| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/31/2013 - 06/03/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 49031 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK GARCIA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/14/2013
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2013
Event Time: 15:02 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text PLANNED POWER OUTAGE AT TSC AND OSC
"During Refueling Outage 21, at 1502 PDT on 5/14/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility to temporary power during a bus outage impacting the normal facility power supply. The TSC and OSC will be unavailable for use for several hours until temporary power has been established.
"Established compensatory measures direct ERO members normally responding to either of the two impacted centers to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the bus outage.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when temporary power has been established and the facility is available for use."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM SANDRA CHRISTIANSON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1637 EDT ON 5/15/13 * * *
"This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 49031. Temporary power has been established to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. Normal power to TSC and OSC is expected to be restored on or about June 2, 2013 at 0600 PDT and will require a similar removal of power to the facility. A separate notification will be made when swapping off of temporary power."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hay).
* * * UPDATE AT 1735 EDT ON 5/31/2013 FROM SANDRA CHRISTIANSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"On 5/31/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility from temporary power back to the normal facility power supply. The duration of the power outage will last approximately 90 minutes. The TSC and OSC are unavailable for use during this time for support of emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when normal power has been reestablished and the facility is available for use."
Notified the R4DO (Azua).
* * * UPDATE AT 2050 EDT ON 5/31/2013 FROM LISA WILLIAMS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At 1700 hours [PDT] on 5/31/13, normal power has been reestablished to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Azua). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49063 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: KXR INSPECTION INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 01074
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/23/2013
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On May 23, 2013 the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by a licensee that while performing work at a remote site, a radiographer crew was unable to retract a source into a Spec 150 exposure device. The event occurred when a pipe jack fell on the source guide tube and crimped it to where the source connector would not pass through it. The radiographers contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) who responded to the scene. The source was covered with bags of lead shot to reduce the dose rates in the area. The RSO was able to un-crimp the guide tube using a pair of pliers enough to allow the source to be returned to the exposure device. The RSO received 45 millirem for the entire operation. No exposure limits were exceeded. The RSO stated that they disposed of the guide tube."
Texas Incident #: I-9085 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49082 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES PIKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 10:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2013
Event Time: 07:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 40 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO AN ANTICIPATED LOSS OF CONDENSER COOLING
"On May 31, 2013 at 0712 [EDT], Unit 2 [reactor] was manually tripped due to high differential pressure on the debris filter for the 2A1 Condenser Waterbox which required a trip of the 2A1 Circulating Water Pump. The 2A2 Condenser Waterbox and the 2A2 Circulating Water Pump were already removed from service due to a suspected condenser tube leak.
"All CEAs [Control Element Assembly] fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal is from main feedwater and steam bypass to the main condenser. The cause of the rising differential pressure on the 2A1 debris filter was potentially due to an influx of algae.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip."
The reactor trip response is considered uncomplicated and the unit is stable in Mode 3 at normal temperature and pressure. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no impact on Unit 1.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49083 | Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21 - REACTORS ()
| Event Text PART-21 INTERIM REPORT - INCORRECT PRESSURIZER SUPPORT LOADS FOR AP1000
"The deviation being evaluated is an identified inconsistency between the applied design loads for the AP1000 plant pressurizer support columns and embedments and the calculated actual loads. As a result, certified for construction drawings have been delivered to customers of the AP 1000 plant new build projects with an incorrect pressurizer support column embedment design configuration. The planned changes to the embedments to correct this deviation for the pressurizer support columns will be reflected on revised certified for construction drawings but do not require changes to the current licensing basis. The certified for construction drawings have been delivered to U.S. AP1000 plant new build customers, V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3, and A.W. Vogtle Units 3 and 4." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49084 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 09:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 6O-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 2, 2013, Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building area high ambient temperature isolation signal when lifting a lead for trip unit E31-N638B while performing surveillance N2-IPS-LDS-Q010, Reactor Building General Area Temperature Instrumentation Channel Functional Test. The isolation signal provided a closure signal to two Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) valves, and three Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system containment isolation valves.
"As a result of the isolation signal one of the RCIC containment isolation valves, 2ICS*MOV128 closed. The other four valves were already in their normal closed position. The RHR system valves are associated with the RHR Shutdown Cooling System and second RCIC isolation valve is used to warmup and place the RCIC system in standby following an isolated condition. All affected isolation valves responded as designed. As a result of 2ICS*MOV128 closing the RCIC system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.3, RCIC System, Condition A was entered. Action A.1 required verifying the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was operable immediately. Action A.2 requires restoring RCIC to operable within 14 days.
"After the instrumentation system was restored to normal, the RCIC system was subsequently restored to available later that day at 1205 [EDT] and operable at 1500 [EDT].
"The actuation signal was not valid because it resulted from maintenance activities when leads were lifted, and the trip unit had not been bypassed as required by the procedure. There were no isolation logic signals in response to actual plant conditions or parameters.
"This event was entered into the corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2013-002461. There were no actual safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49085 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LIEUTENANT CHRISTOS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 19:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION CONCERNING FLOODING MITIGATION
"On May 31, 2013, during an aggregate review of issues raised during a focused self assessment of external flooding mitigation, it was concluded that the A.6 Acts of Nature procedure may not adequately protect equipment required to maintain safe shutdown from the external probable maximum flood.
"The plant is currently in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown for refueling. MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] is addressing the inadequacies.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition."
Compensatory measures are being prepared including procedure changes, additional barriers, and contingency actions.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49086 | Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM KISNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 06/02/2013
Notification Time: 04:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2013
Event Time: 21:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text VALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"On June 1, 2013 at 2129 [EDT], a valid actuation of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator occurred when power was lost to the 'B' 4160V engineered safeguards bus due to failure of the 'B' Unit 6900 V bus feeder breaker 3104. There were no interruptions of spent fuel pool cooling during this event.
"This event is reportable as an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8).
"This condition has no adverse affect on the public's or employees' health and safety. NRC Region II has been notified." | |