| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/04/2013 - 12/05/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 49583 | Rep Org: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Licensee: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Region: 1
City: MOUNDSVILLE State: WV
County:
License #: GL 700076-18
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENISE POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 11/26/2013
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2013
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER CABLE FAILURE
The cable used to remotely operate the shutter for a fixed process gauge broke. The gauge is installed in a location that is not readily accessible by personnel. The normal position for the gauge is open. The gauge is currently open and in use. The licensee can manually close the shutter if needed. There were no personnel exposures.
The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the cable.
The gauge is a Termo MeasureTech Model 5202, Serial Number B2813, containing 200 mCi of Cs-137. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 49584 | Rep Org: HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS
Licensee: HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS
Region: 3
City: ATTICA State: IN
County:
License #: 13-02141-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE HOLLANDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 11/26/2013
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOCKING MECHANISM FAILURE
After the licensee completed an exposure and was retracting the source, the radiographer noticed that he did not hear the click of the posi-lock. The radiographer finished retracting the source using the hand crank.
The radiographer then entered the room using a radiac to ensure the source was in the safe position. He found that the spring for the posi-lock had broken. He manually locked the source in the camera and took it out of service.
The licensee will send the camera to the manufacturer for repair.
There were no overexposures to personnel as a result of this event.
* * * UPDATE AT 1043 ON 11/27/2013 FROM DAVE HOLLANDER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The projector (camera) is an Amersham 680BE, S/N BE132.
Notified the R3DO (Peterson) and FSME Event Resources via e-mail. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49587 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNSPECIFIED
Region: 1
City: State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/27/2013
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SEED INCORRECTLY PLACED ON PATIENT
The following information was received by facsimile:
"Reported to NYS DOH [New York State Department of Health] on 11/12/2013. A patient received two seeds for right breast radioactive seed localization when only one was intended. The patient had two marker clips, a cylinder clip marking a benign biopsy site and a coil clip marking a papilloma. It was intended for her to only receive one seed placed at the papilloma site, but the benign site was marked with a 0.252 mCi iodine-125 seed. A second seed (0.251 mCi) was then placed to mark the correct site. The unintended dose from the 0.252 mCi seed in place for 2 days was 0.61 Gy @ 0.5 cm. Root cause analysis is ongoing."
Event Report Identification Number: NY-13-06
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49599 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEO WREDE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 12/02/2013
Notification Time: 22:01 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On December 2, 2013, activities are scheduled that will render the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional by removing the normal and emergency ventilation system from service. These activities are being performed in support of planned preventive maintenance. In preparation for these normal and emergency ventilation system outages, the TSC emergency responders were notified that if an emergency occurred during this outage the Emergency Coordinator and the TSC staff involved with classification, notification and PARS should report to the Work Execution Center. All other TSC personnel should report to the Operational Support Center. The duration of this TSC outage is expected to be less than 36 hours. The NRC Operations Center will be provided an update to this notification when the TSC normal and emergency ventilation is restored. This 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE ON 12/4/13 AT 0440 FROM BRIAN LEWIN TO DONG PARK * * *
The TSC is fully functional.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Riemer). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49605 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/03/2013
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2013
Event Time: 13:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY- EP CONFERENCING LINES UNAVAILABLE
"At approximately 1330 [EST] on Tuesday, December 03, 2013, while performing a table top drill, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) discovered that EP [Emergency Preparedness] bridge conferencing lines were unavailable. The conference lines affected included the mitigation line, plant data phone, radiation data phone, emergency conferencing line, and the back up conference bridge line. Reviews to determine the cause of the event and efforts to restore the system are ongoing.
"The licensee has determined the Emergency Plan to be functional based on other communication methods that are available between onsite and offsite facilities. These include direct telephone lines, portable handheld radios, satellite phones and cell phones. Immediate actions to establish compensatory conferencing lines have been completed. On-going actions are in-progress to ensure procedure instruction is provided at each facility to enable use of the compensatory conference lines.
"At the time of this report, the plant is currently operating at 82% power due to a planned power maneuver unrelated to the reported communication event.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector [and will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts].
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of emergency response communication capability."
* * * UPDATE AT 1718 EST ON 12/4/2013 FROM STAN PAUL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The primary communications method has been restored. The backup communications method should be restored tomorrow.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Cook). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49606 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT KARL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 12/04/2013
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2013
Event Time: 13:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2013 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
MARK DAPAS (R4RA)
MARK KING (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF STARTUP POWER DUE TO A CUT CABLE
"At 1343 CST on 12/04/2013, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of safeguards electrical power when 345KV transformer XST2 lost power from offsite while 138KV transformer XST1 was out of service for maintenance. Non-Safeguards electrical power remained energized. Both Units remain at power in Mode 1. Both units Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and all safeguards busses were re-energized from the Emergency Diesel Generators. All ESF systems functioned as expected and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump automatically started as designed. Operators reduced reactor power to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent rated thermal power."
At 1350 CST, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to losing both startup transformers. The cause of the loss of the second start up transformer was a cut cable. No one was injured during this event.
The licensee informed State and Local Government Agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1718 EST ON 12/4/2013 FROM MATT KARL TO STEPHEN SANDIN * * *
Correction to initial event report description; actual loss of electrical power time was 1341 CST.
Include 8-HR Non-Emergency report for Specified System Actuation for automatic start of Auxiliary Feedwater and Emergency Diesel Generators.
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49607 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/04/2013
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2013
Event Time: 15:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text A POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL HOT SHORT IN THE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING CONTROL CABLE COULD RESULT IN AN INTER-SYSTEM LOCA
"As a result of questions raised by inspectors as part of the 2013 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, a vulnerability from a postulated fire in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room was identified. This vulnerability involved the assumption of a fire occurring in Fire Area 0024A (Cable Spreading Room) which would create an inter-cable vulnerability that could result in an inter-system LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident]. Hatch's licensing basis included credit for the use of disconnect or remote shutdown panel 'Emergency' switches located on the respective remote shutdown panels to isolate the circuits in the cable spreading room thereby eliminating this vulnerability. However, the presence of these switches does not fully address this vulnerability. The Unit 1 RHR [Residual Heat Removal] shutdown cooling isolation valves 1E11-F008 and 1E11-F009 need to be de-energized in order to preclude the opening of these valves should this vulnerability occur on Unit 1. Since the Unit 2 RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves 2E11-F008 and 2E11-F009 are already closed and deactivated, they are not presently impacted by this additional vulnerability.
"Immediate actions were taken to de-energize the valves in the 'closed' position which removed the vulnerability. The postulated intersystem LOCA represents an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |