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Event Notification Report for June 6, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/05/2013 - 06/06/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48862 49091

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Part 21 Event Number: 48862
Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR
Licensee: ATC NUCLEAR
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. A. CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NRR PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

INTERIM PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING REVIEW OF SEISMIC TESTING METHODOLOGY

The following information was received via fax:

"ATC Nuclear in Oak Ridge, TN is making an initial notification of a Potential Part 21 Defect in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

"A recent review performed January 21, 2013 of seismic Test Response Spectra (TRS) for seismic qualification activities identified that Required Response Spectra (RRS) may not have been completely enveloped for portions of the required frequency range during test performance of the Operational Basis Events (OBE's) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake(s) (SSEs) for some customers. Specifically, some TRS results may have been below the provided RRS in the 10-25 Hz range in certain circumstances and thus not fully meeting the RRS and required acceptance criteria of IEEE 344 1975/1987/2004. The condition is the result of the instrumentation methodology and inherent tri-axial table characteristics where vibrational energy is not fully transmitted to the unit under test in all test conditions. The safety significance is that the Basic Component may not perform its intended safety function during or following a seismic event exceeding the as-tested vibration frequencies. ATC has demonstrated through actual testing to date that this probability is very low. Many customers provide RRS that include conservatism; however, this also has not been credited in the ATC Nuclear evaluation methodology discussed below. The affected customers, purchase orders, and relevant information have been provided as Attachment 1 [not attached to this report - customers notified were XCEL Energy, Bechtel Power Corporation, TVA for Watts Bar 2 (Projected Operation 12/2015) and Preferred Metal Technologies, Inc.] to this interim notification.

"ATC Nuclear developed a systematic evaluation methodology which has been independently corroborated by industry experts to evaluate the seismic tri-axial test programs of concern conducted by ATC Nuclear. The systematic evaluation involves review of the TRS to determine if adequate test margin exists within the test data when compared to the RRS, evaluation of the table test acceleration versus fixture acceleration as necessary, and when required, retesting of the component. For all program reviews completed to date (~70% of all programs) for operating licensees, all re-evaluation and re-testing has resulted in no reduction in seismic withstand capabilities and no failures. The evaluation included prioritization of operating reactors early in the process to the extent possible to ensure minimal impact to those facilities.

"Based on the successful completion of evaluations to date, ATC Nuclear is confident this issue will be resolved through the methodology established and worst-case may result in the submittal of an addenda to existing qualification reports in situations where retesting has been required for a basic component.

"ATC Nuclear will need until May 15, 2013 to conclude the evaluation process. Should, during any re-testing, a condition arise warranting notification, that notification will be immediately made at the time of discovery to the affected customer. All orders since the point of discovery have been addressed through corrective actions to prevent recurrence and are unaffected.

"The below contact information should be utilized regarding any questions.

R.A. Chalifoux
Vice-President QA, ATC Nuclear
Tel: (865) 384-0124
email: rchalifoux@argoturbo.com"

* * * RETRACTION FROM R.A. CHALIFOUX VIA FAX AT 0957 EDT ON 6/5/13 * * *

The following information was obtained from ATC Nuclear via facsimile:

"ATC Nuclear in Oak Ridge, TN has concluded the evaluation of a potential Part 21 defect in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a) (2). The evaluation for reportability with respect to the remaining licensees in Attachment 1 of the original NRC Interim Report (ML1309/ML13091A388) determined, as anticipated, no safety degradation exists. Based on the results of the evaluation, reportability under 10 CFR Part 21 is not required for this issue. Affected customers will be receiving revised documentation as appropriate.

"The [above] contact information should be utilized regarding any questions."

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Spitzberg) and Part 21 Group (via email).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49091
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRIN GARD
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 06/05/2013
Notification Time: 17:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2013
Event Time: 10:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE INTEGRATED PLANT COMPUTER

"This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 1039 CDT on June 5, 2013, Farley Unit 2 experienced a communication failure of the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC). This represents a loss of Unit 2 automated SPDS and ERDS capability. This also rendered the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional for Unit 2 since the TSC relies on IPC data displays for event assessment.

"The Unit 2 IPC was returned to service at 1115 CDT, restoring all affected emergency response capability. Investigation to determine the cause of the failure is ongoing.

"With the exception of the Unit 2 IPC all systems functioned as required.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, June 06, 2013
Thursday, June 06, 2013