Event Notification Report for March 11, 2014

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"An extent of condition review of all unfused ammeters circuits in Direct Current (DC) distribution systems at Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) identified areas in the plant which may be susceptible to secondary fires due to hot shorts from these unfused ammeters. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

"This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.

"Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received via email from the State of Texas:

"On March 11, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified of the theft of a Humboldt model 5001EZ moisture density gauge containing an americium-241 source and a cesium-137 source by the licensee. The licensee did not know the activity of the sources. The licensee stated a technician was working at a job site taking measurements every thirty minutes. The technician placed the gauge on the bed of their truck after taking a reading and left it there to talk to the site foreman. When they came back to the truck the gauge was missing. The technician and site foreman looked for the gauge, but did not find it. The technician notified his supervisor who notified the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer. The licensee stated they intend to notify the service providers they use of the theft. The licensee stated the operating rod for the cesium source was locked. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER TO KLCO ON 3/12/14 AT 0908 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *

"On March 12, 2014 at 0745 [CDT], the Agency was notified by the licensee that the moisture density gauge had been recovered. The licensee had limited information on how the gauge was located and stated they will provide additional information as soon as it can be collected and verified. It did not appear to the licensee that any member of the general public received a significant exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided to the HOO as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified the R4DO(Farnholtz), FSME Events Resource via email and Mexico.

Texas Incident # I-9166

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE WITH STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following Agreement State Report was received from the State of Texas via telephone and email:

The Texas Department of State Health Services received a report from the licensee concerning a stuck open shutter on a level gauge mounted on a tank. The gauge is in operation with the shutter in the normal open position. The failure to the shutter to close was discovered during routine testing. The licensee will contact the Texas Radiation Program Licensing for authorization to continue using the gauge until repaired. The device does not represent any harm to workers or to the public and a vendor will repair the gauge in 3-4 days.

Follow up information will be provided in accordance with SA 300.

The gauge shutter is normally open during operation. The device is a Thermo Fisher Scientific model 5201 with a 100 mCi Cs-137 source.

TEXAS INCIDENT # I-9165.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On March 11, 2014 at 0300 [EDT], the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 78 hours."

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

NORMAL VENTILATION PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

Normal ventilation - normal and high range process radiation monitor, 3HVR*RE10A/B, has been removed from service for planned maintenance. The maintenance window is scheduled for 7 hours.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, and Local police dispatch.

MILLSTONE STATION STACK RADMONITOR OUT-OF-SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

At 0931 EDT on 3/11/14, the Millstone Station Stack Radmonitor RM-8168 was removed from service for pre-planned maintenance. This resulted in a loss of assessment capability and is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii).

The licensee informed State/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

NOTIFICATION TO STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IN RESPONSE TO CONTAMINATED SPILLS/LEAKS PROCEDURE

"This is a 4-hour notification to report a Notification to the State of Mississippi is being made in accordance with the Response to Contaminated Spills/Leaks procedure.

"A surface contamination event has occurred at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station that meets the State reporting criteria of 'An unmonitored and inadvertent contaminated leak or spill greater than 15 cubic feet-solid to the environment occurs.'

"The source of the contamination is not known at this time, investigation to determine the source and extent of the event is in progress. The known contamination has been contained. Actions include sampling of storm drains to verify no unmonitored release outside the protected area, additional radiation protection monitoring of the area, removal of the contaminated liquid and soil, and covering of the affected ground. Installation of tenting over the area is in progress. There was no effect on plant operation. No one was injured during the event."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments.

PART 21 - SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE NOT EXHAUSTING PROPERLY

The following was excerpted from a fax received from ASCO Valve, Inc.:

"Problem Description

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) customer Energy Northwest reported that an ASCO scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) Catalog number HVL266000010J 115/60, GE-H part number 107E6022P014, serial number A272718-054, CRD-SPV-118/1043 did not exhaust properly. The valve had been installed in Energy Northwest's Columbia facility for approximately 7 months and had been cycled 60-70 times. Energy Northwest's internal investigation revealed the pilot head assembly spring was not in the groove of the associated core.

"Conclusion

"Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core. The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

"This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve. There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This Includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core.

"Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves, it was not able to be determined if this could create a 'Substantial safety hazard' as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

"If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Arnone at 803-641-9395."

* * * UPDATE FROM LARS GACAD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA FACSIMILE ON 6/16/14 AT 0855 EDT * * *

"Closure and Conclusion: Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core. The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

"This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve. There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core. Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves. It was not able to be determined if this could create a 'substantial safety hazard' as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

"If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Arnone at 803-641-9395."

Notified R4DO (Hay) and Part 21 Group via email.