| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/06/2013 - 12/09/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49309 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NABORS COMPLETION & PRODUCTION SERVICES COMPANY
Region: 4
City: WILLISTON State: ND
County:
License #: 33-48830-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 08/27/2013
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2013
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE INVOLVED IN FIRE AT WELL SITE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"A fire started at a well site near Williston, ND on Saturday, August 24, 2013. At the time of the event, fracking activities were being performed utilizing a Thermo Fisher Scientific model 5190 nuclear density gauge containing a Cs-137 source attached to a blender. Personnel evacuation was immediately performed and notification was made to the local fire department. Local fire department personnel arrived on-site and established control of the scene. The fire was extinguished later that night. Local fire department personnel restricted access to the site until Sunday morning. At that time, licensee personnel on-site were allowed to approach the gauge from a safe distance working their way towards the gauge while continually monitoring a radiation survey instrument (Ludlum Model 3). As the observed readings were higher than expected, it was believed the lead shielding had melted inside the steel casing and shifted to the lower area within the casing. The steel casing remained intact. After the initial assessment, licensee personnel maintained continual surveillance while site security personnel prohibited access within the public dose boundary set by the licensee. The licensee dispatched their Radiation Compliance Coordinator for further evaluation.
"The licensee's Radiation Compliance Coordinator arrived in Williston late Sunday night. Early Monday morning he arrived on site to perform more complete radiation surveys and leak testing of the involved gauge. The highest radiation levels noted around the gauge were 2.6 R/hr at the surface and 20 mR/hr at 1 meter. Wipe tests were collected and sent to Applied Health Physics of Bethel, PA for analysis. The results of the first two wipe samples demonstrated no evidence of contamination.
"The licensee contacted the manufacturer regarding disposal of the damaged gauge. The manufacturer, not willing to accept receipt of the gauge, suggested the licensee contact a waste broker for final disposal. The licensee subsequently contacted Applied Health Physics (AHP). AHP plans to cut out the gauge and package it in a lead lined 55 gallon steel drum for transport, and ship the container for final disposal. AHP is scheduled to perform this activity on Thursday, August 29, 2013.
"Licensee and site security personnel will continue to maintain surveillance and control of the site until the disposal personnel arrive."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID STRADINGER TO PETE SNYDER AT 1756 EDT ON 9/5/13 * * *
AHP removed the gauge and packaged it for transport. Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (e-mail).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID STRADINGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1431 EDT ON 12/6/13 * * *
The North Dakota Department of Health has completed their investigation and recommending the LER (License Event Report) for closure.
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez), R1DO (Cook), and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49485 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ALLWEST TESTING & ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: HAYDEN State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27637-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 03035139
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 10/30/2013
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 11:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT WORKSITE
The following report was received from the North Dakota Department of Health via e-mail:
"A portable moisture/density gauge possessed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering, LLC of Hayden, Idaho containing a 10 mCi Cesium-137 sealed source and a 50 mCi Americium-241:Beryllium sealed source was crushed by a piece of heavy equipment (excavator bucket) at a temporary job site located southwest of Dickinson, North Dakota. The portable gauge user had failed to maintain constant surveillance of the gauge. Upon observing the heavy equipment running into the gauge, the user flagged down the heavy equipment operator to halt his activity. The operator lifted the bucket off the gauge and set it to the side. The gauge user instructed the operator to relocate to an area approximately 150 feet from the damaged gauge. Subsequently, he phoned his immediate supervisor and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for guidance. An area at an approximate distance of 150 feet in three directions from the damaged gauge was roped off with 'Caution Radiation' tape. The fourth direction (east) consisted of a large hill of soil not readily accessible.
"1:02 PM (MST): The gauge user placed a call to the ND State Radio emergency response number to report the event.
"1:08 PM (MST): ND State Radio personnel notified the Stark County Emergency Manager (SCEM) who in turn notified the Southwestern District Health Unit Executive Officer (HUEO).
"1:10 pm (MST): The HUEO notified the ND Department of Health Radiation Control Program Manager (RCPM) of the event. The RCPM informed the HUEO the gauge should remain in place until radiation surveys had been performed and the site evaluated by his department.
"2:17 pm (MST): The HUEO and the SCEM were present at the event site. They met with the gauge user and the Westcon, Inc. HSE Coordinator for a briefing of the event. The HUEO performed an initial radiation survey using a calibrated SE International, Inc. Model Radiation Alert Inspector survey instrument (SN 35756). The survey was performed beginning at the outer boundary moving inwards toward the damaged gauge. The reading at a distance of 4 feet from the source was 0.063 mR/hr. The background reading was 0.013 mR/hr. The HUEO and SCEM instructed the gauge user to leave the gauge in place and wait for North Dakota Department of Health personnel to be on site the next morning to evaluate the site. Visual assessment of the gauge showed evidence of the two source housings to be physically intact.
"October 28, 2013:
"6:00 am (MST): As instructed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering's RSO, the gauge user relocated the damaged gauge and associated fragments to the gauge transport case. The case was secured in the box of his pickup truck.
"9:00 am (MST): North Dakota Department of Health (NDDoH) personnel were on site to perform interviews, radiation surveys and evaluation of the site. Radiation surveys were performed by the NDDoH using a calibrated Ludlum Model 19 microR meter (SN 270378) and a Canberra Dineutron neutron meter (SN 18327). The background readings were 12 microR/hr and 0.027 mR/hr respectively. The highest gauge shipping container surface readings were 3.1 mR/hr (gamma) and 0.09 mR/hr (neutron). Surveys of the pathway from the initial impact of the bucket to the gauge's final resting spot revealed background readings. A leak test of the gauge was performed and shipped via overnight express for analysis. The leak test results demonstrated no leakage. The gauge was transported by licensee personnel back to their Idaho office to make arrangements for final disposal.
"Throughout the event, the gauge user had not worn personnel dosimetry. Exposure calculations will be performed by the RSO."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID STRADINGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1431 EDT ON 12/6/13 * * *
The North Dakota Department of Health has completed their investigation. Several non-compliances were identified during the reactive inspection. A letter of apparent non-compliance was sent to the licensee. Corrective actions will be required to be submitted in response to this letter. The North Dakota Department of Health is recommending the LER (License Event Report) for closure.
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez), R1DO (Cook), and FSME Events Resource via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49603 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/03/2013
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2013
Event Time: 08:22 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text REACTOR BUILDING STACK RADIATION MONITOR NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"During scheduled maintenance, at approximately 0822 PDT on December 3, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment.
"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the non-functioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases is available. The additional personnel are pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The planned outage is scheduled for approximately 90 hours.
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVID HOLICK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0652 EST ON 12/07/2013 * * *
"At 2104 PST on 12/6/13, planned maintenance on the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was complete, the instrument was retested satisfactorily, and the instrument was declared functional. This restored the emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO(Vasquez) and R1DO(Cook). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49613 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/06/2013
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2013
Event Time: 12:48 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1248 EST, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was being tested for routine quarterly flow verification using surveillance test procedure SO-252-002. When HPCI turbine speed was lowered to approximately 2400 RPM, oscillations on turbine speed, flow and discharge pressure were observed. HPCI turbine speed was raised to approximately 2700 RPM and the oscillations stopped.
"Unit 2 HPCI system had been declared inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 entered at 1200 EST for the surveillance test. [This is a 14 day LCO.]
"Review by Engineering determined that cause of the oscillations warrant further evaluation and HPCI remains inoperable.
"HPCI is a single train Emergency Core Cooling Safety system. This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49614 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/07/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FAILS RETEST OF DRAWDOWN SURVEILLANCE TEST
"On December 7, 2013 at 0950 [EST], Susquehanna Steam Electric Station [SSES] Secondary Containment drawdown testing failed to meet acceptance criteria of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to inleakage flow rate exceeding the allowable value.
"SSES previously entered SR 3.0.3 at 0900 [EST] on 11/15/2013, due to not meeting the requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 because of an untested alignment of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay (101 bay). Corrective maintenance was performed on several boundary components (doors and hatches) along with multiple inspections. The test being performed on 12/7/2013 was to be a retest for the previously failed surveillance [performed on 11/20/13]. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0950 [EST] in support of this test. During the test, it was determined that the maintenance performed did not produce the desired outcome. As a result, the retest was not successful.
"The 101 Bay ventilation was realigned to the previously known operable configuration. Upon completion of this realignment, LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 1349 [EST] and operability restored. Note that SR 3.0.3 remains in effect for the unsuccessful, untested configuration.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
See EN #49565 for the previous surveillance test failure, performed on 11/20/13.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49615 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON DEPRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/08/2013
Notification Time: 06:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 23:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 60 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation | Event Text AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO NON-CONSERVATIVE POWER VALUE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. A scheduled load reduction for surveillance testing and control rod sequence exchange was in progress. During the control rod sequence exchange, the core monitoring software system (3DMonicore) was used to obtain a 'case' which records various calculated and actual core parameters (i.e. core thermal power, Power Range Monitor indication). The 'case' data is used to evaluate the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) acceptance criteria for SR 3.3.1.1.2 to verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is less than or equal to 2% rated thermal power (RTP) while operating at greater than or equal to 25% RTP. The 'case' showed that all 3 A RPS Trip System APRM channels exceeded the allowable 2% difference threshold in the non-conservative direction (i.e. APRM power reading less than calculated thermal power, difference of 2.9, 3.1, and 2.5% respectively). TS 3.3.1.1 requires at least 2 operable APRM channels per trip system (there are 2 RPS trip systems, A and B). At least 1 of 2 TS required APRM channels are required to maintain the Safety Function (i.e. SCRAM). In this situation, none of the A RPS TS required APRM channels met their SR and were declared inoperable. TS 3.3.1.1 allows delaying entry into the associated Condition and Required Action for this inoperability for up to 2 hours when the inoperability is solely due to APRM indication not within the 2% limit; therefore no TS Required Action tracking timeclocks were entered. A confirmatory 'case' was performed that validated that the subject SR was not met. Prompt action was taken to restore the APRM indications to within limits (this action took approximately 22 minutes to complete) and the subject APRMs were declared operable, restoring the A RPS Safety Function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49616 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JASON HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/08/2013
Notification Time: 10:53 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF ASSESSMENT DUE TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY PLANNED REPLACEMENT
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"At approximately 0800 Mountain Standard Time on December 8, 2013, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) uninterruptable power supply (UPS) from service for a planned replacement. The outage disables the Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) inside the TSC, remote meteorological data display in the emergency response facilities and control rooms, and transmission of plant data to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and to the NRC's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The outage is expected to be completed within five days.
"The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. The outage does not affect the availability of normal power to the TSC or back-up power from the TSC diesel generator. Existing telecommunication systems provided for the emergency response organization (ERO) remain functional to provide the ERO within the TSC and EOF the necessary emergency assessment capabilities, as described in the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The ERFDADS system in each of the three unit control rooms and unit satellite TSCs remain functional and are not affected by the TSC UPS outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and from the National Weather Service.
"The ERO has been briefed on the effects of the planned TSC UPS outage.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
"PVNGS will inform the NRC after the outage has been completed and the functionality of affected equipment has
been restored." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49617 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAN HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/09/2013
Notification Time: 01:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2013
Event Time: 20:27 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF DIVISION 1 480 VAC POWER CAUSING LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR TO CONTAINMENT AND SCRAM AIR HEADER
While operating at rated electrical power, the station experienced a transformer fault which resulted in a loss of Division 1 480 VAC power. This resulted in the operators inserting a Manual Scram due to loss of Instrument Air to Containment and the scram air header. On the scram, all control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. Reactor vessel level is being maintained by normal feedwater and decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser through the steam bypass valves. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and proceeding to Mode 4 to comply with Technical Specification requirements. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of the loss of Division 1 480 VAC power.
Reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) due to loss of normal ventilation to secondary containment which resulted in a positive secondary containment pressure for approximately 15 minutes. Secondary Containment required pressure was restored at 2043 CST.
Reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to loss of Division 1 480 VAC power resulting in loss of a single train of Low Pressure Core Spray.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |