Event Notification Report for August 23, 2013

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - UNQUALIFIED MATERIAL USED IN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES

The following information was received via fax:

"Material supplied to MTCN [Mirion Technologies (Conax Nuclear)] by approved sub-suppliers audited to NCA-3800 by MTCN was considered to be ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] qualified source material for Section II and Section III requirements. During triennial survey of MTCN by the ASME for renewal of our N Type Certificates of Authorization, it was identified by the ASME survey team that material supplied by two (2) MTCN approved sub-suppliers should be considered unqualified source material. At that time, MTCN's Quality Program did not include the use of unqualified source material.

"Testing of the coupons for materials used with the basic components supplied to the operating plants is expected to be completed within the next 30 days."

The potentially defective components are electrical penetration headerplates, mounting weldment rings and weld neck flanges for mounting the electrical penetration assemblies.

The affected facilities are: Oconee, Ginna, Crystal River, Point Beach, Monticello, Cook, and Turkey Point.

Point of contact: John MacDonald 716-681-1973

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MACDONALD TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 9/23/13 AT 1747 EDT * * *

MTCN has determined the material supplied to U.S. plants does not impact the material safety or performance of the EPAs (Electrical Penetration Assemblies) delivered. Chemical and mechanical re-verification test results to date indicate there have been no test failures compared to the ASME SA-240 material requirements.

Notified R1DO (Welling), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Riemer), and NRR Part 21 Group (email only).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MACDONALD TO HOWIE CROUCH (VIA EMAIL) ON 2/5/14 AT 1627 EDT * * *

MTCN has determined that chemical and mechanical tests indicate that the materials used in the EPAs delivered met ASME requirements and does not impact safety or performance of the delivered devices.

Due to the evaluation results, the vendor submitted this update to provide final closure of this Part 21 issue.

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Masters), R3DO (Orlikowski) and the Part 21 group (via email).

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - MOTORS MAY HAVE A POINT FOR FOREIGN MATERIAL ENTRY

The following information was received via fax:

"This is a reportable 10CFR21 notification because some 1E motors in frame sizes 360, 400, and 440 may have been shipped by Baldor Electric, which contain an entry point for blast media to enter the motor during post shipment paint treatment preparations. During a recent inspection of a returned motor, some foreign materials were discovered inside the motor which appeared to consist of two types of blast media. One type of blast media found is used during the manufacturing process to clean the rotor end ring area before applying an end ring coating. This media is non-conductive and is typically cleaned away as part of the treatment process. The presence of blast media is a key inspection point at rotor final inspection. In mid 2008 this type of blast media was eliminated from Baldor processes and substituted with C02 blast media.

"The other blast media found inside the motor is not used during the motor manufacturing process at Baldor. It was a metallic bead media and used during a paint preparation process after leaving Baldor. The entry point of this material was found to be through a small window in the frame casting that normally is closed with weld after the stator is assembled into the frame. In this instance, one of the stator weld notches was aligned with one (of the two) small windows in the frame casting. This allowed the blast media to enter and travel along the OD [outside diameter] of the stator core weld notch and into the motor.

"Engineering and Quality reviewed all nuclear orders to verify the frame sizes that may have used the weld slot construction. The frames were determined to be 360, 400, and 440 during the time frame when the welds may not have been verified. The date range was established as 2002 thru 2013.

"The motors identified as possibly having this non-conformance should be inspected for the following:
a. The frame weld windows on identified 360,400 or 440 frame motors show no weld.
and
b. The stator core weld notch is visible in at least one (of the two) frame weld windows."

If both issues exist, then remediation is recommended.

Customers who have received these motors:
Areva, Inc.
David Brown Union Pumps Co.
Duke Energy Corp.
Enertech
First Energy
First Energy Service Co.
Flowserve Pump Division - Spain
Georgia Power
Howden North America Inc.
Limitorque
Spencer Turbine Co.
Taiwan Power Company
Westinghouse Electric Company

Point of Contact: James Thigpen, 678-947-7272

PART-21 NOTIFICATION - AP-1000 TIME RESPONSE FOR THE SAFETY ANALYSIS CANNOT BE DIRECTLY MEASURED

The following information was received via fax:

"Several technical specifications were identified in a Corrective Action Report (CAR) as having a time response surveillance requirement that cannot be directly measured due to logic pathways where overlap with another protective function occurs. Westinghouse is now determining what other reactor trip and engineered safeguards actuation system protective functions have a credited time response in the Safety Analysis for the AP1000 plant and therefore should be assigned a time response surveillance requirement in the Technical Specifications. The evaluation will address the safety implication of the items identified in the CAR as well as confirm that all other protective functions where a time response was credited in the safety analysis have a measurable surveillance requirement in the Techni.cal Specifications.

"The safety significance evaluation for the AP1000 plant is still in process and a determination of the potential to create a substantial safety hazard is not yet complete."

Affected licensees:
Summer Units 2 and 3
Vogtle Units 3 and 4
Levy Units 1 and 2
Harris Units 2 and 3
Lee Units 1 and 2
Turkey Points Units 6 and 7
Bellefonte Units 3 and 4

Point of contact: James Gresham 412-720-0754

Westinghouse letter: LTR-NRC-13-62

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ACTUATION

"At 0754 on 8/23/13, a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the unexpected opening of the circuit breaker (RPS-CB-MG2) for the RPS 'B' motor generator due to a failure of the voltage regulator circuit card. The loss of RPS 'B' resulted in a half scram signal, closure of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) from multiple systems and loss of power to main steam line radiation monitors (MS-RIS-610B & MS-RIS-610D). No plant parameters or maintenance activities existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-MG2 or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

"The half scram signal, closure of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) from multiple systems, and loss of power to main steam line radiation monitors were an expected response to the loss of RPS 'B'.

"RPS 'B' was repowered from an alternate power supply. The half scram signal was reset, the containment isolation valves were opened and the affected systems were returned to normal operation. The voltage regulator circuit card was replaced and RPS 'B' was returned to its normal power supply.

"As indicated in 10CFR50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid.

"The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:

"The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: PCIVs in multiple systems
EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
EDR-V-20 Drywell Equipment Drain Outboard Isolation Valve
FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
FDR-V-4 Drywell Floor Drain Outboard Isolation Valve
RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve
RWCU-V-4 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Outboard Isolation Valve
RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve
RRC-V-20 Reactor Water Sample Outboard Isolation Valve
TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve
CRD-V-11 Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Volume Drain Valve

"Whether each train actuation was complete or partial:
All PCIVs actuations for a loss of RPS 'B' were complete.
The reactor half scram for a loss of RPS 'B' was a partial activation.

"Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully:
All PCIVs functioned successfully."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.