Event Notification Report for October 04, 2013

UNEXPECTED CONTAINMENT LINER PENETRATION FOUND

"On October 4, 2013, during the Beaver Valley Unit 1 refueling outage, a planned visual examination of the interior containment liner and coatings was being performed. The containment design consists of an interior steel liner that is surrounded by reinforced concrete. An area approximately 0.4 inches by 0.28 inches was discovered that penetrated through the containment steel liner plate.

"With the plant currently shut down and in Mode 6 the containment as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1 is not required to be operable. The cause of this discrepancy is currently being evaluated.

"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"The Site Resident Inspector has been notified."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO OPERATOR LEAVING CONTROL ROOM

"Technical Specification 6.7.2(1)(c) Special Report Violation of Technical Specification 6.1.3(1)(a)

"The following special report is being made in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.7.2(1)(c) which states in part: There shall be a report not later than the following day by telephone or similar conveyance to the NRC Headquarters Operation Center of any reportable occurrence as defined in TS 1.3. TS 1.3 defines an observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls, such that the inadequacy caused the existence of a condition which results in a violation of technical specifications as a reportable occurrence.

"Specifically, on Friday October 4, 2013, while performing a training session, an operator left the control room while the console key remained in the console key switch and the switch was in the ON position. This is in direct violation of the staffing requirements defined in TS 6.1.3(1)(a) which states a licensed reactor operator must be in the control room when the reactor is not secured. The reactor was not secured by the fact that the console key switch was not in the OFF position and the key remained in the console key switch. However, all control elements were fully inserted, a normal reactor SCRAM condition was present, the reactor was shut down, no work was in progress involving core fuel, core structure, control elements or drives and no experiments were being moved. This condition remained for a period of 67 seconds until the reactor operator returned to the control room. The reactor operator subsequently secured the reactor and notified the Reactor Supervisor. A review of security records confirms the control room remained locked and unoccupied during the entire duration.

"A follow-up written report to the NRC describing the circumstance of the event including an analysis of the cause of the occurrence, corrective actions and measures to prevent or reduce the probability of the recurrence shall be made no later than 14 days from today, October 4, 2013."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control via e-mail:

"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on Friday, October 4, 2013, at 1117 hrs (EDT), that a CPN Model MC-1-DR had been damaged at 1110 hrs [EDT] on October 4, 2013. [The] RSO, stated that the gauge had been run over by a bulldozer during a density test. [The South Carolina] Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 1223 hrs [EDT]. The source rod was extended and the gauge had sustained considerable damage. The inspector placed a small lead pig over the exposed source rod and placed the source rod and the damaged components in the transport container. The inspector surveyed all parts and was unable to verify that the Am-241:Be source was still contained with the gauge. A thorough survey of the area was made and the area under the damaged gauge was dug up but the inspector was unable to verify that the Am-241:Be source was with the damaged gauge. The inspector traveled to the permanent storage location of the licensee to ensure that the gauge was properly secured. [The licensee] was advised to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal and to keep all personnel away from the gauge.

"[The licensee's RSO] was advised by [the South Carolina inspector] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department. Updates will be made through the national NMED system."

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined the described condition to be applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1E Train B and D batteries and chargers (including the BD Swing charger) control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.

"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to the ground plane; simultaneously, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also hot short to the ground plane. This would cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R.

"The train B and D DC circuits were reviewed first since they are part of alternate safe shutdown capability for the control room fire event. An extent of condition review is ongoing for the A and C train DC circuits and other similar circuit designs that could potentially cause a secondary fire.

"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."