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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/03/2013 - 10/04/2013
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation |
Event Number: 49263 |
Rep Org: SUSQUEHANNA
Licensee: PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County: LUZERNE
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-28
NRC Notified By: DOUG LAMARCA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/10/2013
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2013
Event Time: 04:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c )(2) - SPENT FUEL, HLW OR RX-REL GTCC RED. EFECT
72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION |
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
HO NIEH (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD) |
Event Text
DEGRADED NEUTRON SHIELDING FOR A SPENT FUEL CASK
"PPL Susquehanna, LLC became aware of a reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel confinement system at 0430 [EDT] on Saturday August 10, 2013. One of the safety barriers in a spent fuel cask is the water filled volume of the cask which provides neutron shielding. This volume is normally filled with approximately 670 gal of demineralized water. It has been determined that the neutron shielding volume was not completely filled. The cask neutron shield volume is currently being filled. The loaded spent fuel canister is currently located in the reactor building on the refuel floor and has been located there for the duration of the event. Investigation is currently in progress concerning personnel radiation exposure. The lack of neutron shielding represents a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system which is an 8 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(c)(2). This also represents a dry fuel storage safety system that was disabled or failed to function which is a 24 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(d)(1)."
The cask was a TransNuclear NUHOMS-61BTH. Personnel on the refuel floor were equipped with neutron dosimetry.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1609 EDT ON 10/3/2013 FROM DOUG LAMARCA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At the time the original ENS notification was made, PPL Susquehanna, LLC had determined that a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage confinement system had occurred, and that spent fuel equipment important to safety was disabled or failed to function as designed. This conclusion was reached because a loaded dry fuel storage transfer cask's neutron water shield was found partially drained down.
"Subsequent to this event, an investigation concluded that the identified condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) or 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1). Transnuclear's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter K.7 defines the 61BT dry fuel storage 'confinement system' as those components which make up the dry shielded cask (DSC) and not the transfer cask. Therefore, the transfer cask neutron shield is not part of the confinement system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) do not apply. In addition, Transnuclear FSAR drawing number NUH-03-8002-SAR, Rev. 8, Sheet 1 'General License NUHOMS« ISFSI Onsite Transfer Cask Inner & Outer Shell Assembly' defines the neutron shield components as 'not important to safety.' Therefore, the TC neutron shield is not part of the dry fuel storage safety system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1) do not apply.'"
No personnel exposures exceeded regulatory limits.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state.
Notified the R1DO (Joustra). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 49385 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PARADIGM CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 04875
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 09/25/2013
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2013 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (EMAI)
DENNIS ALLSTON (ILTA)
MEXICO (FAX) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On September 25, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by a licensee that one of its Humboldt Model 5001EZ moisture/density gauges was missing and presumed stolen from its facility. The gauge (SN: 3561) contains one 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and one 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The gauge could not be located on Friday, September 20, 2013, and the licensee began a search and investigation. On Monday, September 23, 2013, it made the determination that it was missing/presumed stolen. The gauge had been secured inside a locked storage area inside the facility with the licensee's other gauges. No other gauges were missing. The licensee notified local law enforcement and a gauge sales/service company in Houston. The Agency will notify the Texas Pawnbrokers Association. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.
"[The] Houston Police Department [was notified by the licensee on 09/23/2013]."
Texas Report # I 9118
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 49404 |
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 06:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL |
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
0 |
Startup |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP
"At 0643 EDT [on 10/03/13], during reactor startup, with the reactor critical and power in the intermediate range, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to an invalid (noise) intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram signal processed on both RPS trip systems. All control rods fully inserted and plant response was as expected. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor is currently subcritical."
When the reactor scram occurred, reactor power was below the Point of Adding Heat and had minimal effect on the plant. Normal offsite power is being maintained. Decay heat is being maintained via normal shutdown cooling.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 49406 |
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INADEQUATE SHIFT STAFFING TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUCTIONS
"The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) minimum Operations shift staffing was evaluated for response to a fire in the Control Bay that ultimately leads to entry into Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions (SSIs). The result of this evaluation revealed that the minimum Operations shift staffing does not provide sufficient staffing to support SSI required staffing levels. In the event of an Appendix R fire, one BFN unit would be without a Senior Reactor Operator to direct the implementation of the time critical manual actions specified in the SSI procedures.
"On October 3, 2013, this condition was determined to be an 8 hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since sufficient shift staffing levels to implement the SSI procedures in the event of an Appendix R fire were not provided.
"Compensatory measures have been implemented to ensure sufficient shift staffing is provided to implement Appendix R SSIs.
"The event was entered into the licensee corrective action program as Service Request number 788812.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 49407 |
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 02:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 20:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNIT 2 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE DUE TO DRAIN LINE LEAK
"On October 3, 2013, at 2045 [CDT] hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the drain line for the LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH. The defect was identified during investigation of leakage near LS 2-2365. The LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH, is provided to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap during standby line-up. The location of the defect, is in Class 2 Safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The instrument isolations for LS 2-2365 have been close and the leak has been isolated."
There is no increase to plant risk and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) is available.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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