the specification requirements Valcor is required to perform qualification testing in accordance with the requirements of IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1987 and IEEE-382-1996.

"Discovery:

"On Saturday January 11th, 2014, Valcor's lab technician discovered that the hard faced seat of an AP-1000 Solenoid Operated qualification valve had a crack through the thickness of the valve seat to the outlet port that caused the valve to leak in the closed position beyond its Technical Specification requirement (WEC Specification APP-PV13-ZOD-101). The subject valve had undergone heat rise testing to determine actuator temperatures during its specified design basis conditions. As part of the qualification process (IEEE-323) and in accordance with the test procedure the subject valve is given a factory acceptance test (FAT) at each stage of the qualification program.

"The valve design is unique to the model (V526-5631-36/40) in that the dimensional constrain resulted in a web thickness of the hard faced seat that is thinner than our standard historical valve designs. A total of eight (8) valves of this configuration (four (4) for Valve Model Number V525-5631-36 and four (4) for Model number V526-5631-40) have been delivered to Westinghouse for installation in the Sanmen and Haiyang nuclear power plants located in the People's Republic of China. Neither of these plants have loaded fuel or are operational.

"The investigation, failure analyses, and stress analyses completed to-date have not provided a firm conclusion of the root cause of the crack. Westinghouse, the purchaser who imposed 10CFR21 on the procurement document of the valve models identified in question, has been informed of the condition and current status of investigation."

Submitted by Jimmy Shieh Quality Assurance Director.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49905
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION - FEDERAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM (FTS)

"At 1315 [EDT] on Wednesday March 12, 2014, while performing monthly communications testing, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) discovered that portions of the Federal Telephone System (FTS) were not functioning as designed. Specifically, the Emergency Notification System (ENS), is not available from the Control Room or Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) while the Health Physics Network (HPN), the Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL), and the Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL) are not currently available from the Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC). All four of these systems were confirmed to be available from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The initial investigation has determined that the failure has not impacted the entire FTS, but may have the potential to impair the licensee's ability to communicate in the event of an emergency.

"Immediate actions are being taken to restore the system to functional status and applicable plant procedures have been entered to determine any further mitigating actions. Members of the Emergency Response Organization have been notified of the failures and the need to utilize commercial phone lines as a compensatory action. The NRC Operations Center has been contacted and informed of these communication system failures.

"It cannot be determined at the time of this notification as to when the system will be restored to full functional status.

"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of certain emergency response communication capabilities as provided by the FTS."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the state.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49906
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JARREAU HOSKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/12/2014
Notification Time: 21:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: 14:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 15 Power Operation 15 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE AND UNPLANNED ISOLATION OF BUILDING VENT RADIATION MONITOR

"At 1422 EDT on March 12, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 declared secondary containment inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being positive. The positive differential pressure was related to sustained high winds from the northeast associated with Winter Storm Vulcan. The reactor building was isolated at 1630 EDT and secondary containment declared operable at 1700 EDT when Secondary Containment Vacuum was restored to greater than 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The isolation of the reactor building resulted in the isolation of the reactor building vent rad monitor (Vent WRGMS [Wide Range Gas Monitors]) which is a loss of emergency assessment capability.

"Secondary containment being inoperable is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control radioactive release.'

"The unplanned isolation of the Vent WRGMS is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will notify the state.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 14, 2014
Wednesday, May 14, 2014