Event Notification Report for October 17, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/16/2013 - 10/17/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49446
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/17/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined the described condition to be applicable to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1 E batteries control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.
"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to the ground plane. Simultaneously, it is postulated that the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also hot short to the ground plane. This could cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
See the following related Event Numbers: 49411, 49419, 49422, and 49444.
"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined the described condition to be applicable to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1 E batteries control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.
"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to the ground plane. Simultaneously, it is postulated that the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also hot short to the ground plane. This could cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
See the following related Event Numbers: 49411, 49419, 49422, and 49444.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 49483
Rep Org: U.S. AIR FORCE
Licensee: U.S. AIR FORCE
Region: 1
City: FORT MEADE State: MD
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket: 30-28641
NRC Notified By: MAJOR EDWARD KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: U.S. AIR FORCE
Region: 1
City: FORT MEADE State: MD
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket: 30-28641
NRC Notified By: MAJOR EDWARD KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/29/2013
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2014
Notification Time: 13:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
LOST GENERAL LICENSE DEVICE CONTAINING A NICKEL 63 SOURCE
"On January 20, 2012, leak tests were conducted on all [Air Force] BE's [Bioenvironmental Engineering] APDs [air particulate detectors] with the expectation of disposing them to AFRRAD [Air Force Radioactive Recycling and Disposal]. The APDs were placed in storage at the BE office (Bldg. 3423) awaiting sample results and direction from AFRRAD. At the time, AFRRAD had a backlog in workload and were not receiving GLDs [general license devices]. During a GLD program review on Oct.17, 2013, BE determined that the GLD, a Smith's Detection APD-2000 (ECN: 0300069, SN: 4150) was missing and likely disposed via DRMO [Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office]. A records search commenced immediately.
"In April 2013, a SSgt [Staff Sergeant] at 779 AMDS/SGPB began the equipment turn-in process on a GLD, a Smith's Detection APD-2000 (ECN: 0300069, SN: 4150). The GLD was turned over to 779 MDSS/MERC by another SSgt, via AF Form 601 and radiation leak sampling data for the item. Upon receipt of the GLD, MERC then turned it over to 779 MDSS/SGSM. On April 24, 2013, the GLD was removed from the BE Flight's Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS) account, and identified for 'turn-in to DRMO'.
"The SSgt [at 779 AMDS/SGPB], contacted the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse at Ft. Meade on Oct. 23, 2013 [and] visited them in an effort to retrieve the missing GLD. DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] records management was overhauled shortly after the item was turned in, thus records relating to the GLD from the warehouse were unable to be furnished. Bioenvironmental Engineering's radiation detection equipment, a SAM940 & Victoreen 451P, were used but [the search] was unsuccessful in locating the GLD at the warehouse. DLA warehouse management has been instructed to immediately notify 779 AMDS/SGPB should the GLD be discovered at their location."
The licensee considers the device un-retrievable and has contacted NRC R4 (Cook).
* * * UPDATE FROM MAJ. DANIEL SHAW TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1229 EST ON 1/30/14 VIA EMAIL * * *
"The missing ADP-2000 reported (Incident report 49483) has been located by the installation RSO at Andrews, AFB, MD. The source was located [approximately 1/20/2014]. The item has been secured and will be turned in for proper disposal as radioactive waste.
"Note: No leakage or physical damage to the device was noted. No personnel were exposed as the device contains an embedded Ni-63 source with low energy beta emissions.
"Background: The subject device was turned into the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO). DRMO realized that the device contained radioactive material and returned the device to the owning organization.
"Device specifications: Model APD-2000, serial no. 4150, 10 mCi, Ni-63."
The licensee has notified NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME Events Resource (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"On January 20, 2012, leak tests were conducted on all [Air Force] BE's [Bioenvironmental Engineering] APDs [air particulate detectors] with the expectation of disposing them to AFRRAD [Air Force Radioactive Recycling and Disposal]. The APDs were placed in storage at the BE office (Bldg. 3423) awaiting sample results and direction from AFRRAD. At the time, AFRRAD had a backlog in workload and were not receiving GLDs [general license devices]. During a GLD program review on Oct.17, 2013, BE determined that the GLD, a Smith's Detection APD-2000 (ECN: 0300069, SN: 4150) was missing and likely disposed via DRMO [Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office]. A records search commenced immediately.
"In April 2013, a SSgt [Staff Sergeant] at 779 AMDS/SGPB began the equipment turn-in process on a GLD, a Smith's Detection APD-2000 (ECN: 0300069, SN: 4150). The GLD was turned over to 779 MDSS/MERC by another SSgt, via AF Form 601 and radiation leak sampling data for the item. Upon receipt of the GLD, MERC then turned it over to 779 MDSS/SGSM. On April 24, 2013, the GLD was removed from the BE Flight's Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS) account, and identified for 'turn-in to DRMO'.
"The SSgt [at 779 AMDS/SGPB], contacted the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse at Ft. Meade on Oct. 23, 2013 [and] visited them in an effort to retrieve the missing GLD. DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] records management was overhauled shortly after the item was turned in, thus records relating to the GLD from the warehouse were unable to be furnished. Bioenvironmental Engineering's radiation detection equipment, a SAM940 & Victoreen 451P, were used but [the search] was unsuccessful in locating the GLD at the warehouse. DLA warehouse management has been instructed to immediately notify 779 AMDS/SGPB should the GLD be discovered at their location."
The licensee considers the device un-retrievable and has contacted NRC R4 (Cook).
* * * UPDATE FROM MAJ. DANIEL SHAW TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1229 EST ON 1/30/14 VIA EMAIL * * *
"The missing ADP-2000 reported (Incident report 49483) has been located by the installation RSO at Andrews, AFB, MD. The source was located [approximately 1/20/2014]. The item has been secured and will be turned in for proper disposal as radioactive waste.
"Note: No leakage or physical damage to the device was noted. No personnel were exposed as the device contains an embedded Ni-63 source with low energy beta emissions.
"Background: The subject device was turned into the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO). DRMO realized that the device contained radioactive material and returned the device to the owning organization.
"Device specifications: Model APD-2000, serial no. 4150, 10 mCi, Ni-63."
The licensee has notified NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME Events Resource (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 50260
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/07/2014
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 12:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2014
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2013
Event Time: 12:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
TRANSPORT OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS FOR OFFSITE MEDICAL TREATMENTS
"Based on discussions with NRC on 7/7/2014 at 0800 EDT, it was determined that two (2) previous unplanned medical treatment cases should have been reported to the NRC Operations Center. The unplanned medical treatment cases occurred on 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013 and involved injured and potentially contaminated individuals. The individuals were injured at the NFS facility and transported to local medical facilities. Due to the extent of the injuries, a full survey for potential contamination on the individuals could not be performed prior to being transported to the offsite medical facilities. Due to the inability to perform full surveys, NFS Medical and Radiological Staff, along with the medical facilities, implemented effective contamination control measures prior to the individuals arriving at the medical facilities, preventing the spread of potential contamination. On 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013, respectively, NFS determined that reports to the NRC Operations Center were not required; however, notification to the NRC should have been made within 24-hours of the potentially contaminated individuals being transported to the medical facilities. Follow-up surveys and analysis by NFS Radiological Control staff did not identify spreadable radioactive contamination on the individuals or the medical facilities.
"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or environment. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers involving exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Based on discussions with NRC on 7/7/2014 at 0800 EDT, it was determined that two (2) previous unplanned medical treatment cases should have been reported to the NRC Operations Center. The unplanned medical treatment cases occurred on 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013 and involved injured and potentially contaminated individuals. The individuals were injured at the NFS facility and transported to local medical facilities. Due to the extent of the injuries, a full survey for potential contamination on the individuals could not be performed prior to being transported to the offsite medical facilities. Due to the inability to perform full surveys, NFS Medical and Radiological Staff, along with the medical facilities, implemented effective contamination control measures prior to the individuals arriving at the medical facilities, preventing the spread of potential contamination. On 10/17/2013 and 10/29/2013, respectively, NFS determined that reports to the NRC Operations Center were not required; however, notification to the NRC should have been made within 24-hours of the potentially contaminated individuals being transported to the medical facilities. Follow-up surveys and analysis by NFS Radiological Control staff did not identify spreadable radioactive contamination on the individuals or the medical facilities.
"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or environment. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers involving exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."