| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/27/2013 - 06/28/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49043 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/16/2013
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2013
Event Time: 19:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 23 | Power Operation | Event Text PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO DEGRADED SEAL ON INNER DOOR CONCURRENT WITH PERSONNEL PASSING THROUGH THE OUTER DOOR
"At approximately 1934 EDT on May 15, 2013, maintenance personnel entered the primary containment personnel air lock to determine the cause of the inability to attain test pressure during a type B leak rate of the airlock. The inner door seal was found degraded and partially rolled from its required position allowing air from inside the airlock to enter the primary containment. During the limited time the outer airlock door was opened for access into the airlock concurrent with the degraded seal on the inner door, a condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structure to control the release of radioactive material.
"The inner door seal was subsequently replaced and the leak rate of the personnel air lock completed with satisfactory results. During the seal replacement activity, the outer airlock door remained closed to provide the barrier against the release of radioactive material should it be required.
"This is a notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material. It is recognized that this notification [was] not within eight hours of the event.
"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program."
The licensee will notify the New York State Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/27/13 AT 1549 EDT FROM KROCK TO HUFFMAN * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification #49043, which reported a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material when the primary containment airlock inner door seal was found degraded concurrent with the outer door being open.
"Further analysis by engineering of the actual conditions which were recorded when the airlock Type B leak rate test was being performed and calibration checks of the leak rate monitor instrumentation used for the test, has determined that the leakage through the degraded inner airlock door seal, when combined with the Appendix J As-Left Minimum Pathway Type B and C leak rates, remains below the Technical Specification Primary Containment As-Left Minimum Pathway Leakage Limit of 0.6 La.
"Therefore, for the period in which the inner airlock door seal was degraded and the outer airlock door was open, the primary containment function to control the release of radioactive material was maintained and the initial notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) is being retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission. R1DO (Ferdas) notified. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49139 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: METAL INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: MARION State: NC
County:
License #: GL 056-0600-0
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/20/2013
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING Sr-90 SOURCE IDENTIFIED DURING STATE INSPECTION
"The facility is a General License: 056-0600-0G that went out of business effective June 1, 2012. [North Carolina State] did an inspection on June 11, 2013 and [the licensee] had no records of inventory or sources or records of disposal. [The state] was able to determine from [state] records that [the licensee] had disposed of all sources except one on [the licensee's] inventory dated 6/13/1995. [The missing device contains] a Sr-90 [source] with a less than 25 micro Curie source, S/N 49874, that was purchased from CMI. [The state] called CMI and the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] did not have any records of [the device] being disposed. The source is lost and missing so [the state] is filing this incident with the NRC today."
North Carolina Incident Report Number: 13-12. The state considers this incident to be closed.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49144 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NAVEEN KOTEEL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 06/24/2013
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2013
Event Time: 04:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER BACKUP GENERATOR
"A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on the backup diesel generator that supplies TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM MATT HORN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2015 EDT ON 6/27/13 * * *
The backup diesel generator was returned to service at 1641 EDT on 6/27/13 which restored the TSC to functional status.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49150 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GLEN LAWSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/27/2013
Notification Time: 04:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2013
Event Time: 04:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency notification. Planned maintenance activities will be performed today which will temporarily affect Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation. The maintenance will be completed in approximately 20 hours and is scheduled to be worked to minimize out-of-service time.
"In the event of an emergency, specific conditions may warrant relocating the TSC to the alternate facility per existing procedures. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the maintenance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49151 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 06/27/2013
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2013
Event Time: 13:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"At 1307 CDT on May 2, 2013, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100% power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'A' side of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation, and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge, Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System.
"This event was caused by a human performance error that led to a blown fuse. Specifically, the fuse failed during pre-planned maintenance on a differential pressure switch when a test clip made inadvertent contact with an energized part of the switch.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49152 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK KERRONE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 06/28/2013
Notification Time: 04:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2013
Event Time: 17:58 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 65 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY AND DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE FOR 20 MINUTES
"At 1758 [PDT] on June 27, 2013, an alarm signaling heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) trouble in the Division 3 diesel and high pressure core spray (HPCS) room was received in the main control room. Follow-up investigation determined that the switch for the normal room supply fan (DMA-FN-32) was off. It is believed that the switch may have been inadvertently mispositioned during ongoing work in the vicinity. A worker was moving a vacuum nearby and stopped when he heard the local alarm. Columbia Generating Station is performing further investigation to determine if there are other possibilities for DMA-FN-32 control switch being mispositioned.
"The fan was returned to service at 1819 [PDT]. An Operation's supervisor was present when returning the switch to ON and verified the switch operated as expected. Loss of DMA-FN-32 results in both the HPCS diesel (DG-3) and the HPCS system being inoperable due to inadequate cooling of those systems. Offsite power for Division 3 was verified to be operable while DG-3 was inoperable. The loss of the HPCS system results in the loss of safety function for a single train system and thus is reportable under the 10 CFR 50.72 sections noted above.
"Appropriate Technical Specification actions were entered and exited for DG-3 and HPCS inoperability times. There was no radiological release associated with this event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |