United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2013 > September 9

Event Notification Report for September 9, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/06/2013 - 09/09/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49279 49315 49326 49327 49328

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 49279
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
                   FABRICATION & SCRAP
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/14/2013
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 22:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)

Event Text

VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE AS REQUIRED ON LOW TEMPERATURE INTERLOCK

"At 2230 [PDT] on 8/13/2013, AREVA Richland Dry Conversion Operations notified AREVA Safety personnel that a low temperature interlock on one of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) headers activated and that the valve, HV1-1054, did not close as required, and therefore the process has been shut down pending investigation. The system remains down and will remain down pending thorough investigation and appropriate corrective actions.

"The low temperature interlock is not an IROFS [Item Relied on for Safety]. However, further investigation this morning determined the valve, HV1-1054, impacted the function of four IROFS, which would not have performed as required. Of these four, two were found to be used in accident sequences that only credited one additional IROFS for nuclear criticality accident sequences. In each of the cases accidental nuclear criticality remained highly unlikely due to the robustness of the remaining IROFS and the low occurrence frequency of the initiating event.

"Operating with only one IROFS to protect against accidental nuclear criticality is reported within one hour of discovery under 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (a)(5). AREVA determined that this criterion had been met at approximately 0900 [PDT, on 8/14/2013]. It is estimated that this particular process line had operated for less than 100 hours in this condition."

The licensee has notified NRC Region II.

* * * UPDATE AT 1526 EDT ON 9/6/13 FROM CALVIN MANNING TO PETE SNYDER * * *

"Based on the following discussion, AREVA formally withdraws the notification made in NRC event report 49279 with this update.

"After careful review of this plant condition, the apparent causes and the extent of condition, AREVA NP has concluded that the plant condition that precipitated the initial notification did not meet the criteria for reporting to the NRC under 10CFR70 Appendix A. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that closure of valve HV1-1054 (for UF6 isolation) was not required to meet the safety function specified by the IROFS credited to prevent the accident sequences related to this plant condition. Specifically, the temperature triggers for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018 each activate both the UF6 Isolation and the Reaction Gas Shutoff interlocks. The UF6 isolation interlock causes valve HVx-1054 to close. However, UF6 isolation was not required to meet the safety function specified for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018.

"AREVA was compliant with the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61 at all times during the condition reported to the NRC on 8/14/2013.

"A more detailed write-up of this conclusion was previously provided to NRC Region II and additional information will be provided to them later today [9/6/13]."

Notified R2DO (Ernstes) and NMSS (Guttmann).

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State Event Number: 49315
Rep Org: ACUREN INSPECTION INC
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION INC
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 42-27593-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE STATON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2013
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE OF RADIOGRAPHER

The RSO for the licensee called to report a potential overexposure of a radiographer. This event occurred while the radiographer was checking welds at a refinery in Wyoming. While moving the camera to another location, the radiographer's dosimeter alarmed. It is suspected that the camera's source was not fully retracted into the safe position. The source was subsequently retracted back into the fully shielded position.

The RSO calculates an estimated dose to the radiographer of 5 rem. The licensee will send the radiographer's dosimetry for expedited reading as soon as possible.

The licensee will update this report with additional details as they become available.

* * * RETRACTION FROM GAYLE STATON TO HUFFMAN AT 1436 EDT ON 9/04/13 * * *

The RSO has received the radiographer's dosimetry badge readings. The radiographer was still wearing his August dosimetry when the event occurred. His badge readings was 328 mrem for the entire month of August including the exposure from this event.

Since there was no significant exposure from the event, the licensee has retracted this event notification.

The licensee has notified NRC (Thompson) in Region 4. R4DO (Gaddy) notified and a copy of this report was sent to FSME Event Resource.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49326
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MASON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. Conditions were discovered which appear to require immediate NRC notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to both trains of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water [CCW] being inoperable several times since 7/27/2012. A deficiency was identified with Auxiliary Component Cooling Water valve ACCW-126A, which is a part of the ultimate heat sink system, associated with the inability to adequately close this valve manually, locally, in order to preserve Wet Cooling Tower A inventory during an accident. System operability requirements came into question and resulted in Operations declaring the system inoperable on 9/4/2013 at 1509 CDT, and entering Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TS. As part of the review for NRC reporting requirements associated with the inoperable CCW Train A, historical information was discovered that indicated the redundant train of CCW, Train B, was declared inoperable several times, while ACCW-126A was presumably in the degraded or inoperable condition, since ACCW-126A had last been rebuilt on 7/27/2012. This condition requires immediate reporting to NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The condition was corrected and the system declared operable on 9/5/2013 at 1231 CDT, exiting the CCW TS LCO and associated cascading TS.

"Prior to the condition with ACCW-126A being corrected, a snubber pin (FWSR-60) was found missing on 9/5/2013 at 1228 CDT that could have adversely affected the ability to feed Steam Generator #2 with Emergency Feedwater. Less than 4 hours later, the pin was replaced, which restored the path to operable at 1609 CDT on 9/5/2013.

"The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. Plant risk index was 10.0 green."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49327
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT HUMMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 22:44 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TURBINE BUILDING STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE

"At 2244 PDT on September 5, 2013, the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector were declared non-functional due to a failure of the sample rack supply fan.

"At 0156 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, a temporary sample cart was installed to return the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector to service.

"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitoring equipment was nonfunctional, a field team survey would have been used if required.

"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 49328
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2013
Event Time: 06:07 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

RADIATION MONITORING SAMPLE RACK DECLARED NON-FUNCTIONAL

"At 0607 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional due to a loss of power to the sample rack. The cause of the loss of power is under investigation.

"At 0945 hours PDT, auxiliary sampling equipment was installed to collect samples from the associated effluent release pathway.

"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack is non-functional, field team survey results will be used if required.

"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/6/13 AT 2251 EDT * * *

"Repairs have been completed and the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack has been returned to service and declared functional at 1631 hours PDT.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, September 09, 2013
Monday, September 09, 2013