| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/09/2013 - 10/17/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49289 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG KANDA
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 08/19/2013
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2013
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
ERDS GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITIES DUE TO UNIT 1 PPC REPLACEMENT
"The Unit 1 DC Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Plant Process Computer (PPC) will be removed from service on Monday, August 19, 2013 at 0900 EDT to support planned replacement. The Unit 1 PPC, including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), will be unavailable to the NRC Operations Center. Planned replacement also affects the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Real Time Data Repository (RDR), and PPC data to Emergency Response Facilities at CNP. Safety system annunciators and indications in the control room remain available.
"The scheduled replacement, returning of equipment to service and post maintenance testing is expected to be completed by 2000 EDT on Saturday, September 7, 2013.
"Compensatory measures exist within the DC Cook emergency response procedures to provide plant data via the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system)."
* * * UPDATE AT 1228 EDT ON 10/15/13 FROM BOWMAN TO HUFFMAN * * *
The Unit 1 DC Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Plant Process Computer (PPC) was restored to service on Tuesday, October 1, 2013 at 1649 EDT following the planned replacement of the PPC. The Unit 1 PPC is fully functional, including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which is available to the NRC Operations Center. This also restores the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Real Time Data Repository (RDR), and PPC data to Emergency Response Facilities at CNP.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Duncan) notified. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49312 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANGEL BRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/28/2013
Notification Time: 05:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2013
Event Time: 21:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text RECIRC PUMP RUNBACK AND POWER REDUCTION
"On August 27, 2013 at 2152 CDT, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) experienced a runback of [the] 'B' Recirc pump from 87% speed to 71% speed. Operators took action to lock [the] 'B Recirc pump scoop tube. This runback resulted in a power reduction from 100% to 94% RTP [Rated Thermal Power]. With the resultant mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops greater than required limits, should a LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident] occur, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. It has been determined that this is an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(8).
"At 0121 CST on August 28, 2013, MNGP completed reducing power to 88% using 'A' Recirc pump to match total jet pump flows and [the plant] is no longer in an unanalyzed condition. The 'B' Recirc scoop tube remains locked pending investigation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/11/13 AT 1253 EDT FROM MARK HOESCHEN TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is a retraction for ENS 49312: The licensee reviewed the MNGP design basis analysis to determine if the event was bounded. The licensee determined that the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) provides a bounding analysis for this event.
"The limiting LOCA event for the MNGP as analyzed in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix K conditions is based upon single failure of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) injection valve, effectively making LPCI inoperable for the event. The large break Design Basis Accident (DBA) with LPCI injection valve failure (which is analytically equivalent to the condition of both LPCI subsystems being inoperable) is the event analyzed for the current Licensing Basis Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT). This analysis bounds the event as a recirculation pump flow mismatch event is less limiting than the LOCA with LPCI injection valve failure analysis.
"Therefore, this recirculating loop flow mismatched event is less limiting than a previously analyzed event and ENS 49312 may be retracted as an unanalyzed event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49316 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANGLE BRAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/01/2013
Notification Time: 23:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2013
Event Time: 16:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text RECIRC PUMP RUNBACK AND POWER REDUCTION
"On September 1, 2013 at 1610 CST, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) experienced a runback of 'A' Recirc pump from 87% speed to 82% speed. Operators took action to lock 'A' Recirc pump scoop tube. This runback resulted in a power reduction from 100% to 98% RTP [Rated Thermal Power]. Should a LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident] occur with the resultant mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops greater than required limits, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. It has been determined that this is an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"At 2123 CST on September 1, 2013, MNGP completed adjusting recirc flow speed on 'A' and 'B' Recirc pumps to match jet pump loop flows to within the required limits and is no longer in an unanalyzed condition. Both 'A' and 'B' Recirc scoop tubes remain locked pending investigation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/11/13 AT 1253 EDT FROM MARK HOESCHEN TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is a retraction for ENS 49316: The licensee reviewed the MNGP design basis analysis to determine if the event was bounded. The licensee determined that the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) provides a bounding analysis for this event.
"The limiting LOCA event for the MNGP as analyzed in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix K conditions is based upon single failure of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) injection valve, effectively making LPCI inoperable for the event. The large break Design Basis Accident (DBA) with LPCI injection valve failure (which is analytically equivalent to the condition of both LPCI subsystems being inoperable) is the event analyzed for the current Licensing Basis Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT). This analysis bounds the event as a recirculation pump flow mismatch event is less limiting than the LOCA with LPCI injection valve failure analysis.
"Therefore, this recirculating loop flow mismatched event is less limiting than a previously analyzed event and ENS 49316 may be retracted as an unanalyzed event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 49399 | Rep Org: NANTICOKE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: NANTICOKE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: SEAFORD State: DE
County:
License #: 07-17618-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIANNA RETZLAFF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text TWO GERMANIUM-68 CALIBRATION SOURCE RODS LOST DURING SHIPPING
On June 28, 2013, the licensee shipped two boxes to Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, Inc., located in Burbank, CA. One box contained a cylinder phantom and the other box contained two source rods, serial numbers D689 and D690, containing 1.35 mCi Ge-68 each.
On July 8, the licensee received confirmation from the shipper that the boxes arrived and were signed for at their destination. In September, the licensee followed up with the manufacturer who informed them that they had received the cylinder phantom but the box containing the source rods was empty.
The shipper confirmed that the boxes were not identified as damaged at the time of delivery. The licensee searched their lab and shipping areas and could not find the sources. The manufacturer's RSO said that the incident is still under investigation but that they could not locate the sources.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49401 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROSWELL PARK CANCER INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: BUFFALO State: NY
County:
License #: NYS #2923
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/02/2013
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IODINE 125 SEALED SOURCE SEED
The following information was received from the New York State Department of Health (NYS DOH) via facsimile:
"The source was a seed source for Breast Localization Procedures. The medical procedure occurred on July 12, 2013. A tissue specimen was removed from a patient. The localization seed was identified and removed from the specimen post-surgery. The seed was not returned to the Nuclear Medicine Department per institute policy, which initiated a facility search for the missing RAM [radioactive material]. Immediate actions included conducting extensive facility area surveys for several weeks. The source was declared officially lost on August 29, 2013. The root cause involved a failure to follow the facility policy. The seed was allowed to become lost, after it had been properly identified. Corrective actions involve an incident review with the pertinent staff and an in-service refresher training for all staff. The facility has been informed by NYS DOH that this event should have been reported immediately on July 12, 2013."
Manufacturer, Best Medical International, Inc., Model No. 2301 I-125, Activity, 140 microCuries.
New York State Report ID No. NY-13-05
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49402 | Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 1
City: AUGUSTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA-1609-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IRENE BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/02/2013
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (EMAI)
PATRICIA MILLIGAN (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WORKER RECEIVED >50 REM TO BOTH HANDS
The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:
"An authorized user exceeded the annual extremity limit for both the left and right finger. Landauer sent an immediate report (report date 9/23/2013) to the corporate office of Cardinal informing them of the over exposure. At the current moment, Cardinal does not know the time frame at which this took place, but should know in a week and a half when Landauer will send their monthly report.
"The immediate report issued by Landauer reported the following doses:
Employee One, who resigned on August 13, 2013, received 57,554 mrem for the left finger and 52,681 mrem for their right finger.
Employee Two received 22,016 mrem - left finger and 39,861 mrem - right finger.
Employee Three received 43,140 mrem - left finger and 16,647 mrem - right finger.
"Cardinal will be investigating the incident to determine the root cause. They will be looking a systemic issues at the facility."
Georgia Incident Number: 72258 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49403 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: IBA MOLECULAR NORTH AMERICA, INC
Region: 1
City: HAVERHILL State: MA
County:
License #: 41-0618
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWARD SALOMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 10/02/2013
Notification Time: 18:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2013
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CESIUM-137 CALIBRATION SOURCE
The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program provided the following report via facsimile:
"[The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] Agency received a call from the licensee [stating] that a Cs-137 dose calibrator sealed source was leaking. This sealed source [has been] stored for a long time. [The] licensee performed a leak test today on the sealed source before the sealed source was going to be used. The leak test results indicated that [the source] was leaking and the activity reported was 0.3 microcuries of activity, which is above the regulatory reporting limit of 0.005 microcuries.
"The licensee provided the following information about the sealed source: original activity: 251 microcuries; Manufacture Date: 9/01/2011; and Source lD # 743-16-17. The leaking sealed source was never used and it was returned to storage for disposal. There was no personnel contamination or area contamination from this leaking source.
"The licensee will file a report to the Agency within 5 days of this leak test." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49405 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BED BATH AND BEYOND
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KYLE WALTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (E-MA)
ILTAB (E-MA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following report was received from the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section via e-mail:
"On October 1, 2013 the licensee identified a tritium exit sign as missing and reported it to the state of Wisconsin on October 2, 2013. Last inventoried during 2009, the sign was not recorded on an inventory conducted on September 17, 2013. The missing sign is a double-sided Isolite exit sign model 2040-07R-20BA SN: 227163. According to the SSD sheet, this device contains up to 25 Curies of tritium. The licensee stated it might have gone missing after a lighting retrofit project in 2010."
Wisconsin Report ID: WI130020
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49408 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: BP-COOPER RIVER PLANT
Region: 1
City: WANDO State: SC
County:
License #: 252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED RETRACTION MECHANISM ON FIXED GAUGE DEVICE
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Event Description: The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified by the licensee at 2:00 p.m. [EDT] on October 3, 2013, that a source on a gauging device would not retract into the holder as designed. This licensee also stated, 'steam is leaking from the top of the right hand side source holder where the pulley is. The source tube is welded to the vessel. At the present time the cable is stuck, so the source will not retract into the holder.
"The [South Carolina] Department [of Health and Environmental Control] responded to this event and found that an Ohmart Model SHLM-C-2 fixed gauging device containing two 200 mCi Cs-137 sources (s/n 2667/2668) had incurred a failure of the shutter/retraction mechanism. There was no evidence of steam being released from the gauge housing but water was dripping very slowly from the top of the gauge housing. Surveys indicated background readings of 0.03 mR/hr as the source has now been locked in place in the vessel.
"The area is roped off to prevent unauthorized access. Vega Americas, Inc. is scheduled to perform repair of the shutter/retraction mechanism on October 8, 2013. Notifications and updates will be made through the NMED system." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49410 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: GEO-SYSTEMS DESIGN & TESTING, INC
Region: 1
City: LEXINGTON State: SC
County:
License #: 421
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2013
Event Time: 11:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control via e-mail:
"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on Friday, October 4, 2013, at 1117 hrs (EDT), that a CPN Model MC-1-DR had been damaged at 1110 hrs [EDT] on October 4, 2013. [The] RSO, stated that the gauge had been run over by a bulldozer during a density test. [The South Carolina] Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 1223 hrs [EDT]. The source rod was extended and the gauge had sustained considerable damage. The inspector placed a small lead pig over the exposed source rod and placed the source rod and the damaged components in the transport container. The inspector surveyed all parts and was unable to verify that the Am-241:Be source was still contained with the gauge. A thorough survey of the area was made and the area under the damaged gauge was dug up but the inspector was unable to verify that the Am-241:Be source was with the damaged gauge. The inspector traveled to the permanent storage location of the licensee to ensure that the gauge was properly secured. [The licensee] was advised to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal and to keep all personnel away from the gauge.
"[The licensee's RSO] was advised by [the South Carolina inspector] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department. Updates will be made through the national NMED system." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49412 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTOR SOURCE
The following information was received from the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality via e-mail:
"On Sept. 27, [2013] the [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] was notified by the University of Oklahoma Health Science Center that they had found an Electron Capture Detector with approximately 1 microCi of removable contamination. The unit in question is a Varian 3000 Series (P/N 02-001972-00) S/N A8075 (SSDR #CA-8253-D-80 1-B). Activity was 8 mCi [Ni-63] in Aug. 1990. The unit has been removed from service and is being stored prior to disposal." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49417 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT STANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/07/2013
Notification Time: 20:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2013
Event Time: 18:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text VENT STACK AND AREA RADIATION MONITORS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"On October 7, 2013 at 1804 CDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support deenergizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 1833 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release.
"At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitor will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0419 EDT ON 10/13/13 * * *
"On October 13, 2013 at 0217 CDT, with Unit 1 in defueled mode during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to transfer the radiation monitors back to their normal power supply. The connection to the normal supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 0245 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release."
Notified R2DO (Widmann) and the licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49421 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES INC
Region: 4
City: HARLINGEN State: TX
County:
License #: 04944
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/09/2013
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2013
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
MEXICO (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On October 9, 2013 at approximately 1445 CDT, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice by phone that the licensee had lost a Troxler 3430 (sn 28350) moisture/density gauge near the Donna International Bridge near Donna, Texas. The sources contained within are an 8 mCi Cs-137 source (QSA Global X1218 sn 7502362) and a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source (QSA Global AX1 X.1 X.1/2 sn 47-25061). The gauge had been left on a tailgate out of its transport container when the truck left the temporary job site at approximately 0930 CDT. Upon reaching the first light in town approximately 5 miles away, the driver/technician noticed the down tailgate and missing gauge. A search is still underway."
Texas Report # I 9123
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49422 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICAH BENNINGFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/09/2013
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2013
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that the condition described below to be applicable to Callaway Nuclear Plant resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1E Train B batteries and chargers (including the B Swing charger) control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.
"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to the ground plane; simultaneously, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also hot short to the ground plane. This would cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Similar Events: EN #49411 and EN #49419 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49423 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNNEY CAMP
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 10/09/2013
Notification Time: 22:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2013
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"A review of industry operating experience with respect to fire induced damage to unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that the condition described below is applicable to Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This condition results in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design did not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current in these circuits. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each NK direct current (DC) battery or charger. Two leads run from the shunt to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). These leads are tied to the positive polarity of the NK battery system. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt is not overcurrent protected. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment. Reference Palo Verde plant event #49411. A Breech Authorization with compensatory Control Room hourly fire watch for this issue is in place and will remain in effect until this deficiency is resolved.
"This condition has been discussed with the Resident Inspector."
Similar Events #49422 and #49419 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49424 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN GENEVA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/10/2013
Notification Time: 07:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2013
Event Time: 05:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
J LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SINGLE SIREN ACTIVATION
"At 0538 [EDT on 10/10/13], Calvert Cliffs was notified by Calvert Control Center, that a siren in the Calvert County Area was activated. [It was] determined to be siren C-15 on Lloyd Bowen Road. This is 1 of 73 sirens.
"Per [procedure] CNG-NL-1.01-1004 this is a verbal report to Calvert Control Center.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour non emergency notification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as: any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has or will be made."
Heavy rains in the area are believed to have caused the siren activation. Maintenance personal have been dispatched to repair the siren.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49425 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT HUMMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/10/2013
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2013
Event Time: 08:09 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOW PRESSURE CONTAINMENT SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 0809 PDT on 10/10/2013, after starting Standby Service Water (SW) pumps, Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) received a flow low alarm for the Low Pressure Containment Spray (LPCS) pump motor cooling water. The flow indicator SW-FIS-19 was reported too low to support pump function. The LPCS system was declared inoperable, and the appropriate Technical Specification action statement was entered. The cause of the low flow alarm has not been determined. This event is reportable under criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'Any Event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"Columbia is continuing to troubleshoot and repair as appropriate to restore the SW flow to the LPCS pump.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/11/13 AT 1653 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *
"Subsequent to receipt of the low flow alarm, flushing of the flow indicating switch sensing lines was conducted. It has been determined that the instrument sensing lines are partially blocked providing a flow indication that is slow to respond to actual flow conditions. The flow is currently reading normally. The LPCS pump was declared operable on 10/10/13 at 1447 PDT. The initial notification incorrectly stated 'Low Pressure Containment Spray (LPCS)', the correct description is 'Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)'."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Hay). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49426 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RODGER ELLINGWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 10/10/2013
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2013
Event Time: 15:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INCOMPLETE BRAZING OF CONTACTS FOR DIESEL GENERATOR CONTROL RELAY
"On August 5, 2013, annunciators were received for diesel generator (DG) 2B low lube oil inlet and outlet temperature. Investigation revealed that a control relay in motor control center cubicle 2EMXF F02D was not operating as expected. A work order was generated to replace the relay. While working the work order, a relay contact pad was found resting next to the relay. An inspection of the relay revealed that the contact pad came from the backside of the left movable contact. With the relay coil in the energized state and the contact pad missing, the relay contact would not engage. This prevented the lube oil heaters from energizing.
"The failed relay was sent to the Duke Energy Metallurgy Laboratory. It was observed that the gold brazing material was miniscule where the pad should have been attached. The laboratory observed the same brazing issue with the adjacent relay contact pads that were still attached on the failed relay. The material could barely be seen under the pads: it should have protruded out the edges for good brazing. It was determined that the overseas manufacturer of the relays had insufficiently bonded the relay contact pads to the movable contact arms for at least one known batch of relays.
"The failed relay is a Cutler-Hammer relay, Model Number 9575H3A000. The failed relay had been installed on July 30, 2013 to replace obsolete relay Model Number 9575H2612A. The replacement relay type was purchased by Duke Energy as a commercial grade item and dedicated for use in safety related applications. The failed relay batch number is 1111AF. Similar relays had been installed in the DG lube oil sump tank heater and the DG jacket water heater applications for DGs 2A and 2B. Duke Energy concluded that for these two installed applications, no substantial safety hazard existed, as DGs 2A and 2B were determined to be operable. (The heaters operate while the DGs are in standby to maintain required lube oil and jacket water temperature. Failure of these heaters to automatically start would be detected by alarms and the DGs could be started to maintain temperature. The heaters do not operate when the DGs are running.) However, because similar affected relays were in inventory, they theoretically could have been utilized in other safety related applications (even though they were not actually utilized in any other safety related applications). The most significant safety related applications where the affected relays could have been utilized were in circuitry associated with safety related ventilation system fans. Had they been utilized in these systems, a failure could have prevented the affected ventilation system fan from starting on an actuation signal. Catawba's evaluation that concluded that this issue could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard was completed on October 7, 2013. However, there was no actual impact to public health or safety. The required company officer notification was made on October 9, 2013.
"Catawba is the only Duke Energy site that had the affected relays. In addition, none of the affected relays were sold or transferred to other utilities by Duke Energy. Notifications will he made to the Catawba NRC Resident Inspector and to the required state and local agencies."
The licensee will also be notifying North and South Carolina State, York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49429 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/11/2013
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2013
Event Time: 13:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 48 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC TURBINE AND REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER LOCKOUT
"At 1317 hours on 10/11/2013, Unit 1 experienced an automatic turbine and reactor trip from 48% power. Unit 1 was in the process of increasing power level following a refueling outage when the 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout Relay actuated as the 'C' Condensate Pump was started. The 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout resulted in the turbine trip which subsequently tripped the reactor. All three station service electrical buses transferred to the Reserve Station Service Transformers. The 1C Station Service Transformer does not have any visible exterior damage. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. The actuation of the Reactor Protection System is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps actuated as designed following the trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The steam generator levels were returned to normal operating level and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were returned to automatic. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Due to low decay heat loads, the Main Steam Trip Valves were closed as the Reactor Coolant Tavg temperature decreased, as directed by the reactor trip response procedure and decay heat is being removed using the atmospheric steam dumps. Decay heat control will be transferred to the main condenser steam dump system.
"Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 at normal Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power and was not affected by this event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local government. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 49430 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ABEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/11/2013
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2013
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
| Event Text UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL
"An employee reported to the on-site dispensary this afternoon [on 10/11/13,] with a bump and minor cuts on her head. The plant nurse administered first aid and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility for further evaluation. A whole body survey of the employee in her plant clothing was performed while in the dispensary; the maximum amount of contamination found was present on the employee's boots, 4,600 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into her personal clothing, and exit monitored from the facility. The employee was free of contamination upon release."
The licensee was unable to contact Region II due to the government shutdown. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49432 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALEXANDER MCLELLAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/13/2013
Notification Time: 09:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2013
Event Time: 04:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
J LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AT ZERO INCHES WATER GAUGE
"On October 13, 2013 at 0420 [EDT], Susquehanna Steam Electric Station control room operators received an alarm for a local secondary containment ventilation control panel. Investigation revealed that Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) secondary containment differential pressure was at zero inches water gauge. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. All fans and dampers appeared to be operating normally and there was no apparent equipment malfunction. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable.
"Zone II differential pressure recovered within five minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0420 and exited at 0425.
"There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49433 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW RADOSEVIC
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/13/2013
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2013
Event Time: 09:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2013 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (R3RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO CIRCULATING WATER PUMP HOUSE FLOODING
"Point Beach declared an Unusual Event based on HU 1.6 Uncontrolled Flooding in the Circulating Water Pump house that has the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the current operating mode.
"The leak was from the North main Zurn Service Water strainer. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal operating procedure and secured and isolated the affected strainer. The leak is now isolated."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC and via E-mail the Nuclear SSA.
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW RADOSEVIC TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1427 EDT ON 10/13/13 * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1245 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Skokowski), R3RA (Pederson), NRR ET (Uhle), IRD (Morris), NRR EO (Evans), and R3 (Shear). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC and via E-mail the Nuclear SSA. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49434 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WAYNE HARRELSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/13/2013
Notification Time: 21:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2013
Event Time: 16:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
J. LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ONE MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE
"Loss of assessment capability for steam generator rupture determination associated with the radiation monitor for one of four steam lines. The 3MSS-RE78 is out of service due to the unplanned loss of its power supply. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR72(b)(3)(xiii). A blown fuse is the suspected cause."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0408 EDT ON 10/16/2013 FROM BARRETT NICHOLS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The radiation monitor was returned to service at 0100 EDT on 10/16/2013. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49435 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 04:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"At approximately 0402 [EDT] on October 14, 2013, planned maintenance activities began on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean the Air Handler Units and Fans that support TSC ventilation. The planned work activity duration is expected to be approximately 43 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1418 EDT ON 10/16/13 FROM JOHN CAVES TO HUFFMAN * * *
The planned maintenance on the TSC HVAC system has been completed and the TSC returned to service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ernstes) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49436 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ACQUARO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
J LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VENTILATION PROCESS FLOW RADIATION MONITOR REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED TESTING
"The supplementary leak collection release system ventilation process flow radiation monitor 3HVR*RE19B has been removed from service for preplanned testing. The system will be returned to service in approximately 6 hours.
"Loss of assessment capability due to pre-planned testing affecting a radiation monitor. The ventilation process radiation monitor for supplementary leak collection release system (3HVR*RE19B) out of service is a reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 49437 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ABEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
| Event Text UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL
"An employee reported to the on-site dispensary this morning [on 10/14/13,] after a chemical exposure to his face. The plant nurse administered treatment and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility for further treatment. A whole body survey of the employee's plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination found was present on the employee's left boot, 32,000 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49441 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GRANT FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 21:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 21:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM AND START OF EMERGENCY DIESELS DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"On Monday October 14, 2013 at 2121 hours [EDT], with the reactor critical at 100% core thermal power, the mode switch in RUN, and offsite power 345kV line 342 out of service for scheduled modification, a loss of offsite power occurred due to the loss of the second 345kV line 355. All control rods fully inserted, main steam isolation valves closed on the loss of power to the reactor protection system, emergency diesel generators automatically started supplying power to both 4160V safety buses. Following the scram, reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically per design. A plant cool down is in progress with reactor water level being maintained in the normal post-scram band of +12 inches to +45 inches utilizing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. Preliminary indication from the grid operator was that the line loss was due to a failure of an offsite tower support. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(8)."
Pilgrim is currently in Mode 3 and being cooled down to Mode 4. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49442 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES FIANT
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 22:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 15:12 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation | Event Text TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP
"On October 14, 2013 at 1512 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 experienced a low control oil pressure on Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) 1-1, which caused MFP 1-1 to trip offline. In response, the turbine control system initiated an automatic ramp from 100 percent to 50 percent turbine load. Operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (OP) AP-15, 'Loss of Feedwater Flow.' Procedure OP AP-15 directed operators to manually start both motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps 1-2 and 1-3, based on existing plant conditions. The manual initiation of an AFW pump in response to actual plant conditions constitutes a valid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
"Unit 1 is stable at 50 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49444 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"At 1315 EDT, the VC Summer Nuclear Station determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition:
"As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, VC Summer performed a review of ammeter circuitry. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to VC Summer resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery or charger. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses.
"It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat-up causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49445 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICK GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 10:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE
"On 10/16/13 at 1032 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an inadvertent isolation that occurred during testing. During performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.5.1.2(ATU D), an erroneous signal was induced causing actuation of primary containment isolation system group IV (i.e., HPCI Isolation). Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating, Condition C was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The erroneous signal was cleared and the HPCI isolation was reset. Upon reset of the isolation signal, the HPCI system was returned to available status. The HPCI system was unavailable for 14 minutes. The HPCI system was returned to operable status at 1503 CDT following successful performance of the surveillance section affecting HPCI isolation logic.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Service Request 794050 has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program to capture this event." | |