| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/05/2014 - 03/06/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49791 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KYLE SAYLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/04/2014
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2014
Event Time: 07:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
ERIC THOMAS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY ON SITE
"At 0738 CST on 2/4/2014, the control room received a report that a supplemental radiological technician was found unresponsive on the refueling floor in the Reactor Building. The individual was located in a contaminated area and was dressed out when he was found. At 0745 CST, the individual was reported to be deceased by the EMT's. The Nemaha County Sheriff Department was contacted and responded to the site. OSHA is also being contacted. A news release is planned. No release has been made at this time.
"The fatality does not appear to be work related at this time however an investigation is in progress. The individual was found to be not contaminated and was transferred off site.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID MADSEN TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1618 EST ON 3/5/14 * * *
"Correction: The report that the individual was deceased was made to the Control Room by an RP Technician not an EMT. The Nemaha County Sheriff made the official declaration of death."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Drake). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49852 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEISINGER HEALTH SYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: DANVILLE State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0006
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/25/2014
Notification Time: 08:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION IDENTIFIED ON A PACKAGE
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: Licensee emailed notification to the Department's [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] South Central Regional Office on March 2, 2011. This was initially evaluated as not exceeding the limits of 71.47; however, further assessment determined it as an immediate reporting event under 20.1906(d)(1).
"Event Description: On March 1, 2011, a Nuclear Medicine Technologist from Geisinger logged in a package from Triad Isotopes radio pharmacy. Exposure on the surface of one of the containers labeled White I was measured to be 14 mR/hr. The contamination was found to be limited to the handle of the package. The inside of the container and its contents were not contaminated. The contents were removed and the empty contaminated package was double bagged and placed in decay storage.
"According to calculations provided by the licensee, the initial net wipe reading of the handle area on the suspect package was 10,670 dpm for an area of 6 [inch] x 1.5 [inch] or 15 cm x 3. 8 cm. Assuming a 10% wipe efficiency, the activity per unit area was 1,840 dpm/cm2 (0.8 mCi/cm2), which exceeded the maximum permissible limit of 220 dpm/cm2 as noted in 71.47.
"Cause Of The Event: Cross-contamination from the radio pharmacy.
"Actions: The Department called Triad Isotopes on March 2, 2011. It was stated that the driver, vehicle, and all other areas that the driver and the package came into contact with, were surveyed and no contamination was found. Triad Isotopes confirmed that the shipment met the requirements of the Radioactive White I when it left and only contained 20 mCi of Tc-99m. No further actions were taken."
PA Event Report ID No. PA110005 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49853 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEI ANALYTICAL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1164
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/25/2014
Notification Time: 08:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILS TO RETRACT
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: This was originally reported to the NMED within 30-days per 10 CFR 34.101 (a)(2) on May 5, 2011 and was assigned NMED Number 110278; however, after further evaluation it was determined it should have also been reported under 10 CFR 30.50 which requires immediate reporting.
"Event Description: TEI Analytical Services was performing gamma radiography of pipe welds at its facility in Washington, PA. During the first exposure, the radiography source assembly was unable to be retracted to its shielded position due to excessive bend in the guide tube. When retraction of the source was attempted resistance was encountered within 1/4 turn of full retraction. The source was returned to the collimator and a second attempt was made to retract the source. Again, resistance was encountered at the same location. Additional attempts to retract the source were terminated and the RSO was notified.
"Equipment information:
Exposure Device: Make: Source Production and Equipment Company
Device Model: SPEC-150
Serial #:0418
Date Quarterly Inspection/Maintenance performed: 03/08/2011
Sealed Source: Isotope: Ir-192
Make: Source Production and Equipment Company
Model: G-60
Serial #: SB2506 .
Activity: 105 Ci (3885 GBq)
"Cause of the Event: Exceeding the maximum 6 [inch] radius bend for guide tube. A longer tube would have prevented the event.
"Actions: The device was operated by the RSO to retract the source conventionally and the resistance was significant. The RSO made one entry to the area to lower the stand height; thereby, decreasing the radius of the guide tube. Total time for the entry was 11 seconds including walking to the stand from the shieldwall and return. Time to lower stand was 2 seconds. The source was cranked back into the device and the event was terminated. The equipment was disassembled and inspected by the RSO. No physical damage was evident to the guide tube, or to the external/internal materials of the guide tube."
PA Event Report ID No. PA110010 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49855 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSAL WELL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: LEMON State: PA
County: WYOMING
License #: PA-1446
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH M. MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 02/25/2014
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILURE ON BERTHOLD DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"NOTIFICATIONS: Licensee notified the Department [PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection] via email and voice message after close of business on February 24, 2014. This event is reportable within 24-hours per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: During the pressure pumping operations at a well fracturing job site, personnel observed an unexpected fluctuation in density readings. The density gauge was inspected and attempts to turn the shutter handle to the closed position caused it to separate from the body of the gauge. It was observed that the roll pin, which attaches the shutter handle to the shutter shaft, had come out causing the shutter handle to separate from the shield housing. The pin was replaced, the handle reattached, and the gauge shutter was closed and locked. No elevated exposure to personnel is anticipated. The gauge was then removed from service, placed into storage, and the manufacturer was notified.
Manufacturer: Berthold
Model: LB 8010
Serial Number: 10049
Isotope: Cs-137
Activity: 20 mCi
Source Serial Number: 0180/08
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: The roll pin, which attaches the shutter handle to the shutter shaft, came out causing the shutter handle to be removed from the shield housing. More information will be forwarded upon receipt of final report.
"ACTIONS: The density gauge has been removed from operations and is in storage in a Williamsport, Pennsylvania facility. The licensee is working with the manufacturer to investigate the event, make repairs, and determine root cause. The Department plans to do a reactive inspection."
PA Event Report ID No: PA140006 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49870 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HOLLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 01:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2014
Event Time: 19:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"At 1917 hours [CST] on March 4, 2014, the Unit 1B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate (the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed). The Standby Gas Treatment system was already in operation for a scheduled surveillance as of 1900 hours on March 4, 2014. During the ensuing pressure transient, the Reactor Building differential pressure momentarily went positive. As a result, Secondary Containment was declared inoperable.
"Given the temporary loss in secondary containment, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
After the transient, the reactor building ventilation system was shutdown for scheduled maintenance and the control room ventilation system was returned to its normal configuration. The Standby Gas Treatment system was operating to support planned reactor building ventilation system maintenance. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49871 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 02:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2014
Event Time: 23:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 1 MANUALLY SCRAMMED DURING A RAPID SHUTDOWN IN RESPONSE TO A TURBINE EHC FAILURE
"At 2334 EST on 3/4/14 Unit 1 was manually scammed during a Rapid Plant Shutdown. The Rapid Plant Shutdown was initiated due to an Electro Hydraulic [Control] [EHC] System failure resulting in all Low Pressure Turbine lntercept Valves failing closed.
"The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using Feedwater."
The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. A press release will be issued by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49872 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN McHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2014
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSED EMPLOYEE
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for cocaine during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted.
Notified R1DO (Bower). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49873 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2014
Event Time: 10:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF INDIVIDUAL PATHWAYS THAT COULD BYPASS FLOOD BARRIERS
"During walk downs to ensure the availability of flood protection barriers, a condition was identified which had the potential to adversely impact the ability to address external flooding conditions. Several individual pathways between both unit's Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building were identified that could bypass flood barriers. In the aggregate however, the current equipment could become overwhelmed and the flooding in the Auxiliary Building could then potentially challenge equipment necessary to remove residual heat.
"The identified pathways were for the most part unscheduled partially filled conduits. There were no isolation features on these pathways and no barriers to flooding were in place between the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building thus the potential existed to bypass the existing flood barriers. Flooding of the Turbine Building conceivably could have resulted in the accumulation of water in sufficient quantities to fill the Turbine Building to the height of the external floodwaters which could enter the Auxiliary Building via one or more deficient flood barrier. These floodwaters would then potentially challenge equipment, located within the Auxiliary Building, which is required to remove residual heat.
"This condition has been determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition is a non-emergency condition. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.
"Barriers are being installed in these pathways as they are identified or compensatory measures implemented."
The walk downs were performed in response to Fukishima lessons learned.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49874 | Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2014
Event Time: 09:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
"A planned actuation of the emergency sirens across the state of Ohio was scheduled as part of a Severe Weather Awareness activity. When Columbiana County, Ohio, was activating their county sirens at 0958 EST, they inadvertently depressed the button which activated all 120 sirens within the Beaver Valley Emergency Planning Zone, which included Beaver County, Pennsylvania and Hancock County, West Virginia sirens.
"This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'A News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.'
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49875 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: CESAR GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2014
Event Time: 09:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL IMPACT ON UNFUSED DIRECT CURRENT AMMETER CIRCUITS IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM
"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that a similar condition is applicable to the Waterford 3 Nuclear Station resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for an ammeter measuring current from the train AB Class 1E battery to its associated power distribution panel does not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current and is routed through multiple fire areas. The ammeter is located on the train AB power distribution panel in the train AB switchgear room.
"In the postulated event, a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to ground. Simultaneously, it is postulated that the fire could cause another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This could cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There is no effect on plant operation. Fire watches have been implemented for affected areas of the plant as an interim compensatory measure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49876 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JON LAUDENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 03/05/2014
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2014
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
72.75(b)(2) - PRESS RELEASE/OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DRY SHIELDED CANISTER TEST RESULTS
"This report is being made to provide information to the NRC regarding Monticello Dry Shielded Canister (DSC)-16.
"On February 17, 2014, dye penetrant examinations were performed on the outer top cover plate (OTCP) to shell weld on dry shielded canister (DSC)-16. This was a re-examination of a linear indication identified on January 24, 2014. The results of the re-examination identified a 1.6 inch linear indication that remained after surface conditioning. This indication had not been previously detected by nonconforming nondestructive examination previously reported by TriVis Inc.
"Xcel Energy is evaluating the condition and will remedy prior to moving the cask to the ISFSI [Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation] pad.
"The associated DSCs loaded during the current campaign successfully passed their helium leak tests. Helium leak checks are performed to demonstrate confinement and boundary integrity. Thus, public health and safety is not affected.
"Since the licensee communication plan also notified other government agencies, this report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 72.75(b)(2)."
The above referenced dry shielded canister is currently located on the refuel floor in the reactor building.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |