| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/05/2013 - 08/06/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49167 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON DEPRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 07/01/2013
Notification Time: 21:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2013
Event Time: 17:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY MINIMUM FLOW VALVE PRESSURE SWITCH SETPOINT FOUND OUTSIDE OF TOLERANCE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During routine Instrument Maintenance Surveillance Testing (LIS-HP-205), the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) minimum flow valve pressure switch set point was found outside the Technical Specification allowable value. This could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), a single train safety system, from performing its design function. This is reportable as an 8 hour ENS notification.
"The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 7/01/13 at 1646 [CDT] when the system was made inoperable for surveillance testing. At 1705, maintenance personnel reported minimum flow valve pressure switch set point was found at 112.6 psig, which is outside of the TS Allowable Value of greater than or equal to 113.2 psig (0.6 psig below the Allowable Value). The minimum flow valve pressure switch set point has been calibrated and was left within Technical Specification allowable values, HPCS was declared OPERABLE at 1815 on 7/01/13."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE CHURCHILL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1346 EDT ON 8/5/2013 * * *
"The event notification was reported by LaSalle Generating Station on 7/01/2013 at 2147 EDT. This update is being provided for the purposes of retracting that notification.
"On July 1, 2013, during surveillance testing, the Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) minimum flow valve pressure switch setpoint was found below the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5.1 allowable value. HPCS was declared inoperable, and TS Required Actions (RA) were entered on July 1, 2013, at 1646 hours [CDT]. Because HPCS is a single train system, an ENS report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The minimum flow valve pressure switch setpoint was calibrated to within TS allowable values, and HPCS was declared operable on July 1, 2013, at 1815 hours.
"A post-event review determined that declaring HPCS inoperable was not required. The inoperability of the pressure switch would not have impacted the function of the HPCS minimum flow valve to automatically open as required to prevent overheating of the HPCS pump. The as-found setpoint was 0.6 psig below the TS allowable value, which would have resulted in the minimum flow valve opening slightly sooner. The inoperability would also not have prevented or delayed the automatic closing of the valve at the required system flow to assure that adequate ECCS flow is available. It should be noted that the LaSalle ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] LOCA [Loss Of Coolant Accident] analysis assumes that the HPCS minimum flow valve is open during an injection.
"TS 3.3.5.1 RA D.4 requires that the minimum flow valve pressure switch be restored to operable status within 7 days. If it cannot be restored within that time, RA G.1 requires that the supported system (HPCS) be declared inoperable, precluding extended operation with the minimum flow pressure switch inoperable. The pressure switch was re-calibrated to within TS allowable values within approximately 1 hour and 29 minutes of being declared inoperable.
"Therefore, the HPCS system was operable with the minimum flow pressure switch 0.6 psig out of calibration for 1 hour and 29 minutes. This event did not constitute a loss of safety function of the HPCS system, and the event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Lara). |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 49216 | Rep Org: IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
Licensee: IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
Region: 4
City: BOISE State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27076-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DIANNA HOFFECKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/26/2013
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2013
Event Time: 09:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CANADA (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at the Idaho Transportation Department discovered a Troxler 3440 moisture density gauge missing when it was believed to be in lock-up and a wipe test was to be performed on July 18, 2013. The Idaho Transportation Department searched all the projects and alerted everyone in the district that the gauge was missing. After a week, the gauge could not be located.
Gauge Information: Troxler Model 3440, Serial # 26155
Sources: Americium-241/Beryllium, 40 millicuries; Cesium-137, 8 millicuries
* * * UPDATE FROM DIANNA HOFFECKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/26/13 AT 1307 EDT * * *
The gauge has been found and is in the possession of the licensee. Notified R4DO (Allen), FSME Events Resource, ILTAB and Canada..
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49236 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TODD PERKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 08/05/2013
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2013
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH RANGE STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE:
"The Millstone Unit 2 high range stack radiation monitor is out for pre-planned maintenance. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49239 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/05/2013
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2013
Event Time: 14:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH OFFSITE POWER SOURCES INOPERABLE DURING UNDERVOLTAGE TESTING
"Both Limerick 4 KV offsite sources were inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered for Unit 2 from 1456 to 1512 [EDT] during D23 4KV Undervoltage testing. During the undervoltage test, the affected diesel and one offsite source (101 Bus) are inoperable. During the test, the alternate offsite source (201 Bus) UV relay was tested and found to be inoperable, resulting in the need to declare the second offsite source (201 Bus) inoperable.
"When notified of the failure, action was taken to restore the 101 Bus offsite source to operable and exit the 3.0.3 condition [at] (1512 EDT). The 201 Bus Relay was successfully calibrated and tested to subsequently restore the 201 Bus to operability [at] (1543 EDT)."
Testing of the 201 bus UV relay is directed per procedure while the 101 bus is powered from the diesel generator.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |