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Event Notification Report for April 30, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/29/2013 - 04/30/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48859 48944 48946 48952 48954 48968 48979 48980 48981

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Agreement State Event Number: 48859
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY
Region: 1
City: WORCHESTER State: MA
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENTINO
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/27/2013
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

DISCOVERY OF TWO RADIOACTIVE GAUGES IN LOCKED STORAGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"[On approximately] 1/16/13, two surface gauges [manufactured in 1961 were] found in locked storage within [a] remote airfield facilities building at Worcester Regional Airport, Worcester, MA. Third-party waste brokers [were] contacted to bid on proper removal. Wipe tests by a third-party waste broker indicate no leakage of radioactive contamination from [the] gauge sources. [The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency) received the information via email] on 3/19/13. The Agency conducted a site visit to confirm device identifications on 3/26/13. A waste brokers' bid [was] accepted [and] packaging and removal [is] scheduled for 4/17/13. Gauges [are being] held in locked storage until removal by [the] waste broker.

"[The] items [are] described as one Nuclear-Chicago Corporation Model P21 Surface Moisture Probe, SN 136, containing 5 mCi Ra-Be, date stamped 5/2/61; and one Nuclear-Chicago Corporation Model P22A Surface Density Probe, SN 139, containing 3 mCi Cs-137, date stamped 5/23/61.

"The Agency considers this matter to be open until [the] items [are] confirmed removed on 4/17/13."

* * * UPDATE FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1132 EDT * * *

"4/19/13 UPDATE - The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this matter to be OPEN until items confirmed removed for disposal.

"Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] regulation 105 CMR 120.281 (A)(1) and USNRC regulation 20.2201 (a)(1)(i) requires 'immediate' telephone reporting of stolen, lost or missing licensed radioactive material in specified quantities under circumstances that it appears an exposure could result to individuals in unrestricted areas. The situation in this case involved 'found' radioactive material, devices already wipe tested to confirm no leakage of radioactive contamination and stored in a 'secure' location to prevent exposure to individuals until such time that scheduled packaging and removal by a waste broker is completed, and therefore, did not warrant immediate notification. This case was determined to be included in the 30-day notification category. The written report to NMED was issued one day after the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] confirmatory site visit of 3/26/13."

NMED Report #: 130149

Notified R1DO (Cook) and FSME Event Resource via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/29/2013 AT 1142 EDT FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"The gauges were removed and shipped for disposal on 4/24/13. The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) considers this matter to be closed."

Notified the R1DO (Hunegs) and FSME Event Resource via email.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 48944
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: 3M HEALTH PHYSICS SERVICES
Region: 3
City: AMES State: IA
County:
License #: 0271185FG
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL S. DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/19/2013
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILURE ON A FIXED GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Iowa via fax:

"On April 18, 2013, the licensee (3M Company - Ames) reported to the Iowa Department of Public Health that a shutter mechanism had failed to close on a fixed gauge at their Ames, Iowa facility. The device is a Thermo EGS Gauging, model ASC-185, serial number KA1527 containing a nominal activity (May 25, 2006) of 1250 millicuries Krypton-85. The licensee's RSO and trained maintenance staff proceeded to troubleshoot the cause of the failure to close. They identified that screws holding the shutter mechanism had become stripped and loose causing the source shutter to not operate properly. The gauge was removed and is now stored in a locked cabinet under the RSO's control. The RSO is currently pursuing the purchase of new screws so that the shutter mechanism can be repaired. Additional corrective actions include a more detailed inspection of the shutter screws during six month inspections."

The sealed source (Krypton-85) is manufactured by Isotope Products Lab, S/N NER-588.

IA Item Number: IA130003

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Agreement State Event Number: 48946
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CORNERSTONE CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: WAGGAMAN State: LA
County:
License #: GL-155
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/19/2013
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON KAY-RAY DENSITY METER

The following was received by the State of Louisiana via fax:

"Louisiana Dept. of Environmental Quality was notified on April 2, 2013, by a written letter from Cornerstone Chemical Company. A Kay-Ray Cs-137 50 mCi (decay corrected to 31 mCi) density meter, model number 7062BP, serial number S93C1706 was removed in order to service a pipe during a turnaround activity. After the device was removed, the shutter was discovered to be stuck in the half closed position and would not completely close. An employee who carried the density meter was calculated to receive a radiation exposure of 1.8 mR total dose. BBP Sales serviced the shutter, reinstalled the density gauge, performed a leak test, and installation survey. Notification was given to all Cornerstone Chemical maintenance planning personnel and supervision in the acid unit to contact the RSO for any activities concerning radiation sources. All activities are to be conducted by licensed contractors.

"The general license registration is in the stages of being modified to a specific license."

State event report number: LA-13-0015

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Agreement State Event Number: 48952
Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: FRONTIER EL DORADO REFINING LLC
Region: 4
City: EL DORADO State: KS
County:
License #: 22-B145-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/22/2013
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2013
Event Time: 01:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

SOURCE JAMS AS IT IS MOVED FROM DRYWELL TO SOURCE HOLDER

The following information was received via facsimile from the State of Kansas:

"We [Frontier El Dorado Refining] attempted to move a source from its drywell, into its source holder. The source seems to be stuck in the drywell. There were no reportable personnel exposures. Because of the position of this source, 2 feet inside a large vessel with 5 [inch] steel walls, it is shielded at least as well as inside its holder.

"The shutter in question is on an Ohmart/VEGA model SHLM-CR3 source holder S/N 19077661, containing 2 Ci of Cs-137 in a model A2102 sealed source S/N 0586CO.

"The source is located at approximately 100 feet above the ground. Operations and maintenance personnel were notified of the issue. A wipe sample was collect to check for gross leakage. None was indicated.

"We [Frontier El Dorado Refining] will contact VEGA Americas (formerly Ohmart/VEGA) to arrange for repairs."

Item Number: KS130004

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Agreement State Event Number: 48954
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC
Region: 4
City: KENT State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR011-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES KILLINGBECK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/22/2013
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2013
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK IN GUIDE TUBE

The following was received from the State of Washington via email:

"Mistras Group, Inc. was conducting industrial radiographic operations at Shell Puget Sound Refinery. After a routine exposure, the radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the camera, but the source became stuck. The source could not make it past a crimp in the guide tube, which was caused earlier when the camera fell on it. The radiography crew moved their restricted area boundaries to increase the size of the restricted area and to provide additional protection to anyone in the area. Fortunately, nobody other than the radiography crew were in that portion of the refinery. The radiography crew and assistant radiation safety officer were able to manually pull the source back into the shielded position in the camera. The highest exposure to any person, as read from a pocket dosimeter, was 10 millirem. Note: This is a preliminary report - we [State of Washington] will obtain additional information from the licensee and provide a more complete report in the near future."

Washington Item Number: WA130001

* * * UPDATE ON 4/29/2013 AT 1931 EDT FROM JAMES KILLINGBECK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"An industrial radiography crew retracted the source, checked to verify that the source was fully retracted and locked, and discovered that it was not. The crew made more attempts to retract the source, but were unsuccessful. They attempted to straighten out the crank assembly, then the radiographic exposure device fell about 46 inches from a pipe onto a platform, after which the drive cable would not move using the crank handle. The restricted area was expanded to the 2 mR/hr line and facility management and the licensee's radiation safety personnel were notified and traveled to the site. The guide tube was moved onto the platform and lead shot bags were placed onto the collimator to provide extra shielding. Licensee radiation safety staff found that the drive cable was hung up in the crank assembly conduit but moved freely in the source tube. So, the staff manually pulled on the drive cable and returned the source to the fully retracted and locked position in the radiographic exposure device. It was discovered that there was a crimp in the crank assembly conduit that kept the drive cable from moving. The highest pocket dosimeter reading was 18 millirem. The radiographic exposure device was sent to the manufacturer for evaluation."

Notified the R4DO (Haire) and FSME Event Resources (via e-mail).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48968
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSH CARROLL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/25/2013
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2013
Event Time: 17:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS DE-ENERGIZED FOR SHORT DURATION DURING PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"On April 25, 2013 at 1759 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support de-energizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors at 1845 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release.

"At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors.

"The NRC Resident inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE AT 0400 EDT ON 4/29/13 FROM BRANNON PAYNE TO S. SANDIN * * *

"On 28 April, 2013, power was again interrupted to the Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors to restore the connection to their normal power supply. The radiation monitors were out of service from 2315 until 2340 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were again implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and minimize potential for vent stack release.

"The reported time for the initial loss of vent stack radiation monitoring on April 25, 2013 was incorrect. The correct time was 1759 CDT.

"The NRC Resident has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Sykes).

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Part 21 Event Number: 48979
Rep Org: SHAW AREVA MOX SERVICES, LLC
Licensee: CB&I LAURENS
Region: 1
City: Aiken State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS YATES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/29/2013
Notification Time: 07:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Event Text

BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

"Kelly D. Trice
President and Chief Operating Officer
Shaw AREVA MOX Services
Savannah River Site
P.O. Box 7097
Aiken, SC 29804-7097

"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect.

- The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is affected by the procurement of Types 304L and 316L SS pipe where some of the delivered pipe contains a defect. An extent of condition was performed based on the initial discovery of a defect in 1/2" (0.109 MW), Type 304L SS pipe. This investigation determined that eight additional heat/size combinations had similar defects including both 304L and 316L pipe as given below.

1/2" (0.109 MW), Type 304L - 5 heats (41789, 44266, 43599, 40900, 41123)
3/4" (0.113 MW), Type 304L - 1 heat (42635)
1-1/2" (0.145 MW), Type 304L - 1 heat (41586)
4" (0.237 MW), Type 304L -1 heat (41880)
3/4" (0.113 MW), Type 316L - 1 heat (44464)

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

- The Type 304L and 316L SS pipe is being supplied to MOX Services as a basic component by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw).

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

- Through independent testing, MOX Services has identified nine heats/sizes of 304L and 316L SS pipe supplied by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) that fail required ASTM A262 testing and cannot be used in their specified application. Test results provided by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) with the pipe indicate that it passes the Practice A test. The pipe was manufactured by Tubacex for CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw), and ASTM A262 Practice A testing was performed by Welding Testing Lab prior to supply of the pipe to MOX services. Both entities have been qualified by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) as approved suppliers.

- Testing of these heat/size combinations of material has been performed by an independent test lab contracted by MOX Services with failing results thus indicating that the pipe is susceptible to intergrannular corrosion if utilized in an environment with electrolytic potential (e.g., nitric acid, oxalic acid). The heats/sizes of SS pipe in question are intended for use where these environments exist for many processes.

- In total, 124 heat/size combinations of Type 304L SS pipe and 64 heat/size combinations of Type 316L supplied by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) were retested to validate original testing results. Eight heats/sizes of Type 304L SS pipe fail both ASTM A262 practice A and C and the one heat/size of Type 316L SS pipe fails ASTM practice A making this pipe unusable for the MOX Project in certain applications.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

- The deviation was initially identified in a test report provided by Savannah River National Laboratory on May 14, 2012.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

- MOX Services does not possess information as to whether other facilities have been supplied a similar basic component by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw).

"(vii) The corrective action, which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

- Corrective actions are being addressed via MOX Services' corrective action program. The major activities associated with this issue include, tagging and segregation of impacted pipe spools, retesting samples for the affected pipe, generating/dispositioning non-conformance reports for heats of pipe that fail the re-test, and investigating the test protocol at both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory. The majority of the samples requiring retest have been retested. Initial nonconformance reports have been generated. Additional nonconformance reports will be generated as retesting is completed and affected heats are mapped to affected pipe spools. Test protocols at both Weld Test Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory have been observed.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

- The following two excerpts are from ASTM A262 and pertain to the advice offered by MOX services.

5.2 The intent is to test a specimen representing as nearly as possible the surface of the material as it will be used in service. Therefore, the preferred sample is a cross section including the surface to be exposed in service. Only such finishing should be performed as is required to remove foreign material and obtain a standard, uniform finish as described in 5.3. For very heavy sections, specimens should be machined to represent the appropriate surface while maintaining reasonable specimen size for convenient testing. Ordinarily, removal of more material than necessary will have little influence on the test results. However, in the special case of surface carburization (sometimes encountered, for instance, in tubing or castings when lubricants or binders containing carbonaceous materials are employed) it may be possible by heavy grinding or machining to completely remove the carburized surface. Such treatment of test specimens is not permissible, except in tests undertaken to demonstrate such effects.

6.2 The etched cross-sectional areas should be thoroughly examined by complete traverse from inside to outside diameters of rods and tubes, from face to face on plates, and across all zones such as weld metal, weld-affected zones, and base plates on specimens containing welds.

- Based on these excerpts, MOX Services offers the following advice.

- Sample preparation is an area that should be carefully controlled in regards to detection of piping with 10 sensitization. Heavy cleaning or deburring in sections of the sample to be tested is proven to impact test results. Follow up surveillance at both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory determined that standard protocol is for samples to be taken from newly cut sections without sanding or deburring.

- Procurement specifications should clearly indicate that micrographs should be done perpendicular to the forming direction, and should be representative of the worst case area of the cross section including the pipe 10 when appropriate. In a number of cases represented herein, only the inner portions of the pipe walls were sensitized to the point of ditching in which case a complete traverse of the cross-sectional area is needed to detect the condition. In a follow up survey of both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory, ASTM A262 practices were reviewed and it was determined in both cases that testing practices and procedures are in compliance with the ASTM standard including a full traverse of the cross-section.

"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

"This is not an early site permit concern."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48980
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY ROSE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/29/2013
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2013
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

"At 0900 EDT on Monday, April 29, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.

"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room, if necessary.

"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1200 EDT on Thursday, May 2, 2013.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48981
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS YURKON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/29/2013
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2013
Event Time: 14:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A FREON LEAK

"Offsite notification to the New York DEC [Department of Environmental Conservation] to report a Freon (R-22) release to the air of 8 lbs. 11 ozs. This release came from the cafeteria kitchen walk-in cooler."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, April 30, 2013
Tuesday, April 30, 2013