Event Notification Report for March 12, 2014

PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.

"Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER'S HAND

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On March 13, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee's Site Radiation Safety Officer (SRSO) that one of its radiographer trainees may have received an overexposure while performing radiography at a field site on March 12, 2014. The radiographers were using a QSA880D camera containing a 69 curie iridium - 192 source. At 2100 hours [CDT], the radiographers had completed a shot and the trainee went to the camera to disconnect the guide tube from the camera. The trainee stated while attempting to disconnect the guide tube he observed the reading on the dose rate meter had gone back up. The trainee backed away from the camera and the source was returned to the fully shielded position. It is unknown at this time where the source was located in the guide tube. The SRSO stated the trainee may have been in contact with the guide tube for as long as 15 seconds. The SRSO stated the radiographer trainer was near the trainee during the event. The SRSO stated the trainee's self-reading dosimeter was off scale. The SRSO did not know if the trainee's alarming rate meter was alarming at the time of the event. The SRSO stated he was not at the licensee's facility when he contacted this Agency, but he was returning to the facility. The SRSO stated he would provide additional information as soon as they had a chance to interview the individuals involved. The Agency contacted the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer who stated they were on their way to the company's facility to do reenactments and preliminary dose assessments. The SRSO stated the trainee's dosimetry had been collected and will be sent for processing. No other individual received an exposure due to this event. The Agency contacted the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) and informed them of the event. REAC/TS agreed to provide the licensee with assistance when requested. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident # I-9167

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/14/14 AT 0957 EDT VIA FAX * * *

"The Agency was contacted by the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) at 1700 [CDT] on March 13, 2014 and provided with additional information on the event. The CRSO stated they had interviewed the radiographers involved in the event and discovered a second radiography trainee was involved. The CRSO stated the three individuals were shooting welds on a tank. The two radiography trainees were inside the tank in a man lift basket operating the camera. The camera would hang on the side of the tank. The radiography trainees would place the collimator to perform the shoot and then back off from the camera the distance of the control cables, approximately 35 feet, and operate the camera. The trainer was in a man lift outside the tank placing film. The CRSO stated the camera had been retrieved from the wall of the tank and placed in the basket with them while they waited to set up for the next shoot. The radiography trainees stated they were in the basket for as long as 15 minutes, with the source not fully shielded. The radiography trainee who tried to remove the guide tube stated he had difficulty removing the guide tube, so the 10 to 15 second estimate for the time he spent trying to remove the guide tube was accurate. The radiography trainee stated when they retracted the source to the fully locked position, it took about one quarter turn of the crank handle to fully retract the source.

"During the interviews with the radiographers, it was discovered that the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube was not wearing any personnel monitoring devices. He had left them in the truck. The other radiography trainee was wearing their dosimetry, but failed to turn the alarming rate meter on. The CRSO stated the dosimetry will be sent to their dosimetry [lab] for processing.

"The CRSO stated they had contacted REAC/TS for assistance. They have taken the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube to the hospital for blood samples to be provided to REAC/TS. The radiography trainee will be taken to a medical facility again on March 14, 2014.

"The Agency contacted the CRSO at 0700 [CDT] on March 14, 2014, and asked the condition of the radiography trainee's hand. The CRSO stated they were not aware of any issues with the individual's hand. The Agency discussed the previous event in Texas with similar circumstances. The consultant for the licensee working with the CRSO was also the consultant in the previous event and is providing the licensee with information gained in that event.

"The licensee currently plans to have the Site RSO to manage the health aspects of this event. The CRSO will manage the investigation of the event. The CRSO stated the former Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director for NRC Region IV will meet them in La Porte on March 14, 2014, to help with the reenactment."

Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK ON 3/15/14 AT 2120 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *

"On March 15, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that based on the reenactment of the event, they have calculated the exposure to the hand of the radiography trainee to be 3,680 rem. The calculation is based on the trainee's hand being 0.5 centimeter from the source for 10 seconds. The licensee reported the whole body deep dose equivalent was 6.0 rem for the trainee. The licensee stated they examined the trainee's hand today and did not see any visual effects of the exposure. The licensee stated the trainee has not experienced any pain in his hand. The licensee stated they will continue to monitor the trainee's hand. The licensee stated they are still corresponding with REAC/TS.

"The badge for the second trainee in the basket was read by the dosimeter processor and reported to be 3.327 rem. The licensee stated based on the reenactment they believed the reading to accurately reflect the individual's exposure."

Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (Dudes), FSME Resources via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/23/14 AT 0925 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *

"On April 20, 2014, the Agency was notified by the licensee they had completed their investigation into the exposure to the radiographer who had come into contact with the guide tube while the source was not shielded. The investigation determined that the source was located at a distance of six inches from the hand of the radiographer when he contacted the guide tube. Interviews with the radiographer who retracted the source determined that the crank out handle had been rotated almost one full turn to retract the source, not one-quarter turn as initially reported. The error in the initial report was due to the radiographer who returned the source to the fully shielded position not having a clear understanding of the term he used as English is not his primary language. Based on that information, the calculated dose to the radiographer's hand is 4.0 rem for the event. The calculated whole body dose to the radiographer was calculated to be 12.0 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent]. The hand and TEDE dose calculated by this Agency are consistent with the numbers assigned by the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified the R4DO (Azua), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1756 EDT ON 05/20/14 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *

"On May 20, 2014, the Agency received a copy of the NRC Form 5 for the radiography trainee. The Form 5 listed the TEDE dose for 2014 as 12.369 rem and the SDE Max Extremity dose as 15.680 rem. Also, the reporting criteria was changed to match the exposure reported by the licensee.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified R4DO (Gepford) and FSME (McIntosh) via email.

PYRO PANEL MAINTENANCE RESULTS IN LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

"At 0841 [CDT] on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1344 EDT ON 3/12/14 * * *

The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A POSTULATED HOT SHORT THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS2 Main Turbine Emergency Lube Oil pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage this cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

"Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the town of Waterford.

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A POSTULATED HOT SHORT THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to fire safe shutdown requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS3 Main Turbine Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and Main Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage the cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by the approved fire protection program.

"Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the town of Waterford.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION - FEDERAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM (FTS)

"At 1315 [EDT] on Wednesday March 12, 2014, while performing monthly communications testing, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) discovered that portions of the Federal Telephone System (FTS) were not functioning as designed. Specifically, the Emergency Notification System (ENS), is not available from the Control Room or Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) while the Health Physics Network (HPN), the Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL), and the Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL) are not currently available from the Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC). All four of these systems were confirmed to be available from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The initial investigation has determined that the failure has not impacted the entire FTS, but may have the potential to impair the licensee's ability to communicate in the event of an emergency.

"Immediate actions are being taken to restore the system to functional status and applicable plant procedures have been entered to determine any further mitigating actions. Members of the Emergency Response Organization have been notified of the failures and the need to utilize commercial phone lines as a compensatory action. The NRC Operations Center has been contacted and informed of these communication system failures.

"It cannot be determined at the time of this notification as to when the system will be restored to full functional status.

"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of certain emergency response communication capabilities as provided by the FTS."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the state.

* * * UPDATE FROM KEN GRACIA TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1712 EDT ON 3/14/14 * * *

"Federal Telephone System (FTS) communications testing was completed at 1130 EDT on March 14, 2014. The FTS System has been restored to full functional status. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been informed.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE AND UNPLANNED ISOLATION OF BUILDING VENT RADIATION MONITOR

"At 1422 EDT on March 12, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 declared secondary containment inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being positive. The positive differential pressure was related to sustained high winds from the northeast associated with Winter Storm Vulcan. The reactor building was isolated at 1630 EDT and secondary containment declared operable at 1700 EDT when Secondary Containment Vacuum was restored to greater than 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The isolation of the reactor building resulted in the isolation of the reactor building vent rad monitor (Vent WRGMS [Wide Range Gas Monitors]) which is a loss of emergency assessment capability.

"Secondary containment being inoperable is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control radioactive release.'

"The unplanned isolation of the Vent WRGMS is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will notify the state.