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Event Notification Report for January 22, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/21/2014 - 01/22/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49623 49631 49721 49746 49747 49748 49749 49751 49753 49754

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Agreement State Event Number: 49623
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WILCO NDT
Region: 4
City: FARMINGTON State: NM
County:
License #: IR470-05
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE CASARES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/11/2013
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2013
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
BRIAN HOLIAN (FSME)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ELIOT BRENNER (HQPA)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO RADIOGRAPHER AND MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"The owner of J-CAP manufacturing [located in Seminole, TX] reported at 14:10 CST [on 12/11/13] that an incident [involving industrial radiography of a pressure vessel occurred at his facility on December 10, 2013]. Individual reported that his site foreman was working with the industrial radiographer who was performing radiography of a pressure vessel. The radiographer approached the source collimator to change the film and the radiographer realized the source was still in the open - exposed position. The amount of exposure is still in question and the site foreman was escorted by his employer to the hospital for evaluation. The employee reported he was in the area for 5- 8 minutes and approximately 12-24 inches from the source. The employee was not working for the industrial radiography company, thus this is an exposure to the public. The radiographer also received a dose. The Radiation Safety Officer for Wilco NDT [licensed in Farmington, NM] was contacted by the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] to verify the incident. RSO for Wilco NDT reported that he contacted the State of New Mexico to report the incident and is currently working on sending [the radiographer's] monitoring badge to be read. RSO is still trying to contact his radiographer and review details of the incident. A calculated dose for the time period of 8 minutes with a distance of 1 foot from the Ir-192 source with 67 curies of activity was 40 rem/8 minutes. Investigation is ongoing and further details will be supplied as in accordance with SA300."

Texas Incident #: I-9142

* * * UPDATE FROM IRENE CASARES (VIA EMAIL) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1758 EST ON 12/13/13 * * *

"On December 13, 2013, at 1632 hours [CST], the licensee notified the Agency [that] their dosimetry processor had completed reading the radiographers' badges. One badge read 34 millirem DDE, and the other 30 millirem, DDE.

"Two Agency inspectors are scheduled to interview all parties involved in the event [on] Tuesday, December 17, 2013.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified R4DO (Werner) and FSME EO (Holian).

* * * UPDATE FROM IRENE CASARES TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/21/14 AT 1214 EST * * *

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"Update to Event 49623: The initial report stated a possible public exposure of 40 rem, upon further investigation and interviews the dose was much lower. The dose for whole body was calculated to be 515 mrem for the public exposure and 2.06 rem for the radiographer's exposure in 5 minutes of exposure time. The initial report was stated that Wilco NDT reported the incident to State of New Mexico and State of Texas. During investigation [it] was understood that Wilco NDT did not report to any Agency. The J-Cap Manufacturing company reported the incident. The incident is not an immediate report event after complete investigation. . . "

Notified R4DO (Spitzberg) and FSME EO (Holian).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 49631
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 12/13/2013
Notification Time: 19:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 15:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BREACH SIZES EXCEEDED FOR CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE

"On December 13, 2013 it was determined that a reportable condition has existed at Columbia Generating Station since 1500 hours [PST] on November 25, 2013.

"At 1500 hours on November 25, 2013, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable based on the inability to ensure that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System would be able to maintain a positive differential pressure with all areas surrounding the CRE boundary. Columbia does not have the installed instrumentation to directly monitor the differential pressure between the Main Control Room (MCR) and certain areas adjacent to the MCR. The pressure in the adjacent areas is controlled by placing conservative limits on allowed breach size for these adjacent areas.

"On November 25, 2013, it was identified that the combined breach size associated with several doors in these adjacent spaces resulted in exceeding the allowed limit. Based on exceeding the allowed breach size limit to the adjacent areas, the Control Room Envelope was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered.

"An additional breach was discovered on 12/05/13 from a hole in ductwork passing through the cable spreading room, which is one of the adjacent areas to the CRE boundary, and that condition was added to the existing action statement 3.7.3.B.1. These are conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and are reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN HEAVILIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/21/2014 AT 1720 EST* * *

"In the case of this event, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered conservatively based upon limited knowledge at the time of discovery. There is no installed differential pressure indication between the CRE and this area adjacent to the Main Control Room (MCR), therefore conservatively this adjacent area is included in the CRE, and leakage is administratively controlled. The leakage between the MCR and the adjacent area included in the CRE exceeded this administrative limit.

"Testing performed on November 20, 2013, prior to the December 13, 2013 reported events, as well as testing after the event, January 10, 2014, has demonstrated that the leakage identified does not prevent the Control Room Envelope (CRE) from establishing and maintaining the required differential pressure to ensure fulfillment of its required safety function for Control Room Habitability.

"The ability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system to perform its function of pressurizing and maintaining the Main Control Room positively pressurized with respect to its surroundings was not lost due to the leaking doors and duct specified in the event. Performance of the surveillance without these breaches sealed validated this conclusion.

"The event described above should not have been reported, as the Control Room Envelope was always operable and capable of fulfilling its safety function with the existing breaches and did not constitute a reportable event as conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).

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Agreement State Event Number: 49721
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: NOVA ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC
Region: 1
City: KENNESAW State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1323-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/14/2014
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:

"On January 13, 2014, NOVA Engineering and Environmental, LLC had a Troxler 3440 gauge stolen out of the bed of the truck. There have been a couple thefts at this site leading up to this incident (2075 Princeton Ave., College Park, Georgia). The truck was parked at an active construction site (new elementary school) and the vehicles are required to park some distance away from the construction. During [the] NOVA gauge operator time at the site he stated he saw the gauge in the bed of the truck and sometime later he left this site to go to another. Upon arrival, he realized the chain had been cut and the gauge box was gone.

"[The] NOVA RSO confirmed that the gauge box was only secured with one chain and that there was a lock on the box. A police report has been filed and will be available to be viewed in three to five days. At this moment, all gauges are locked in storage at the company's office. Gauges are only allowed to be removed if there is an assignment. Prior to this, the gauge stayed in the bed of the truck and went to all job sites even if there wasn't an assignment for it.

"A leak test was done on November 27, 2013 and the result report was created on December 13th 2013 by Atlantic Supply with no areas of concern.

Gauge Information:
Model Number: Troxler 3440
Serial Number: 22661
Isotope: Am-241 and Cs-137
Source serial numbers: 47-18503 (Cs-137) and 75-4417 (Am-241)
Activity: 8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Am-241"

GA Complaint ID: 72861

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49746
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUESING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 01:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM DISCOVERED IN GROUNDWATER

"This notification is being made pursuant to [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of other government agency. Notification to other government agency, State of Ohio, was made at 0140 [EST] on 1/21/14.

"At 1310 on 1/20/2014, a leak was identified on a feed water Venturi. In response to the water leak, samples were taken to check for the spread of tritium. A positive result for tritium was identified in the under drain system in the Auxiliary Building which requires communications as part of the NEI ground water protection initiative. The positive sample results were obtained at 2330 on 1/20/14. Actions are in progress stop the leak (perform leak injection)."

The EPA limit for groundwater is 20,000 pCi/l. The samples taken by the licensee indicated 46,000 pCi/l.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify local counties.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49747
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN SPEIRS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 05:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2014
Event Time: 22:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OUT OF SERVICE

"On 1/20/14 at 2230 CST, an interruption in the control power to the TSC diesel generator was discovered. Investigation revealed a blown fuse supplying the TSC diesel generator control panel. The blown fuse has resulted in the TSC diesel generator starting batteries depleting. The fuse has since been replaced, and the TSC diesel generator starting batteries are currently recharging. The TSC diesel generator remains non-functional until the starting batteries are charged. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the unplanned loss of the backup power supply to the Emergency Response Facility (ERF). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. An update notification will be made when the TSC diesel generator has been restored to fully functional status."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49748
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SAM GOLDSMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 06:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On Tuesday, January 21 at 0640 CST, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location.

"The ventilation system is expected to be out of service approximately 8 hrs.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM SAM GOLDSMITH TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1347 EST ON 1/21/14 * * *

The TSC system maintenance is complete and returned to service as of 1140 CST on 1/21/14.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R3DO (Valos).

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Part 21 Event Number: 49749
Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Licensee: NUKLEARNA ELELKTRARNA KRSKO
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTIAN RHEAULT
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP ()

Event Text

PART 21 - LOOSE BATTERY VENT ASSEMBLIES

The following (in part) was received via facsimile:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC preliminary notification in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On November 15, 2013 C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Nuklearna Elelktrarna Krsko (NEK) of Slovenia that the vent assemblies in a lot 66 units of LCY-39 batteries were not engaging properly to form a seal between the vent assembly and the battery cover. This issue was detected and corrected prior to installation and use of the batteries.

"The vent assembly is a safety related component with the primary function of preventing spark or flame propagation back into the cell from external sources. Lack of engagement or seal between the vent assembly and cover may provide a path for flame or spark propagation. Subsequent evaluation of the design of the cover to vent assembly seal has shown that under certain combinations of assembly, gasket and cover dimensions a clearance fit is formed that may exist in installed batteries. To date no other user of LCY-35, 37, or 39 batteries that use these covers and vent assemblies has reported a similar situation, however, the possibility exists that this issue may exist in products used by US licensees. And may pose a safety hazard. Thus, C&D is submitting this report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use LCY batteries of this report, and actions to be taken to eliminate the possible safety hazard.

"U.S. Licensees using batteries possibly containing the clearance fit have been notified of the filing of this report with recommendations that they inspect their batteries for any signs of problems. A procedure (attached) will allow users to detect clearance fits between the vent assembly and cover. Replacement parts will be provided by C&D for affected cells that will eliminate the possibility of clearance fits."

The affected US facilities are: Oconee Nuclear Station, Indian Point Energy Center, Arkansas Nuclear One, Beaver Valley Nuclear Generating Station, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Edwin I. Hatch Power Plant, and Wolf Creek Generating Station.

The affected foreign facilities are: Bruce, Laguna Verde, Krsko and Pickering.

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Part 21 Event Number: 49751
Rep Org: CCI THERMAL TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Licensee: CCI THERMAL TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Region:
City: OAKVILLE State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALEJANDRO MALDONADO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - NONCONFORMANCE OF AN ELECTRICAL TUBULAR WATER HEATER

The following information was received via facsimile:

"Subject: Non-Conformance on [CCI Thermal Technologies] Purchase Order 244232-1-MRA-MEEW-00001 Element

"We notify you that we have initiated a notification process today to:

"Bechtel Project Quality Manager
EQB1A/Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Hwy 68
Spring City, TN 37381

"Regarding finding on January 16, 2014 related to non-conforming items shipped under purchase order 244232-1-MRA-MEEW-00001 Element.

"Manufactured by:

"CCI Thermal Technologies Inc.
2721 Plymouth Dr.
Oakville, [Ontario]
[Canada], L6H5R5

"Non-conforming items are under investigations with further pending review of action with the issuance party on the purchase order indicated."

The nonconformance is related to a borated water storage tank electrical heater that was shipped in 2011 for use on Watts Bar Unit 2.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49753
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN J. LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 13:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS OUT OF SERVICE

"At 1340 [EST] on 1/21/2014, Susquehanna Control Room Operators received an alarm due to the lockup of a monitoring panel utilized for Vent Stack Radiation Monitors (known as SPINGs - System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas). There are two monitor panels, one in the control room and one in the Technical Support Center (TSC). Both panels are fully redundant. At the time, the control room panel was out of service for maintenance.

"This event rendered all five SPINGs inoperable. Additionally, control room alarm capability was not available. The associated Technical Requirement (TROs) were entered for this inoperability. In order to clear the lockup, the TSC terminal needed to be powered down and rebooted.

"The TSC monitoring terminal was restored to operable status at 1352 and the associated TROs were cleared. The SPING function and control room alarm functions were inoperable for a total of 12 minutes.

"In accordance with the guidance of NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Item 3.2.13, this event is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. The loss of the Stack Monitoring System was not part of a pre-planned evolution. This equipment is relied upon by control room operators and emergency response personnel to implement procedures addressing classification, assessment, and protective actions associated with the emergency plan."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49754
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 00:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 21:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

DUAL UNIT TRIP ON THE LOSS OF THE "21" 13KV BUS

"Dual Unit Trip due to loss of '21' 13 KV bus . All safety functions are met for both units. Unit 1 remained with normal heat removal. Unit 2 lost power to its normal heat sink and is stable on Auxiliary Feed water and Atmospheric Dump Valves for temperature control. Both trips were automatic trips. Due to loss of power a Under Voltage actuation occurred on both units ('14' and '24' 4Kv bus). Due to loss of main feed on Unit 2 a Auxiliary Feed water Actuation System [AFW] actuation occurred on Unit 2. Cause is under investigation."

All control rods fully inserted on the loss of power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms [CRDMs]. Both Units Reactor Coolant Pumps [RCPs] remained running during the transient. The normal Unit 2 heat sink was unavailable due to the loss of the operating circulating water pumps resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 AFW actuation included one of two steam-driven pumps and the motor-driven pump. Both Units Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded and have since been secured. Both Units are stable and will remain in mode 3 (Hot Standby) pending the results of the investigation.

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 14, 2014
Wednesday, May 14, 2014