| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/28/2013 - 03/29/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48833 | Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: INTERNATIONAL PAPER
Region: 1
City: PINE HILL State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MYRON RILEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/20/2013
Notification Time: 08:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAUGE CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health via facsimile:
"On March 19, 2013, the Environmental Health & Services [representative] for International Paper of Pine Hill, Alabama notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control that they had lost accountability of a fixed gauge. The gauge is a Kay Ray model 7062BP serial 27137, containing 100 mCi of Cs-137.
"During a routine inspection on February 7, 2013, it was noticed by the inspector that the device had been missing since the March 2005 inventory. The inspector requested that [the] Radiation Safety Officer investigate the incident due to several changes within the department and inconsistencies in record keeping. The licensee was issued two violations, one involving the loss of the accountability of radioactive material.
"The [licensee's response to the] notification [of violation] letter included both the response to the violations and a attachment. The attachment was a memorandum dated September 12, 2010, referencing losing the gauge, and indicating the loss had been discussed with the [Alabama of Public Health] Director of Licensing. This was discussed with [Director] and he does not recall this conversation nor could this memorandum be found in any of the [Alabama of Public Health] International Paper files. Due to this, the [Alabama of Public Health] considers the response letter the notification of the device being lost.
"As of today [March 20, 2013], at 7:15 AM CDT, the device containing radioactive material has not been recovered. This incident remains open until further investigation can be completed."
Alabama Incident 13-06
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48836 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: TULSA GAMMA RAY
Region:
City: TULSA State:
County:
License #: OK-17178-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/20/2013
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2013
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"[The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality was] informed of an over-exposure of a radiographer employed by Tulsa Gamma Ray (OK-17178-02). The dose involved is 6700 mR, but it isn't clear if this is the dose from just this exposure or if that is for the year to date. We [Oklahoma] will provide more details as they become available." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48839 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AKRON GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: AKRON State: OH
County:
License #: 02120-78-0000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KARL VONAHN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - Y-90 SIR-SPHERE UNDER DOSE OF 87%
"The licensee notified the Department [Ohio Department of Health] on March 20, 2013 of a medical event that occurred on March 19, 2013 involving a Y-90 SIR-Sphere patient treatment. The delivery system became clogged and delivered only 3.2 mCi (13%) of the 24.3 mCi prescribed activity. The cause of the event is under investigation. The licensee plans on retreating the patient."
Ohio Item Number: OH130002
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 48841 | Rep Org: EI DUPONT DE NEMOURS, PENCADER SITE
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: NEWARK State: DE
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHIRLEY STEWART
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 03/21/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
EI DuPont de Nemours and Company Inc.(DuPont) during a routine periodic audit identified that one tritium exit sign was missing from a doorway at their Pencader Site. It is believed that the sign was misplaced during recent remodeling/construction in the area.
A thorough search has been conducted by both the demolition vendor and DuPont and the sign is presumed lost. The missing sign was a Betalux E-Series, Model 171, Serial Number C090859 with a manufacture date of 7/2012. There was 21.6 curies of tritium gas in the sign at the date of manufacture.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48847 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/24/2013
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2013
Event Time: 23:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text SWITCHGEAR ROOM DEGRADED FLOOD SEALS
"On 3/23/13 it was identified that a conduit flood seal between an outside manhole and the switchgear rooms is displaced. This degraded flood seal compromises the flooding design of both the East and West Switchgear Rooms.
"Compensatory measures were implemented for the flood seal in accordance with the plants barrier control process. Repairs of the seal are in progress."
Per the licensee these switchgear rooms contain both normal and safety related 4kV and 480 V electrical boards. Compensatory measures implemented include: Plant Maintenance personnel will take actions to seal any leak within 24 hours of a flooding event and also provide sump pumps to remove any water that has leaked in.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Vermont State Liaison.
* * * UPDATE AT 2000 EDT ON 03/28/13 FROM BOB VITA TO S. SANDIN * * *
"This is an update to NRC Event No. 48847 reported on 3/24/13 at 1316 [EDT].
"On 3/27/2013 the extent of condition review identified two additional possible water intrusion paths from the outside to the switchgear rooms.
"Compensatory measures were implemented for these paths in accordance with plant procedures. Efforts to seal these paths are in progress."
This is an on-going extent of condition assessment.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector and the Vermont State Liaison. Notified R1DO (Krohn). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48860 | Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JON FORD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2013
Event Time: 22:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ONE EMERGENCY WARNING SIREN ENERGIZED FOR A SHORT TIME
"At 2245 [EDT] on 3/27/2013, Surry Power Station (SPS) Operations Department received a report from Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (VEOC) that a concerned citizen had called James City County (JCC) law enforcement to report that an Early Warning System (EWS) siren, #62 in James City County NW side of Route 682, was sounding. VEOC reported JCC police received call at 2240 [EDT] from a concerned citizen that an EWS siren was sounding. SPS Security contacted JCC police and subsequently reported that JCC police responded approximately 10 minutes later to the site of the siren, but the siren was no longer sounding. Maintenance will investigate in the morning. All plant conditions/parameters are normal, and no releases to the environment have occurred.
"The site NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
"This notification is being transmitted due to notification of other Government Agencies in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee also notified the state and local governments. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48861 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: BRYAN EAGAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2013
Event Time: 08:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Generating Station has removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately fourteen hours and will return to service at approximately 2200 [EDT] March 28, 2013.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48862 | Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR
Licensee: ATC NUCLEAR
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. A. CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NRR PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text INTERIM PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING REVIEW OF SEISMIC TESTING METHODOLOGY
The following information was received via fax:
"ATC Nuclear in Oak Ridge, TN is making an initial notification of a Potential Part 21 Defect in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).
"A recent review performed January 21, 2013 of seismic Test Response Spectra (TRS) for seismic qualification activities identified that Required Response Spectra (RRS) may not have been completely enveloped for portions of the required frequency range during test performance of the Operational Basis Events (OBE's) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake(s) (SSEs) for some customers. Specifically, some TRS results may have been below the provided RRS in the 10-25 Hz range in certain circumstances and thus not fully meeting the RRS and required acceptance criteria of IEEE 344 1975/1987/2004. The condition is the result of the instrumentation methodology and inherent tri-axial table characteristics where vibrational energy is not fully transmitted to the unit under test in all test conditions. The safety significance is that the Basic Component may not perform its intended safety function during or following a seismic event exceeding the as-tested vibration frequencies. ATC has demonstrated through actual testing to date that this probability is very low. Many customers provide RRS that include conservatism; however, this also has not been credited in the ATC Nuclear evaluation methodology discussed below. The affected customers, purchase orders, and relevant information have been provided as Attachment 1 [not attached to this report - customers notified were XCEL Energy, Bechtel Power Corporation, TVA for Watts Bar 2 (Projected Operation 12/2015) and Preferred Metal Technologies, Inc.] to this interim notification.
"ATC Nuclear developed a systematic evaluation methodology which has been independently corroborated by industry experts to evaluate the seismic tri-axial test programs of concern conducted by ATC Nuclear. The systematic evaluation involves review of the TRS to determine if adequate test margin exists within the test data when compared to the RRS, evaluation of the table test acceleration versus fixture acceleration as necessary, and when required, retesting of the component. For all program reviews completed to date (~70% of all programs) for operating licensees, all re-evaluation and re-testing has resulted in no reduction in seismic withstand capabilities and no failures. The evaluation included prioritization of operating reactors early in the process to the extent possible to ensure minimal impact to those facilities.
"Based on the successful completion of evaluations to date, ATC Nuclear is confident this issue will be resolved through the methodology established and worst-case may result in the submittal of an addenda to existing qualification reports in situations where retesting has been required for a basic component.
"ATC Nuclear will need until May 15, 2013 to conclude the evaluation process. Should, during any re-testing, a condition arise warranting notification, that notification will be immediately made at the time of discovery to the affected customer. All orders since the point of discovery have been addressed through corrective actions to prevent recurrence and are unaffected.
"The below contact information should be utilized regarding any questions.
R.A. Chalifoux
Vice-President QA, ATC Nuclear
Tel: (865) 384-0124
email: rchalifoux@argoturbo.com" |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48863 | Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.
Licensee: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.)
Region: 4
City: NEBRASKA CITY State: NE
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN F. BROSEMER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2013
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS
Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.
The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.
Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48865 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAD BARE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2013
Event Time: 17:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF OPERABILITY FOR STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK
"Information Notice IN 2012-01 on seismic qualification of Standby Liquid Control (SLC) tanks was evaluated in 2012 to assess immediate operability of the SLC system based on SLC Test Tank and Mixing Tank not being qualified to Seismic Class 1S. Based on calculation NEDC 12-015 in response to IN 2012-01, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS concluded that SLC was still operable with the test tank full. Long-term actions from the 2012 condition were completed by issuance of calculation NEDC 13-010 and evaluation EE 13-009. NEDC 13-010 concludes that the SLC storage tank is qualified when full and the test tank and mixing tank are qualified when empty.
"No procedure step existed in the SLC surveillances to ensure the test tank is drained prior to restoration of SLC to an operable status to ensure it remained fully qualified to its NEDC 13-010 design. Further, no Caution Order or Standing Order existed to ensure short-term control until a procedure change could be implemented. So, as a short-term action, CNS implemented a Standing Order to establish positive control of the test tank. The Standing Order directs that SLC be declared INOPERABLE if the Test Tank is filled.
"Initially, this was thought to be a conservative measure only, because CNS judged that reasonable assurance of OPERABILITY remained due to conservative assumptions in NEDC 13-010. However, on 3/19/13 at 2146 CDT, the Prompt Operability Determination was changed to credit the Standing Order as a compensatory measure needed to maintain or enhance OPERABILITY of SLC. Therefore, CNS had lost reasonable assurance of OPERABLITY as of 03/13/2013 at 1726 CDT when the Control Room was notified that NEDC 13-010 concluded the test tank and mixing tank had to be empty to preserve the required seismic qualification, and an 8-hour report should have been made prior to 0126 CDT on 03/14/2013.
"Currently the SLC Test Tank is drained and SLC is OPERABLE."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |